Submarines for Canada - Strategic Implications

Rear-Admiral F.W. CRICKARD, RCN (Retd)
Past President - The Naval Officers' Association of Canada

As the end of 1997 approaches, the Canadian government has yet to make a decision whether or not to replace Canada's 33 year old submarine fleet consisting of three Oberon-class, conventionally-powered submarines and a decommissioned training boat. This, in spite of the fact that the Upholder-class of four British attack submarines meets the criteria laid down by the Special Joint Committee on Canada's Defence Policy in 1994 which stated:

If it should prove possible, in the current environment of military down-sizing around the world, to acquire 3-6 modern diesel-electric submarines on a basis that was demonstrably cost-effective (i.e., that could be managed within the existing capital budget), then the government should seriously consider such an initiative.{1}

By any reasonable standard, the Upholder deal is unmatched. It comes at the cost of no "new money". The $800 million price tag over eight years comes from leasing arrangements, training facility trade-offs and the Navy's maritime defence funding envelope. It does not take money away from the Army or Air Force, much less the government's social programmes or funds set aside for deficit reduction.

Recognition of the need for submarines for Canada has been given by successive federal governments, parliament, academia and the public for at least the last 15 years. In 1983 the Senate Sub-Committee on Defence recommended that Canada acquire 17 coastal-type submarines to replace the Oberons. In 1987 the Conservative government's Defence White Paper announced plans to acquire 10 to 12 nuclear-powered submarines which were subsequently cancelled in the 1989 budget. The 1992 defence policy statement called for six conventional submarines to replace the Oberons. In 1994, the new Liberal government declared that the Upholder option, of four conventionally-powered attack submarines, would be "explored". Since then the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs has recommended their acquisition (1996). In February 1997 a public opinion poll showed over 60 percent of those polled were in favour of replacing Canada's Oberons with newer submarines. In March 1997 four nationally recognized scholars (historians and a political scientist), in their separate reports to the Minister of National Defence on the future of the Canadian Forces, recommended submarines for Canada. Both the current Minister of National Defence and his predecessors have indicated that a decision will be made by the end of 1997.

Submarines and Defence Policy

The government's defence policy is clearly described in the 1994 Defence White Paper which was developed in harmony with the Foreign Policy Review and statement.{2} Three defence roles are prescribed for Canada:

• The Protection of Canada, including - "the capability to monitor and control activity within Canada's territory, airspace and maritime areas of jurisdiction";
• Canada-United States Defence Cooperation including "...surveillance and control of ocean areas on both coasts and in the Arctic"; and
• Contributing to International Security including participating in multilateral operations anywhere in the world by providing, along with Army and Air Force elements, a naval task group of four combatants, a support ship and appropriate maritime air support.

With regard to Canada's military force posture, the White Paper states that the retention of multi-purpose, combat capable forces through the maintenance of core military capabilities is the only way "Canada will be able to attend to its own security needs".

Since 1994 the Navy and the Department of National Defence has described and explained for public consumption the naval force posture, including the submarines and maritime air forces, that it requires to carry out the government's policy. The case for submarines has been clearly and comprehensively made to the media, in journals, in letters and presentations to defence interest groups and in public documents on maritime forces and naval strategy into the 21st century.{3}

There is very little that I can add that has not already been said by people who are better qualified on the subject of why Canada needs to retain a submarine force. What I can do however is provide a perspective on the arguments. The remainder of this article posits the case for submarines in the context of Canada's three defence roles; i.e., the protection of Canada - Maritime Sovereignty; Canada-US defence cooperation - The Maritime Defence of North America; and contributing to international security - Regional Contingencies. The aim of this approach is to show clearly why submarines are a "core military capability" for Canada which must be retained.

Information on the characteristics of the British Upholder-class attack submarine has been distributed widely. The Upholder submarine is a modern, ocean-going, conventionally-powered, diesel-electric submarine which meets Canada's essential operational requirements. It is very quiet, capable of carrying the modern MK48 torpedo and has the potential for operations under ice when fitted with some type of Air-Independent Propulsion system (AIP). It is two generations ahead of the Oberons in machinery and quietening (stealth technology) and a generation ahead in combat systems. It has the endurance and range to operate anywhere in Canada's Atlantic and Pacific Oceans approaches and coastal zones and along the Arctic ice-edge. It has the range to deploy to European waters and the Mediterranean and return without refuelling, or a one way trip to East Asian waters without refuelling. In other words it has the "legs" to engage in all three of Canada's defence roles.

Maritime Sovereignty

Since the 1970s Canada's oceans policy and naval strategy have evolved on parallel tracks. However since the end of the Cold War they are converging at the policy level as well as operationally on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts.{4}

A comprehensive Oceans Policy is emerging spurred on by the coming into force of the Law of the Sea Convention on 1 November 1995 and the declaration of Canada's Oceans Act in January 1997. An Oceans Strategy for Canada's three oceans is under development to come into effect in the year 2000. With the lead of the federal Department of Fisheries and Oceans, the Oceans Strategy will include a maritime security and enforcement dimension in which Canada's maritime forces and the Department of National Defence will be needed. Meanwhile, on the waterfront, the Navy and other government agencies are developing joint doctrine and have been conducting training, exercises and routine operations on maritime enforcement since the early 1990s.

