Sea Kings and Recent Sensational Headlines

These are examples of some of the headlines which appeared in newspapers on Monday, 17 November. All of them, except the last sub-headline, are an accurate if somewhat hyped reflection of what the follow-on article was all about. It was that last sub-headline which triggered a CBC Radio interview early that Monday morning, and the story was spread across the country during the rest of that day. By evening I had become involved in one TV and nine radio interviews from almost every province in Canada, and I certainly was not the only one sought out by the media that day to discuss the issue.

It was soon realized by the media that the breaking story, that the government had decided not to replace the ageing Sea Kings, was not true; however, they thought they had enough of a sensation to make a story of it anyway. On the positive side, those interviews gave me a wonderful opportunity to raise some crucial concerns about our Sea Kings, to make a strong pitch about the importance of Maritime Helicopters for our Navy's modern fleet of helicopter-carrying frigates and destroyers, and to clear up some misperceptions that are floating around in the public domain. In this article, I will highlight some of the points that arose in the interviews. But, first, I will attempt to clarify the thrust of the newspaper article which led to those sensational headlines.

The Canadian Press journalist, Dean Beeby, obtained through the Access to Information Act a copy of the Sea King Weapon System Support Plan (WSSP) 1998-2003 dated 4 September, 1997. This is a dynamic document, similar to those for every aircraft in the Air Force, which "has a strictly equipment focus and is intended to identify those activities planned, and the financial resources required" to provide the engineering support to keep the Sea Kings flying. It outlines the recommended priorities and is used as the basis to make the case for the Sea Kings' share of the annual allocation of scarce financial resources. In other words, it just reflects good business planning stressing the current situation but also looking at estimated requirements for follow-on years.

The guts of the plan are contained in the details of the three Support Objectives: Airworthiness Sustainment; Supportability; and, Improved Capability. The first objective is the vital one which deals with effective management to ensure the Sea Kings' "airworthiness is preserved for the duration of the current ELE (Estimated Life Expectancy - which is now to the end of the year 2000) and in anticipation of an ELE extension to 2005 or even 2010." Its main provisions include the major structural repair of the centre section, re-routing and clamping of fuel lines, strengthening the tail wheel support assembly, and adjusting the centre-of-gravity by moving mission equipment.

The second objective, Supportability, deals with matters that could improve the cost-effectiveness of maintenance and repair and includes such items as major modifications to the engines and main gear boxes of the whole Sea King fleet. These modifications were driven by the fact that our Sea Kings are the last users of these critical drive-train components, and spare parts are becoming costly and difficult to obtain. Additionally, the transmissions are starting to produce problems leading to increasingly expensive inspection and repair at the contractor. Modifications to both the engines and the transmission should not only improve reliability and reduce repair costs, but will incorporate functional improvements as well.

The third objective is Improved Capability, and as expected, is approached with extreme reluctance for the old Sea Kings. It includes replacing the ancient mechanical navigation system (a reminder of the old WWII ARL tables) with used hand-me-down systems from the USN. With the success of the prototype of the Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) detector in recent Peacekeeping and SAR Ops, it has been decided to install FLIR mounts and wiring in all Sea Kings, and play musical chairs with the 10-12 FLIR sets in the DND inventory. Some components of the unreliable and overloaded electrical power supply system will be improved. Trials are continuing on a Self Defence System that can be quickly installed if the need arises, such as during the Gulf War. The system will include such components as a Radar Warning Receiver, Missile Approach Warning, and Counter Measure Dispensing equipment. This new system and the FLIR are examples of mission system improvements that could be transferred directly to the New Maritime Helicopter.

Now to get back to the newspaper article. Here are some of its key paragraphs.

