AUXILIARY LOGISTIC SUPPLY CAPABILITY

"When the enemy assesses our forces, he values only those forces which the logistics community has ready for combat, or can ready in time, and then sustain for a requisite period of time."

General F. M. Robers, Retired Commander USAF Logistics Command

As recently as 1997, a DND Afloat Logistic and Sealift Capability (ALSC) project team was instructed to identify the mission and attributes for a logistic support ship which would replace Canada's thirty year old Auxiliary Oil Replenishment (AOR) ships. The fact the project started at a time when a realignment of international strategy was taking place, and recognition of defence policy as enunciated in the 1994 Defence White Paper was at the forefront of military planners thinking, presented the planners with a challenge.

First, the ALSC project team could not possibly ignore the fact that many Canadians believed that the Canadian Forces had a serious commitment capability gap. One other concern was that government progress in correcting the situation was not moving fast enough.

The next concern was more obvious. It was/is related to Canada's participation in a series of UN operations, all of which demonstrated that the deployment of Canadian troops overseas has been met with serious logistic support problems, first in the form of providing Canadian controlled air and sealift service, and then with the provision of good logistic support after forces arrived in-theatre. Not without concern is the news that in-theatre logistic support for our troops will be provided by private contractors who will provide non-tactical communications, engineering and logistic services.1

The message is clear-when Canada sends forces overseas, DND must patch up a weak strategic air and sealift system, by contracting with foreign air and sea carriers to deliver troops and equipment overseas.2 A similar arrangement holds true when returning equipment to Canada. The Army's experience when returning military vehicles and equipment using a foreign carrier, GTS Katie, needs no explanation here.3

Canada's experience in the Korean and Cold War era no doubt prompted the Navy to acquire the AOR ships Provider, Protecteur and Preserver, which for over thirty years have served the Navy well. They have delivered task group support in the form of fuel, provisions, at-sea replenishment, ammunition and general stores, as well as helicopter maintenance service for frigate- and destroyer-based Sea Kings, as well as limited medical and dental service. Vertical support to the task group ships has also been available. On several deployments, the AORs have been used to provide support for joint service headquarters. All the aforementioned service has been a task group multiplier and has certainly extended the range and endurance of our task groups.

Some interesting developments have surfaced during the period the ALSC project group has been in place. First, MIL Systems, a naval architecture and marine engineering firm, has produced a suggested set of missions and vessel attributes for what they describe as a proposed Strategic Multi-role Aid and Replenishment Transport. The attributes MIL Systems identifies are, providing a strategic sealift, environmental emergency response, peacekeeping, cargo transportation, and comprehensive command and communications facilities. These attributes comprise a response to broad policy found in the 1994 Defence White Paper. They can be classified under the headings, strategic sealift of Army vehicles, general equipment and supplies to any location in the world, providing means to sustain operations in-theatre, as well as sea-based command and control and joint/combined force support, and finally, under way replenishment of task groups.

Given the aforementioned features, the new logistic support vessels should have roll-on, roll-off (RO-RO) capability, with side ramps for unloading as well as heavy lift cranes permitting the transfer to barges or primitive shore facilities. It has been suggested that the ALSC ship might have accommodation facilities for several hundred mission-specific support personnel. Interest in the project heightens when one considers the statement of the Minister of National Defence who stated that Canada could become part of a European Union rapid-action response force.4

Although Heinze Gohlish's article in Maritime Affairs states the "safest" solution to the sealift problem is to acquire in-house capability, he adds, "the effacy [sic] of this solution is best left to the naval planners."5 Peter Haydon, in another Maritime Affairs article writes, "Does Canada need a rapid response capability under a concept where the Navy would provide sealift and operational support to a joint task force sent on an overseas mission?"6

It is suggested that unless military strategic policy has a strong reason to dictate otherwise, the ALSC project should provide, at a minimum, the same level of at-sea replenishment delivered by the AORs. This seems to make good sense, especially if the assignment of a sealift tasking means our task group ships would become a second priority for at-sea replenishment service, while the Army's equipment and stores is being sea-lifted to an overseas destination.

The pending acquisition of a new class of logistic support ship for the Navy offers an opportunity to select a modern, and to a limited degree, multipurpose ship, ready to be globally deployable with a task group. Present AOR services, with the addition of an improved joint force capability and increased medical and dental service, would be acceptable. The addition of the capability to handle domestic environmental disaster problems in Canadian waters, and the capability to carry containerized cargo for use when responding to humanitarian need on the international scale, would be desirable.

The question now is, does the government understand the significance of what is happening in the maritime support world in other countries such as Britain, Denmark, Norway, Australia, etc.? Does it appreciate and understand the ultimate demands on our military that will come to the fore should Canada become a contributing partner to the EU rapid-reaction force? More important, how much is it prepared to pay in order to deal with the many equipment and resource problems that will have to be corrected if Canada is to become part of the EU force?

The goal facing the Canadian Forces has been set out in the DND document Shaping the Future of Canadian Defence: A Strategy for 2020. It states, "The strategy is to position the force structure of the Canadian Forces to provide Canada with modern task-tailored and globally deployable combat-capable forces that can respond quickly to crises at home and abroad, in joint or combined operations. The force must be viable, achievable and affordable."

As long as this can be attained without jeopardizing at-sea replenishment, at the same time incorporating features which do not include the RO-RO feature, the course of action should be to move the ALSC project ahead as quickly as possible.

Hopefully, the first new ship will be commissioned prior to 2008 which is the proposed delivery date shown in the Defence Planning Guide, DPG-2000.

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Footnotes:

1. Defense News, June 26, 2000, "Contractors to Support Canada's Troops Overseas."
2. Defense News, September 26, 2000, "Ukraine to Offer Bid if Canada Seeks Airlift Lease Deal."
3. Heinz Gohlish, "GTS Katie: The High Cost of Cut-Price Transport," Maritime Affairs, Fall, 2000.
4. National Post, January 14, 2000, "Military Plans Rapid-Reaction Force to Respond to Global Crises."
5. Gohlish.
6. Peter T. Haydon, "What Naval Capabilities Does Canada Need," Maritime Affairs, December 2000.

(Fred Fowlow is Director Maritime Affairs for Calgary Br. and a retired Commander RCN.)

Copyright © 2001 Fred R. Fowlow
All Rights Reserved

(Originally Published in Vol. VII, No. 13 Winter 2000/2001 issue of Starshell)