A Starshell Book Review by Rowland Marshall-
The Halifax Explosion and the Royal Canadian Navy: Inquiry and Intrigue

The complete title indicates clearly the focus of Armstrong's research. Readers may recall read-ing, in school possibly, Hugh MacLennan's novel, "Barometer Rising" (1941), and as a result of a visit to Halifax perhaps, Janet Kitz's "Shattered City: The Halifax Explosion and the Road to Recovery" (1989). Both books help one to appreciate the extent of the devastation to the city and its people. Armstrong however, directs attention to the roles of the RCN in the control of operations in and near Halifax harbour, particularly during the critical days prior to and after the December 6, 1917 explosion of the munitions ship Mont Blanc.

He then closely follows the official inquiry and the subsequent criminal trials of a small number of individuals who had drawn the most public blame. He has researched his subject thoroughly; facts and individual statements have been meticulously supported by documentation. His conclusions are balanced and fair to the key figures involved, but they also provide some needed historical corrections to biased journalism, to some incorrect reporting, to some protective political spin, at local and national levels, as well as to long lived myths. Furthermore, he details what happened to some of the service and civilian personnel working in the dockyard, including the Royal Naval College of Canada, and in naval and merchant ships near the explosion centre. There were Canadian, British and American warships present in the harbour, and Allied and neutral shipping.

Armstrong begins with the war setting for the city and our small, and rather new, navy. He next narrows his focus to ships in the harbour, ship movements, actions of some key people, and the crucial sequence of events chiefly involving the Belgian relief ship Imo and the munitions ship Mont Blanc which results in collision. The subsequent fire in Mont Blanc quickly leads to the rapid departure of its crew, pilot and captain, who pull for the Dartmouth side in the ship's lifeboats.

The Canadian Navy chartered tug Stella Maris, captained by Horatio Brannen, was the first to respond and began pumping water into the fire. Capt. H. N. Garnett, of the British cruiser Highflyer, sent a whaler with his Executive Officer, Cdr. T. K. Triggs, in charge. The captain of the depot ship Niobe, A/Cdr. P. F. Newcombe, sent the ship's steam pinnace with volunteer, Acting Boatswain Albert Mattison in charge, while Carpenter R. O. Burnett rushed to the scene in a car, for Mont Blanc was near the shore within view from Niobe. Cdr. Triggs directed the tug captain to try to pull the burning ship away from the shore. The first attempt failed to move the ship; Brannen then decided, with Triggs' agreement, to use a hawser double the thickness. Triggs then headed his whaler toward the Imo to determine her situation. Meanwhile, CD73, a Canadian Navy "drifter," one of the new, quite small patrol vessels built in the Great Lakes, had been moving nearby when these events were occurring. She was at this time off the dry-dock. Mate H. Whitehead RNVCR, took note of three distinct but "minor" explosions which appeared to come from the fore hatch of Mont Blanc. Meanwhile, interim Dockyard Superintendent, Capt. Fred Pasco, alerted to the accident, was trying to order up water transport for himself, at the same time observing the burning ship from Capt. Edward Martin's house, he being away on a duty mission to the UK. Cdr. Frederick Wyatt, Chief Examining Officer, having been alerted by one of his assistants as he entered North Gate, had rushed to the coaling wharf south of Niobe to take out the motorboat W. H. Lee in order to investigate the situation. She was on the other side of the slip, so he waited for the boat to come over. The second hand was moving 'round toward 09:04:35 Atlantic Standard Time. This chapter ends moments before the horrendous explosion, which is described in the next chapter.

Much of the dockyard was flattened, including the communication centre; the nearby sugar refinery was demolished, as well as north end railway structures. Most of the ships in the vicinity suffered degrees of damage. Some were adrift and others aground. Needless to say, the Canadian sailors aboard Mont Blanc and in the tug fighting the fire, were casualties. (The press mis-identified these casualties as Royal Navy.)

Because many of the Imo crew had been on deck watching the developing fire on Mont Blanc, but unaware of its deadly cargo, they suffered heavy casualties including the captain and pilot, as the ship was driven onto the Dartmouth shore by the force of the explosion.

Navy personnel from Canadian, British and American warships helped casualties and addressed damage on their own and other ships then in the dockyard and in the badly hit community nearby. With Capt. Pasco partly incapacitated, A/Capt. Walter Hose, the Captain of Patrols, jumped into the breach, working with others to bring back the dockyard and harbour operations into full wartime function. RAdm. Bertram Chambers RN, Port Convoy Officer and Senior Officer of Escorts, Halifax, backed Pasco and Hose in any way he could.

In terms of political intrigue, backroom and courtroom drama, Armstrong does an excellent job in the remaining chapters to reveal the subtle nuances involved in the actions and words of important people responding to public pressure, protecting interests of people and institutions, while helping to maintain the effectiveness of the war effort. The reader will be taken up with the dynamics involved.

Soon after the great explosion, some people began asking why the Imo had been allowed to depart Bedford Basin about the same time the Mont Blanc had been directed to proceed into the inner harbour.

The truth was the Pilotage Commission was quite independent, and its personnel failed to regularly report their ship movements as they were required to do. Cdr. Wyatt had complained to Capt. Edward Martin, the Senior Naval Officer (Canadian) on the East Coast, about the lack of this needed cooperation on several occasions, but the problem was not forcefully taken up by Martin. Nor was Martin ever called to explain his lack of action. (It seems Martin received communication from Ottawa indicating a political reluctance to interfere with the Pilotage Commission and the patronage connected with it.)

This lack of positive control was recognized by the clearer thinking legal and even political minds, as the weak link. For sometime it had been recognized that Halifax pilotage needed to be brought under federal regulation. There was hope that the inquiry would lead to such change. In any case, Mont Blanc's captain and pilot, as well as Wyatt, were allotted much of the blame. (The death of the captain and pilot of Imo helped to deflect Imo's share of blame.)

Conservative Senator William Dennis and his Halifax Herald, continued to lay it into the Canadian Navy and helped heat up the emotional climate natural to the disaster. Criminal charges followed: the captain and pilot were acquitted, then Wyatt the same, but he was soon out of the navy.

Because it was thought beyond Canadian jurisdiction, issues like why the French loaded explosive cargo in such a dangerous way, and why the British shipping controllers sent Mont Blanc loaded as she was to Halifax, were not examined during the inquiry.

Admiral Charles E. Kingsmill, Director of the Naval Service, kept Martin out of the light as much as he could, and subsequently sent him to the West Coast. Martin's memory seemed to fail when Wyatt needed it, and back in Ottawa he managed to send some confirmation of Wyatt's defence too late to be included.