THE MARITIME HELICOPTER PROJECT
WHY AND HOW - PART II

The first article in this series suggested "a different approach to determining what is needed in terms of military equipment in the post-Cold War environment; one that is based first on the need for certain peace-time capabilities". Accordingly, it explained the basic air vehicle and mission capabilities a modern Maritime helicopter would need to fulfill its peacetime roles for the Defence of Canada 'sovereignty' mission. In other words, what the maritime helicopter would require to provide the essential surveillance, monitoring and control capabilities needed to enforce Canadian laws and jurisdiction in the Canadian Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). As indicated in the first article, this follow-up "will expand on what additional capabilities the helicopter should have for international peace support and combat operations".

INTERNATIONAL PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

As we enter the new millennium, "Canada faces an unpredictable and fragmented world, one in which conflict, repression and upheaval exist alongside peace, democracy and relative prosperity. As a nation that throughout history has done much within the context of international alliances to defend freedom and democracy, Canada continues to have a vital interest in doing its part to ensure global security, especially since Canada's economic future depends on its ability to trade freely with other nations". This quote from the 1994 Defence White Paper indicates the inevitability that Canadian Forces will continue to be involved in support of foreign policy initiatives wherever in the world our interests lie; and this is certainly true of our maritime forces, particularly in terms of contingency operations. Indeed, according to then Rear Admiral Garnett in his keynote address to the Maritime Peacekeeping course at the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, "Because of their mobility, flexibility and self-sustaining capabilities, maritime forces are highly useful instruments of foreign policy. They can deploy quickly, remain in an area for extended periods of time, and conduct a wide variety of tasks. In many cases they can quickly adapt to new roles and scenarios. A combat-capable, general purpose navy (with embarked helicopters) can provided invaluable support to a peacekeeping force".

In short, if Canada is to assume its "first" world responsibility to contribute military forces to international security operations when called upon and foreign policy dictates, we must be able to make that contribution quickly and with no support or operational strings attached. It makes economic and practical sense therefore, that the maritime helicopter embarked on a Canadian naval frigate be as capable for international security operations as is possible within the constraints of affordability. Based on the experience of contingency operations since the end of the Cold War we can build on the "sovereignty" helicopter to arrive at a very capable and versatile "international security" helicopter. The capability requirements that follow are derived directly from the record of Sea King operations over the last decade, taking note of what the Sea Kings were able to do, and just as important, what they were unable to do because of equipment deficiencies.

• The navigation suite, radar and electro-optical (EO) surveillance device required for sovereignty operations have sufficient capability for international security operations.
• In order to provide the maritime helicopter with a self-protection capability, the electronic support system (ESM) provided for sovereignty operations must also be able to detect and provide warning of anti-air missile tracking and guidance radars, and lasers, and have the additional capability to dispense self-protective chaff and flare decoys against missiles that are targeted against them.
• International security operations require a basic self-defence capability. The Sea King helicopter was fitted with Kevlar seats to protect the crew against small arms fire, and a C-9 light machine gun mounted at the cargo door to provide a basic level of defensive fire. The C-9 proved inadequate. A General Purpose Machine Gun (GPMG) of sufficient calibre to deter rebel ground forces must be provided..
• The communication suite required for international security operations is no more complex than that required for sovereignty operations, except that more than one frequency may be required at any given time. In maritime interdiction operations for instance, it may be necessary to be monitoring a control frequency while at the same time hailing a target vessel on another frequency. For international security operations therefore, it will be necessary to have at least three tactical V/UHF radios, as well as an over-the-horizon HF or SATCOM capability.
• A new capability not previously mentioned for the sovereignty helicopter is a sub-surface surveillance system. One could argue very strongly that this capability is needed for sovereignty purposes in order to monitor the passage of foreign submarines through our waters. Indeed, under any circumstances a non-friendly submarine is a potential threat to a surface vessel, particularly if its intentions and whereabouts are unknown. For international security operations therefore, it is essential to be able to detect a submarine, if only to know where it is so it can be avoided. Forty-four countries operate submarines, including twelve in the Mediterranean and seven in South America. If Canada's maritime forces are to operate in these areas, and they will, the maritime helicopter must be able to track sub-surface targets and monitor their activities.
• Finally, a "Mission Data Handling System" (MDHS) is the name given to the technical wizardry that integrates and displays all sensor data on one tactical computer screen. The relatively small size of the maritime helicopter limits the size of its crew. In order to sift through all available information and make timely and correct decisions in the dynamic threat environment of an international security operation, sensor inputs must feed into a data processing unit and be displayed on one tactical screen operated by one crew man. Even then there must be two operating positions, i.e. two screens, because the information flow in the heat of multi-threat conflict situation requires two operators to manage the information flow. The MDHS is really just a computer with an appropriate operating system into which the data from each piece of equipment is fed, and a monitor on which that data can be displayed.

