Running the Navy

Participants in the Conference: L to R (Standing): Charles Westropp, Fred Crickard, Hugh McNeill, Nigel Brodeur, Bob Timbrell, Chuck Thomas, Bruce Oland, Glenn Davidson, Bob Stevens, Harry Porter, Andy Fulton, Mike Cooper, Bob George, and Colin Curleigh. L to R (Seated): John Anderson and Bob Falls.

Held at the Maritime Warfare Centre in Halifax between 26-27 September, 2002, the 6th MARCOM Historical Conference brought together an impressive array of senior officers and historians to discuss the history of the Canadian Navy's senior chiefs. Following opening remarks by the Chief of the Maritime Staff, VAdm. R. Buck, nine historians addressed the careers of twelve admirals. As one panel chair remarked, the second group of speakers added an invaluable "Salty Dips" element to the conference as the attendees were treated to the personal accounts of six retired admirals. The two strands of historical interpretation and first hand testimonials were then woven together in Dr. Jack Granatstein's closing remarks. For those who could not attend, the following represents a summary of the papers covering the period between 1910 and 1966.

Richard Gimblett's paper on Adm. Sir Charles Kingsmill portrayed a proud but private man whose legacy was to create both the operational and administrative framework that established the navy as a national institution. Although his service in the Royal Navy was somewhat unspectacular, the Canadian-born Kingsmill was an able administrator, and as such, was well suited to guide the embryonic naval service through its teething years. Balancing Dominion autonomy against effective command and control arrangements with the Admiralty, Kingsmill helped the RCN take its first steps and deserves recognition as the "Father of the Royal Canadian Navy."

Bill Glover's characterization of RAdm. Walter Hose showed he was also an "ordinary" RN officer who managed to keep the "extraordinary endeavour" of an independent service alive. Continually frustrated by governmental policies and budget cuts, Hose ensured that the navy survived as a national institution, while at the same time developing its naval policy and maintaining its administration. Remaining steadfast in his dealings with his political masters, Hose had "articulated … clear vision of a future navy," and left the service "healthier than the one he inherited."

While "lucky" that his predecessor had bequeathed "a well-conceived program," Roger Sarty found that VAdm. P. W. Nelles also made a significant contribution to the RCN. His vision centred on a desire for the government to create a vibrant naval shipbuilding industry that could eventually sustain a balanced fleet. During the Second World War, Nelles' leadership ensured that this aim was met, which also developed "the RCN as a national service vis-à-vis the Royal Navy." As Sarty concludes therefore, it was unfortunate that Nelles "lost his position as a result of shortcomings of Canadian industry when one of his first acts … had been to alert the government to urgent shipbuilding needs."

Marc Milner's presentation focused on RAdm. L. W. Murray, who he called the RCN's "most important operational commander." Aside from his adversarial relationship with George C. Jones, and the fact that Nelles "had little faith in" him, Murray's attention was rarely diverted from his main task of operating the RCN's forces in the Atlantic during WWII. Characterizing the admiral as neither a "driver" nor "strict disciplinarian," Milner argued that Murray's real strength was his administrative skill and "sea-smarts."

Richard Mayne addressed the controversial career of VAdm. Jones. An extremely capable officer, and a particularly talented administrator, Jones' flaw was his personal ambition. Competitive with Murray and "whittling away at Nelles' political base of support," Jones was determined to reach the top. Once he became Chief of the Naval Staff (CNS) however, Jones was a strong advocate for the RCN, but having concentrated too much power into his office, the navy's administration eventually grounded to a halt. In Mayne's conclusion, it was "unfortunate that an admiral with such grand plans for the postwar service had over-extended his reach, and by doing so set the navy on a rudderless course that would not be adjusted until his predecessor re-established the Naval Board's bearing."

Wilf Lund stated that VAdm. H. E. Reid was confounded by the challenge of transforming the navy from a war to peacetime footing. Frustrated by cutbacks that made life in the navy difficult, Reid became the sailor's "champion" and was willing to take their plight to the public. But the fact that Reid had been "brought into a job he didn't want," reflected in a lack of direction at NSHQ, and he was more than willing to step aside once VAdm. H. T. W. Grant was ready to take the reins.