The Navy has re-vamped its strategy since the end of the Cold War. At the operational level the Navy, including maritime air forces, has adopted the strategy of deterrence through sea control manifested in a force posture of a "blue water" Canadian Task Group in the Atlantic and the Pacific and a second tier coastal fleet centred around the new Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels. This "two and a bit" ocean navy can maintain surveillance and control of marine activity above, on and below the seas in focal areas in the Atlantic and Pacific. The capability to monitor maritime activity in the Canadian Arctic is marginal and declining. The Canadian Task Group can also provide a sea control and limited sea lift capability to multinational naval operations overseas under NATO, or coalition expeditionary deployments under UN or regional auspices.

To back up the sea control strategy the Navy has developed a concept of operations of surveillance, patrol and response above, on and below the seas. Submarines are a critical component of this doctrine. A comparison of the coverage provided by ships, submarines and maritime patrol aircraft is instructive. Acknowledging sea conditions and other meteorological and oceanographic variables, the comparative order of magnitude of area covered and on-station time is as follows:

The submarine is not only a key surveillance platform, it can also, alone or on patrol with maritime aircraft, detect and identify surface ships and other submarines over an area one-third the size of Newfoundland.{5}

Turning to response, by the end of the Cold War Oberon-class submarines were routinely deployed on patrol in the Atlantic against Soviet vessels of interest thereby gaining access to intelligence of US naval submarine operations in Canadian waters. Since 1990 the Oberons have been used on sovereignty patrols in support of fisheries and the RCMP. HMCS Ojibwa's patrol on Georges Bank in 1993 and HMCS Okanagan's patrol on the Grand Banks in 1994 were very successful while the deterrent value of a submarine presence during the Turbot dispute with Spain and the European Union in 1995 was a decided advantage for Canadian diplomacy. In 1993, off the coast of Nova Scotia, HMCS Ojibwa's unmatched covert surveillance capabilities enabled her to play an essential role in one of the largest drug busts in Canadian history.

The acquisition of four Upholder-class submarines will complete the balance of the Fleet between the Atlantic and the Pacific by providing for a submarine to be based permanently in the Pacific for the first time since the late 1960s. The disposition between both coasts will even out with 14 major war vessels (including three submarines) based in the Atlantic and nine based in the Pacific. Each coast will also be assigned six Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels.

The strategic leverage from basing submarines on both coasts has been explained elsewhere. I would make one point, however, that is often overlooked. By stationing a Canadian Task Group of two to three surface warships and a support ship and submarines on both coasts, it can be sailed out-of-area in the Atlantic or the Pacific for up to six months leaving sufficient maritime forces in home waters to respond to a contingency such as the Turbot fisheries crisis in 1995. Submarines, along with maritime patrol aircraft and high readiness vessels left in Canadian waters could handle local incidents. Without a submarine, it is unlikely that the Navy could deploy out-of-area, in support of the UN for example, and deal with a prolonged contingency in home waters on each coast at the same time.

In summing up the importance of submarines in carrying out the maritime burden of the protection of the Canada "role", their demise would constitute a significant reduction in our ability to enforce the new Oceans Strategy and would reduce, if not eliminate, the Navy's and Canada's capability to respond simultaneously to a crisis overseas and in home waters.

The Maritime Defence of North America

Contributing to the defence of North America with the United States is the one defence commitment Canada must not forsake. On the one hand, Canada has been attacked directly or threatened by submarines five times in this century. On the other, just as the defence of North America was essential for central deterrence during the Cold War, so is it vital today. North America is the centre of the geopolitical fulcrum between the Asia-Pacific and the Euro-Atlantic regions. Historically the United States is extremely sensitive to a vacuum on its northern flank (Canada) or its southern (Central America and the Caribbean). So it is today. If Canada cannot or will not assume its fair share in North American defence, the United States will, begrudgingly, assume it for us.

In the First and Second World Wars, shipping was attacked by German submarines in the Gulf of St. Lawrence and the Northwest Atlantic. The Navy suffered from poor ASW readiness for want of submarines to train on. This was the fundamental reason for acquisition of the Oberons in the 1960s. In the late 1940s the threat of Arctic lodgements from Soviet submarines was a concern to United States and Canadian defence planning leading, in part, to the acquisition of HMCS Labrador, the naval icebreaker. In the 1960s and 1970s, North America was threat-ened by Soviet SSBNs routinely stationed in the Western Atlantic and the Northeastern Pacific, peaking in 1962 in the Cuban missile crisis. In the 1980s the SSGN cruise missile threat emerged and the possibility of Soviet SSNs transitting to the North Atlantic through channels in the Canadian Arctic initiated plans which ended with the end of the Cold War.

