Leadership and Morale in the Navy: A Personal View

Fred W. Crickard, Past President, NOAC

"Changes in force structure will not occur quickly; however, for reasons that go beyond the simple one of decades-long ship lives. More permanently perhaps than the steel of ships are their institutional souls, and history shows that organizational beliefs are not easily changed."

Richard Heggman

The institutional soul of the Canadian Navy is "blue-water". Since the founding of the Royal Canadian Navy by the Naval Service Act of 1910, the type of Navy that Canada developed and maintained is the outcome of an officer corps educated and trained in the Anglo-American maritime tradition of naval mastery, that is, an ocean-going fleet capable of fighting alongside major maritime powers in war. Nevertheless, Canada's maritime forces today also meet the national need to protect its offshore estate while sharing, with the United States, in the seaward defence of the continent. Overseas the Canadian Navy is an important diplomatic instrument of foreign policy. Yet ultimately, it has been built, educated and trained to fight alongside the USN and other naval powers in major conflicts on the world's seas.

Any examination of leadership and morale in the Canadian Forces should keep this body of beliefs in mind. The Canadian Forces is an organizational concept. The individual services are unique institutions bound by shared history and experience. To most career officers and non-commissioned officers, their individual service is a way of life -- still.

By virtue of the nature of the naval service, history and tradition, the Navy is the most cohesive of the three services, the Army the least and the Air Force somewhere in between. To be sure, there are tensions within Canada's maritime forces -- between the communities (surface, submarine, maritime air), between regular and reserves, between East and West Coasts and within the rank structure (junior sailors, chief and petty officers, junior officers and senior officers). These have always existed but, today they are being managed within the institution better than at any time in the past 50 years.

Leadership in the Navy

Sixty percent of Maritime Command's people from all three service elements serve at sea. This is where leadership matters the most. About 33 percent of sea-days are spent on overseas and national contingency operations or patrols representing Canada or enforcing Canadian laws and regulations in our coastal zones. The standard of Commanding Officers and Formation Commanders is high. For example, Commodore (then Captain(N)) Miller, as Commander of the Combat Logistics Force in the Gulf Crisis and War, was the only non-USN officer to be chosen to command an allied naval formation. Commodore Greg Maddison, as Commander Standing Naval Force Atlantic, was selected by NATO's CINCSOUTH to conduct maritime interdiction (blockade) operations off the coast of Montenegro in the Adriatic - the most dangerous sector from possible attack by missiles, submarines and aircraft from the Former Republic of Yugoslavia. Commodore (then Captain (N) ) Art Vey, Task Group Commander off Haiti, was the only non- American asked to return to command the UN Task Group over British, French, Dutch or Argentinean naval commanders. Competence is assumed and is usually forthcoming.

Except for submarines and shipborne helicopters, the Canadian Navy today is a modern, two-tier, ocean-going and coastal naval fleet, due in no small measure to the far-sighted leadership, vision and staff (bureaucratic) skills of senior naval officers working in National Defence Headquarters since 1976, the start of the Defence Services Program which produced today's fleet. The sailors expect their officers to produce the tools to do the job. Although not within the Navy's exclusive powers to accomplish, the new fleet has been delivered. As for pay, rents, promotions, and down-sizing -- although not within the Navy's senior leadership to fix unaided -- the sailors will look to their officers to do something nevertheless.

Morale

In the Navy today morale has been described as "good but fragile". There is no question that the sailors are proud of what they are doing and consider it worthwhile.

Except for submariners and fleet helicopter airmen and women they are motivated by new ships and equipment, although the submariners and helicopter air and flight deck crews, for the time being, take a perverse pride in keeping old gear operational and safe. The naval reserves are happy with their coastal role and the new coastal defence vessels. In the past 12 years, Maritime Forces Pacific has gone from a training fleet (the West Coast Yacht Club) to a modern operational fleet, home to the Pacific Task Group.

The personnel structural dissatisfiers -- the pay freezes, PMQ rents (particularly on the West Coast where local rents are beyond reach of most junior sailors), promotion slow-downs, force reductions and job security affect sailors like the rest of the Canadian Forces personnel.

The Somalia affair and the intense and largely condemnatory media coverage is having far-reaching effects on morale and discipline especially that of junior sailors and young officers. Somalia, harassment awareness and running scared of adverse media comment (the Globe and Mail test) are three sources of concern which could, over time, develop into a chronic aversion by the senior leadership to maintain discipline or take risks -- whereas taking calculated risks is what military judgement is all about.

The media bombardment is slowly wearing down even well- motivated and largely content sailors. If you are told your morale is bad often enough you might end up believing it. A proactive approach by DND to pass the good news about the Forces is needed soon. The forthcoming hearings by the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs on personnel services and the "quality of life" of service personnel is another opportunity to clear the air if competent and concerned people come forward.

All will be for nought without political courage and leadership by the Government of Canada. If the Government will not act in support of its armed forces, no one else without the power to change things can do very much. Ultimately however the senior officers and chief and petty officers must keep their nerve, "take the pain", muster the moral courage to do the right thing and tough out the media bias largely confined to the Toronto-Ottawa-Montreal axis. Regional media and mail from the kids across Canada to servicemen and women serving overseas tell a different story.