Lund's description of Grant clearly indicates that he was exactly what the RCN needed. Personable and energetic, Grant focused on quality of life issues, adopting anti-submarine warfare as the RCN's raison de'être, and making the naval headquarters "more businesslike," which collectively provided a firm course to a navy that had been sailing in circles. Moreover, by constantly advancing new technology, winning approval for new warships and finding a role for naval aviation, Lund asserted that Grant was the "Father of the Postwar RCN."

Lund also presented a paper on VAdm. Rollo Mainguy who was perhaps the most controversial of the CNSs. As Lund noted, Mainguy was a "sailors' admiral, happy at sea but fretful ashore." Besides being an outstanding commanding officer, he gained a reputation as the chief advocate for improved conditions of service. In fact, Mainguy is most remembered as chairman of the commission struck to investigate the "incidents" in the fleet in 1949. While his authorship was minimal, the "Mainguy Report" is purported to be the "Magna Carta" establishing Canadian naval identity. Mainguy became CNS in 1951, but lacked a vocation and, as Lund argued, his disinterest in the appointment resulted in an ineffective administration that led to his being retired early by the Minister in 1955.

In contrast, H. G. DeWolf provides a better example of a CNS who, as Michael Whitby demonstrated, was able to adapt to the radical technological changes in naval warfare through a combination of a sensible outlook, streamlined management tactics, a cautious force generation policy and his firm control. With a hard-earned reputation as Canada's finest ship driver, DeWolf's greatest legacy as CNS was "his success in tightening up and professionalizing fiscal management within the service." Although DeWolf explored the possibility of acquiring nuclear powered submarines and a second aircraft carrier, he was also a "practical navalist;" cutting where necessary so that his cost-conscious political masters would accept the ships the RCN truly needed. As a result of his realistic ideology, DeWolf left the navy "in better shape than he found it."

Peter Haydon's presentation of VAdm. H. S. Rayner, addressed an "enormously competent" and professional man who unfortunately, was unable to cope with the changing needs of the navy in the face of excessive political adversity. Constantly at odds with his new political master's desire to integrate and then unify the three services, Rayner found it difficult to focus on the navy's problems. Politically naïve, he failed to tame the headstrong Paul Hellyer and so retired in 1964, leaving the fate of the navy to VAdm. K. L. Dyer. Likewise, Dyer was a man of "high principles" and he too resigned in protest, finding that Hellyer was disinterested in a realistic fleet structure plan.

However, Bob Caldwell illustrated that the man most identified with leading the resistance to unification was RAdm. W. M. Landymore. In charge of the East Coast fleet, Landymore took the question of unification to the Canadian public. Always concerned with the morale of the fleet, Landymore challenged Hellyer's de facto gag order by encouraging naval personnel to openly express their views. No longer discussed behind the closed doors of the minister's office, Landymore's efforts were largely responsible for making unification national news. Forced into resignation, Landymore's greatest legacy according to Caldwell, was that "he caused the public to confront choices for maritime security, and to think about them. This was new, and lasting."

The presentations by the six former MARCOM commanders - Admirals Porter, Timbrell, Fulton, Thomas, George and Anderson - were articulate, extremely informative and collectively represent a "must read" to those interested in Canada's postwar naval history. These presentations will be available in the published version of the Conference's proceedings. Moreover, there were a number of interesting issues raised in the question period. Brevity precludes a detailed synopsis, but some highlights include the question of when the navy became a truly Canadian institution; the importance and value of the naval reserves, as well as whether the RCN as a whole, disagreed with unification.

In his concluding remarks, Jack Granatstein emphasized that the navy's chiefs have in general, reflected favourably on the service. As with all branches he noted, the navy has had to contend with a historical paradigm of fluctuating rearmament and retrenchment. The same pattern is evident today, as the Canadian Forces is once again being stretched to the breaking point. In this regard Granatstein feels that the current strategic situation not only requires Canada's maritime assets be directed at homeland defence, but also that the forces should get the resources to perform such a task.

Clearly, much was learned at a conference that represented the most comprehensive synopsis of Canada's naval leaders to date.

Compliments to staff at MARLANT, the CF Maritime Warfare Centre and the Directorate of History and Heritage for putting on such an informative conference.