Today, Russia's naval missions, the modernization and new construction of its latest classes of attack and cruise missile firing submarines (such as the Akula, Oscar, and the very new Sverodvinsk classes) as well as the resumption of its SSN deployments keeping watch on United States SSBN movements off the West and East coasts of North America, first reported in 1995, shows how seriously it takes its aerospace defence role.{6} Whatever else can be said about the declining readiness of Russia's armed forces, its priority on strategic deterrence and aerospace defence against American SSBNs is compelling. This includes the deployment or transit through Canadian waters of forward pickets off Juan de Fuca (Bangor) and the Eastern Seaboard (King's Bay, Newport). Like it or not the Canadian government and naval planners are faced once more with strategic ASW.

Now is not the time to close down the Canadian submarine force. The Upholders working alone or with maritime patrol aircraft and the Integrated Undersea Surveillance System (IUSS) are essential to detect and monitor this emerging activity. Traditionally, in the Cuban missile crisis, Vietnam and the Gulf War, while the USN deployed forward, it looked to Allied submarines, particularly the Canadians, to guard the northern flank or act as Gatekeepers. This is our niche in strategic ASW and our obligation under the Basic Security Plan, not to mention staying in the game insofar as access to U.S. intelligence and warning is concerned. More than that, the Upholders, the IUSS and modernized Aurora maritime patrol aircraft working together would be able to provide us with our own intelligence and warning - not what someone else, even our best friend, decides to feed us.

In summary, without submarines Canada is reneging on its maritime defence obligations as well as depriving itself of not inconsiderable political leverage in our relations with the United States.{7}

Regional Contingencies

Clearly the nature of warfare at sea has altered since the end of the Cold War. The Gulf War, 1990-91, ushered in a new US naval strategy which moved away from a "blue water" warfare setting to power projection across the shoreline in coastal waters. Replacing the notion of warfare between navies is the notion of "combined-joint" operations with the army, navy, air force and marines working together as well as with other countries organized in a coalition. We appear to be entering an era of "small wars" in which nations will fight in coalitions. The Gulf War, Somalia, the former republic of Yugoslavia and Haiti illustrate the point. The Canadian navy participated in all these expeditionary operations.

Parallel with this development, a global renaissance in conventionally-powered submarine capability is underway in all of the world's oceans and regional seas except in North America.{8} Improvements in submarine quietening, communications, sensors and weapons and AIP technology is making the conventional attack submarine more formidable and attractive to smaller states as a weapon of deterrence and destruction in shallow water and coastal seas. Coupled with relatively less money for anti-submarine warfare and the inherent difficulty of detecting submarines in shallow water, it can be said that the ASW gap is growing. As in Korea in 1952 and the Persian Gulf in 1991, submarines and mines are "show stoppers".

Today the regional order of battle of conventional attack submarines (SSK) is estimated to be:{9}

Canadian warships have operated in wars and crises in the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean throughout the 1990s. It is highly likely the Navy will be despatched again should trouble occur in any of these regions - all of which are sensitive to US strategic interests.

Conscious of this, will our Task Group be ready for shallow water anti-submarine operations in regional contingencies should North America lose its last, friendly anti-submarine training platforms - Canada's SSKs? This is no rhetorical question. It lies in our historical experience from the loss of ships and men in two World Wars, due to lack of preparedness in anti-submarine warfare. The USN is conscious of this too and needs the shallow water ASW training that the Upholders, operated by the Canadian Navy, can provide. Moveover the USN today provides generous quid pro quos in SSN training time and other facilities for training with the Oberons. This is a mutually satisfactory exchange which should not be broken.

In summary, the Canadian Navy brings strategic and tactical capability to coalition expeditionary operations overseas in support of international security. At the strategic level, the Navy can contribute to power projection with sea control and sea lift. At the tactical level it can contribute know-how in shallow water ASW. Canadian attack submarines are a core readiness asset to coalition partners in peace support operations.

Conclusion

Submarines, operating independently or in combination with patrol aircraft, surface warships and fixed installations, are a core element of Canada's maritime defence and an extension of our foreign policy. In the protection of Canada and the defence of North America roles, the submarine is the one platform capable of extended surveillance and enforcement. Its covert qualities make it an effective psychological deterrent. As a training platform it is fundamental to ASW readiness which is now needed more than ever by Canada and the United States in littoral operations in Europe, the Middle East and Asia.

As Oscar Wilde wrote of parents:

To lose one parent is a tragedy;
To lose two is carelessness.

So it is with submarines for Canada.

Endnotes

1. Report of Special Joint Committee on Canada's Defence Policy Security in a Changing World, 1994. [Back to text]

2. National Defence, 1994 Defence White Paper; Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada in the World, 1995. [Back to text]

3. Cdr Doug Hales, LCdr Doug McLean, "Why Canada needs Submarines", Canadian Defence Quarterly, Summer 1997; VAdm G.L. Garnett, Open Letter to the Friends of the Navy, 30 May 1997; Maritime Command, Adjusting Course: A Naval Strategy for Canada, April 1997; Maritime Command, The Naval Vision: Charting the Course for Canada's Maritime Forces into the 21st Century, May 1994. [Back to text]