THE MARITIME HELICOPTER PROJECT
WHY AND HOW - PART 1

Throughout the Cold War, the raison d'être of Canada's Armed Forces, and almost all military capital equipment purchases, was based on NATO's requirements for defence against the Soviet Union. In terms of our maritime forces, that meant an almost singular focus on building and maintaining an anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability, whether against attack submarines seeking to disrupt the sea lanes of communication to Europe, or against ballistic missile submarines threatening the North American heartland. The fact that military equipment and training have peacetime utility was rarely considered in capital equipment programmes, notwithstanding the countless hours our maritime forces ASW aircraft spend supporting other government departments (OGDs), and by the scarce mentioned fact that the (ASW) Sea King is the only combat aircraft to have been involved in every (until Kosovo) international peace support operation that Canada has been involved in since the end of the Cold War.

Times have changed however; the bi-polar threat of nuclear annihilation has all but diminished and so, therefore, has the need to tailor our maritime forces to a NATO defence of Europe. Accordingly, the 1994 Defence White paper gives the view that "(t)he government's approach to defence is to maintain the Canadian Forces as a fundamental national resource which makes important contributions to a range of Canadian objectives...(O)ur investment in the Forces' training and equipment will yield a capable fighting force whose skills can be applied...to a variety of domestic...objectives."(1) It should not be surprising therefore, that our first Defence priority is to the "Defence of Canada and Canadian Sovereignty".

This very strong statement of domestic priority suggests a different approach to determining what is needed in terms of military equipment in the post-Cold War environment; one that is based first on the need for certain peace-time capabilities that could, secondarily, make a useful military contribution to an allied war effort if the unthinkable did happen. Accordingly, this paper will make the case for a maritime helicopter (MH) replacement for the Sea King based on every-day sovereignty considerations. A subsequent article will expand on what additional capabilities the helicopter should have for international peace support and combat operations, and a third article will propose an acquisition strategy for a maritime helicopter that meets all the requirements including, as the 1994 Defence White Paper is careful to point out, that it be affordable.

SOVEREIGNTY OPERATIONS

Canada is a maritime nation. We derive a substantial portion of our wealth directly from the sea and from marine based commerce. It has been estimated that our oceans provide close to $26B annually to our national wealth, and support over 500,000 jobs. If Canada is to continue to prosper it must encourage the development of its marine based ocean industries, in particular, private activities that result in the generation of wealth from the sea, i.e. tourism, transportation, fishing, oil and gas, aquaculture etc.(2)

The Canada Oceans Act was promulgated in 1997 to address the economic, social and environmental objectives of our marine activities, and to set the groundwork for an Ocean Strategy that was intended, by the turn of the century, to provide the means of achieving those goals. Through the Canada Oceans Act and the national Oceans Strategy, the Minister for Fisheries and Oceans is mandated to implement an integrated management plan for Canada's coastal and maritime areas. In addressing this issue, the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) has recognized the importance of an orderly and secure maritime environment, emphasized the role of maritime security and enforcement in Canada's maritime strategy, and articulated the following requirements and condition:

• the requirement for an integrated surveillance and enforcement regime;
• the requirement for coordination mechanisms to exercise and protect our sovereign rights over offshore areas and resources; and
• the requirement for international and cooperative surveillance of fisheries; conditioned by, our national capacity to monitor and enforce territorial and environmental security.(3)

It is in this context that an understanding of the 1990 Osbaldeston Report is necessary, because it provided a comprehensive look at Canada's federal DFO, Coast Guard, and naval fleet utilization in terms of the requirements for marine defence and security, marine policing and constabulary roles, and marine environmental protection. As a result of much study the Report recommended the maritime forces be given additional responsibility for offshore patrols in support of sovereignty, fisheries management, environmental surveillance, and search and rescue. The Report also recommended the Navy be assigned additional responsibility for assistance to the RCMP for preventive patrols requiring armed vessels. Given that the Oceans Act requires the Oceans Strategy to be based on the "integrated" management of Canada's oceans and coastal waters, it should not be surprising that there is consistency with the Osbaldeston Report in recommending the involvement of the maritime forces, and that it be the result of a collaborative, inter-departmental process of consultation between all the players, private and government, who are stakeholders in Canada's ocean policy.

REQUIRED SOVEREIGNTY CAPABILITIES

So what does this mean for the maritime helicopter. The maritime helicopter increases over four times the area a surface ship can keep under surveillance. In today's world of limited fleet sizes and reduced operating budgets, the pairing of a maritime helicopter embarked on a naval frigate is the most efficient and cost-effective means of conducting maritime surveillance, monitoring and enforcement. That said, the environment in which this helicopter is to operate dictates a certain level of technical sophistication and robustness. The helicopters will operate from ships, so they must be "marinized": the salt air environment must have been considered in their structural makeup; their blades and tail pylon must fold if that is necessary to get them into the ship's hangar; and the aircraft must be sufficiently robust to survive both landing on a ship's flight deck and the constant motion of a ship at sea. The helicopter must also be capable of flight in the north Atlantic environment; it must be capable of flight under instrument conditions; and it must be capable of flight under icing conditions, at least for as long as it takes to fly out of them. These are essential requirements if the helicopter is to be of any service in Canadian maritime environment.