It can be seen that there is a little more sophistication required for international security missions than for sovereignty operations, and some additional capabilities. However, all of the capabilities listed above, other than the MDHS, were fitted in some basic form on the Sea King helicopters for Operation Friction. It is also important to understand that all these capabilities are required for "peacetime" operations, whether in support of national sovereignty, or directed by Canadian foreign policy. The ultimate requirement, not yet addressed, is to be able to fight a war, and win.

DEFENCE OF CANADA AND NORTH AMERICA OPERATIONS

This is the ultimate test; after all, as then Minister of National Defence, The Hon David Collinette, wrote in his "Foreword" to the 1994 Defence White Paper, "In the final analysis, it may be said that a nation not worth defending is a nation not worth preserving." The threat of course, is ballistic missile submarines targeted against the American nuclear deterrent. New generations of very capable Russian SSBN's are being built today to deploy SLBM's armed with MIRV nuclear warheads. The START II agreement does not allow land-based ICBM's with MIRV, so SLBM's now form the major component of their Strategic Nuclear Offensive Force. While the threat of war with Russia is not what it was during the Cold War, one has to wonder why so many resources of an otherwise bankrupt country are being spent on a strategic offensive capability. One might also wonder about China's intentions. According to the US Office of Naval Intelligence

...the Chinese submarine force is the third largest in the world and includes six nuclear powered submarines, one of which is a ballistic missile submarine. Over the next 10-15 years, China will pose the most complex submarine challenge outside of Russia as a result of its¼steadily expanding scope and¼an active acquisition program targeted at modern technology.

It is essential therefore, that the Canadian Maritime helicopter be capable of conducting anti-submarine warfare. The fact that the Sea King needs to be replaced with a new Maritime helicopter with domestic and international security capabilities gets obscured by the fact that it must, in the extreme, be capable of dropping a torpedo on an enemy submarine.

This and the preceding paper have described the complete air vehicle and mission suite requirements of a modern maritime helicopter. Those not inclined to support expenditures for military, or war equipment can take comfort that this helicopter is comprised almost completely of a sovereignty package consistent with the constabulary responsibility of EEZ States and Canada's Ocean Act. Moreover, all but one of the capabilities added to the sovereignty package are designed to enable the crews to operate in an international security environment, leaving only one feature that can be described exclusively as a war capability. The maritime helicopter will not be inexpensive; but the program will be a lot less expensive than buying 'specialty' helicopters for each mission. The 1994 Defence White Paper describes it as "misguided to invest in very specific forces and capabilities¼(such as)¼aircraft designed for anti-tank warfare¼(or)¼forces limited to minimal-risk peacekeeping operations". A specialist ASW helicopter and a minimalist maritime helicopter could exemplify these two ends of the scale. What is proposed in these two papers is a maritime helicopter that has the multi-role capability and flexibility necessary for a multi-purpose force. As required by the White Paper this maritime helicopter represents

a pragmatic, sensible approach to defence at a time of fiscal restraint, one that will provide¼a broad range of military options at a price consistent with the Governments other policy ¼priorities.

The next article in this series will deal with the fleet size, and strategies to ensure that indeed, this Maritime Helicopter Project is "affordable".