"Canada's navy helicopters, originally due to retire in three years, are getting costly refits to keep them flying until at least 2005 while Ottawa continues to mull over their replacements."
"The 30 ageing Sea Kings suffer from airframe cracks, obsolete engines, a suspect fuel system, tail-wheel collapses and many other problems that badly need fixing with no replacement choppers on the horizon, says a military report."
"Every original Sea King airframe is riddled with cracks, with up to 14 patches on some aircraft. Their outmoded General Electric engines are used nowhere else in the world. Fuel and oil lines - implicated in a fatal 1994 crash - need replacing. And the single-rotor choppers are too heavy and unbalanced after 30 years of modifica tions."
"The most serious problem is multiple cracking in the Sea Kings' main airframe, which has been worsening rapidly as more helicopters cross the threshold of 10,000 flying hours. Another $34 million in new repairs and upgrades is being proposed beginning with next year's budget. Among them is a $12 million fix for the main gear box to stop leaks."
"The skyrocketing repair bill is a hidden cost to the 1993 cancellation of the EH-101 order..."

What the newspaper article did not mention is that the Report stressed that its provisions and costs reflect the delays in the an nouncement of the Maritime Helicopter Program (MHP) on the Sea King fleet. "The current ELE of Dec 2000 is fast approaching and no date has yet been proposed for an ELE Extension." The Report goes on to say that, "Delays in the announcement of the MHP will require the extension of the current Sea King ELE (Dec 2000) to the year 2005 and possibly beyond."

What this means is that only with a clearly established date for the introduction of the replacement helicopter can increasingly expensive support for the Sea Kings be reduced. With a finite date for the end of the Sea Kings' life, the current modifications, repairs and improvements could have been much more limited. However, with an open-ended future, prudent planners must assume responsi bility for the longer haul and initiate cost-effective life extension programs now. For example, all 30 Sea Kings have structural cracks that require attention. Only fifteen needed prompt action, and they are being dealt with by a major repair program. This program requires the complete replacement of the centre section at a cost of over half a million dollars each, and with badly needed helicopters out of the system for up to eight months. With an open future, planners now have to bite the bullet and make provisions to repair all 30 helicopters.

Similarly, the engine and transmission modifications are essential for the reasons given, but I would venture the opinion that if the phase-out of the Sea Kings had been announced with certainty for say the year 1999, the Sea Kings could have survived without these expensive mods which will come to over $7 million and over $12 million respectively. As the Report says, "The significant increase (in costs) between fiscal year 94/95 and subsequent fiscal years is explained by the cancellation of the NSA program which caused the Sea King system manager to initiate several modification/upgrade programs in anticipation of an ELE extension."

The newspaper article also did not mention the significance of the chart on Performance Trends in the Report. In essence, the chart shows that average Operational Availability of our Sea Kings is now at an alarming rate in the 35-45 percent range. Surely this one chart, coupled with the fact of increasing sustainment costs, highlights the crux of this sad story.

Most of the critical points I made in my many interviews that Monday are included in a letter to the Editor of the Globe and Mail, on 12 September of this year. A similar letter to the Editor was sent to the Globe and Mail on 16 August, 1997. Neither of them were printed by the newspaper. Rather than repeat them in this article, my letter of 12 September has been included in this article as a "stand- alone" item.

In conclusion, I list in point form what I consider are the main issues.