Beyond being able to operate from a ship at sea, what other capabilities must a Canadian Maritime Helicopter have? The requirements that follow are derived directly from the record of Sea King operations over the last decade, taking note of what the Sea King was able to do, and what it was tasked to do but could not. First, the maritime helicopter will not always be embarked. It has often been the case that a shore-based Sea King has been tasked to respond to an off-shore emergency, so the maritime helicopter must have certain range and endurance capabilities. For instance, it should be capable of refueling from Sable Island and off-shore oil rigs to increase its effective radius of operation, and it should be able to cross from Cape Breton to Newfoundland without having to take two days to go via northern Quebec; these missions imply a three hour endurance.

Second, the maritime helicopter must have rescue and disaster relief capabilities, which imply a certain cabin size and the ability to carry or sling heavy loads. An often heard argument is for a minimalist replacement for the Sea King. Indeed, there are helicopters that have sufficient range and endurance, but are unable to provide anything but surveillance when they are on scene because the basic sovereignty mission suite leaves no margin for anything else. The great circle route between Europe and most of eastern North America passes through Canada's maritime area of international responsibility. The potential for maritime disaster is ever present. Canada at war might be willing to afford specialized helicopters suited only to single purpose (surveillance or utility) missions. Canada at peace requires versatility in a single helicopter type; specifically, it must have range, endurance and payload capabilities.

Third, to be useful in the sovereignty role, the maritime helicopter must have certain mission capabilities. These are fairly basic and can be clearly explained in terms of what is needed to conduct surveillance, to monitor a specific vessel and to enforce Canadian law and jurisdiction. These required capabilities are listed below. All are related to the maritime forces environmental protection and constabulary roles. All are available 'off-the-shelf' and relatively inexpensive compared to the damage being caused by any number of vessels acting illegally, unconcerned by a grossly inadequate enforcement system.

• In order to have legally acceptable evidence of a fishing or environmental violation in Canadian waters, it is necessary that the helicopter be able to navigate in all weather conditions and record its precise geographic location at any time.
• In order to conduct surveillance and monitor specific vessels from a distance or in non-visual conditions, the helicopter must have a radar that provides a 'picture' of all vessels in an area, that can discriminate between vessel types such as fishing boats and freighters, and be able to sort through the various targets and concentrate on a specific vessel of interest.
• To assist in locating a vessel in distress, or to enable the helicopter to monitor a vessel without giving its own presence away (i.e. when tracking a drug smuggler), the helicopter must have an electronic surveillance capability that will enable it to detect electronic transmissions.
• In order to visually identify a vessel at night and record evidence, such as illegal fishing nets being hauled or contraband being thrown overboard, the helicopter must have an electro-optical (EO) device such as Forward Looking Infra-Red (FLIR).
• The radar and EO displays are oriented relative to the helicopter. It would be extremely helpful in terms of their usefulness as evidence if the geographic position and compass heading from the helicopters navigation system could be integrated into the display and recorded simultaneously on video tape.
• Finally, and perhaps most importantly, to be as effective as possible in a disaster situation the helicopter must be able to communicate by radio with cooperating ground or surface forces, whether they be military or from other government departments; and it must be capable of secure communications with its controlling agency when conducting a covert surveillance mission.

The forgoing explains, in rather simple terms, what is required in a "sovereignty" maritime helicopter. The use of jargon has been avoided in the hope that this, and subsequent articles will be read and understood by an audience not familiar with the role the Sea King plays in terms of Canadian sovereignty surveillance and enforcement. If Canada wishes to exploit the resources and enforce Canadian jurisdiction within its 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone it needs the tools to maintain 'order and security'. Surveillance is best done by aircraft because of the area that can be covered, but enforcement is best done by ships because of their 'presence'. Only the shipborne helicopter combines both those capabilities; it provides an airborne surveillance and monitoring platform, and, it can deliver a DFO or an RCMP officer to make an arrest and provide enforcement. If this was a non-military project it would have been funded long ago. It is, after all, a national resource to be used, as the Osbaldeston Report recommends, to facilitate the interdepartmental implementation of Canada's 'Ocean Strategy'. Canada has no problem using the military to shovel snow in Toronto, fight the floods in Manitoba, or restore electrical power in Quebec. Why then the lack of political support for a helicopter that will be a national 'sovereignty' asset for the next three to four decades; is it only because of its military denomination? Surely the Maritime Helicopter Project cannot be delayed any longer.

NOTES

1. 1994 Defence White Paper,14
2. Crickard F.W. and Herbert G.J., Canada's Ocean Strategy Project: Final Report (Halifax: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 1997), 9.
3. Bellefontaine N., Canada's Ocean Act and National Oceans Strategy, in Herbert and Crickard, Canada's Three Oceans: Strategies for Maritime Enforcement, (Halifax: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 1998),23.