• Sea Kings are safe to fly. Our Air Force does not operate aircraft that are not airworthy. Aircrew currently flying the Sea King are not concerned about safety, but unreliability. If one of the few serviceable helicopters does become available, during flight or start-up aircrew often find faults that mean aborting the mission or conducting it in a mode of reduced capability. As professionals they are understandably frustrated when they cannot accomplish their mission because of unreliable equipment.
• It is the cost of maintaining that airworthiness and operational capability that is the issue. It is costing more and more in expensive modification and upgrade programs, in costly spare parts and contractor level repairs, and in base and ship level maintenance and repair manpower (30 hours for every flying hour) to keep these marginally operational helicopters flying. Our Sea Kings are 30-35 years old, built with 1950's technology, and they show it in their unreliability and their rising sustainability costs.
• With reductions in Air Force personnel across the board, fewer technicians are available to carry out those 30 hours of maintenance and repair for that single flying hour. We all should salute our young men and women who often work in appalling conditions to keep our Sea Kings flying safely. A new Maritime Helicopter with high reliability and ease of maintenance and repair would relieve the pressure of this situation as well.
• We should not forget the primary purpose of Maritime Helicopters. It is to support the Navy's sixteen modern frigates and destroyers which from their inception were all designed to be complemented, not supplemented, by equally modern and high tech helicopters. Emphatically, the Sea King is not the modern helo those expensive ships require. Our Navy has 12 CPFs (frigates) embarking one helicopter each, 4 Tribal Destroyers embarking two helicopters each, and three AORS which can operate three helicopters each if needed in contingency operations. Canada has a modern and comprehensive aviation Navy, but it lacks modern Maritime Helicopters to make it complete.
• The reliability of a Maritime Helicopter embarked in a naval ship is crucial. Even with its minimal operational capability, the Sea King can still do many jobs at sea. However, today a Sea King cannot be relied upon to be available when the ship's captain needs it.
• The decision to replace marginally effective and costly to sustain Sea Kings should have been made to ensure that the arrival of new Maritime Helicopters coincided with the introduction of the modern CPFs to the Navy. In fact, at one time the new ships and the new helicopters were combined in a single program. Sadly, new helicopters were not introduced on time, and now every month delay in making the decision on a new Maritime Helicopter means continuing with a modern Navy that cannot fulfil its potential, and with increasing costs to sustain a questionable helicopter capability.
• For all the reasons given in this article and in my Letter to the Editor, the decision to get on with selecting the right Maritime Helicopter for the Navy should be made without delay. The essential staff work has been completed for some time now - it is just a political matter of initiating the selection and procurement process.

The Editor,
The Globe and Mail
12 September, 1997

Dear Sir,

Shawn McCarthy in his Sept. 12 article (Copter choice could embarrass federal Liberals) talks about replacing the "accident-prone" Sea King helicopters. I am sure at some time in his life Mr. McCarthy told a fib or two, but it would be unfair to characterize him as a journalist prone to lying. Similarly, it is not right to say that our Sea Kings are prone to accidents.

As a former Sea King pilot during the 1960s, Commander of the Maritime Air Group in the late 1980s responsible for all Sea King operations in Canada, and one who is still close to those who fly our Sea Kings, I can assure your readers that our Air Force does not fly aircraft that are unairworthy.

The issue is that with our Sea Kings in their 35th year of life, it is becoming more and more expensive and difficult to sustain that airworthiness. The complexity and the 1950's technology of the Sea King and its systems require an inordinate amount of maintenance, parts are hard to obtain and are costly, and major fleet repair programs such as the current replacement of the entire centre section because of fatigue are expensive. Recent calculations indicate that it now requires over 30 maintenance hours for every Sea King flying hour. Nevertheless, our Sea Kings are still flying safely because of the dedication of the young men and women of our Air Force who maintain and support these helicopters, often in extremely difficult conditions. Canadians should indeed be proud of their accomplishments.

While ageing Sea Kings with their older mission systems still play a useful role in world-wide at-sea operations, they cannot perform the operational tasks demanded of modern maritime helicopters. Furthermore, the Navy's new ships were all designed to be comple mented by modern high tech helicopters, so those expensive and capable ships are incomplete without the right helicopters. Most importantly, since maritime helicopters play such a critical role in the effectiveness of those naval ships, the helicopters must be available when needed at sea. Sadly, embarked Sea Kings often cannot fly because they require maintenance or repair. The fundamental fact is that our Sea Kings do not have the reliability required of ship-borne helicopters in today's modern Canadian Navy.

There are many very good reasons why our Sea King helicopters should be replaced; but, it is not because they are unsafe, unairworthy or "accident-prone".

Colin Curleigh
Brigadier-General (Retired)
Halifax