The Maritime Helicopter
A Frigate's Best Friend

Few will deny that defence policies should be directed toward establishing and maintaining a level of military operational capability, which in turn safeguards the security and sovereignty of our country.

The problem which surfaces when one accepts this motherhood statement, is finding a definition of "operational capability."

Listening to the pontifications of our Prime Minister, the Minister of National Defence, the Chief of the Defence Staff and the occasional general or admiral concerning the state of the Canadian Forces, only serves to muddy the waters and certainly adds to keeping Canadians in the dark. Ultimately, it is difficult to settle on an acceptable definition of the term.

Let's take a crack at finding out what this term "operational capability" might mean within the framework of the mess our government has placed the CF.

There are four components which come to mind when seeking a definition of the term. They are readiness, sustainability, force structure and force modernization.

Without a doubt, the government has created a problem for the navy in each of the aforementioned components. Perhaps not as serious as some of the problems it has given to the air and land forces, but serious enough to warrant examination here.

One measure of readiness, for some of us who perhaps disagree with what the leaders in NDHQ will tell us, is a measure of the time for the navy to be ready for combat in its particular role. A high level of readiness - that is the ability to send our ships off to a combat zone within an acceptable period of time - requires not only a high level of trained personnel to maintain operational capability, but of course, the proper equipment and resources to handle the job.

Notwithstanding the fact that Maritime Command has had a personnel problem - which resulted in the laying up of HMCS Huron - forcing the creation of an entirely new readiness system, MARCOM's response to the call to send ships to serve with the coalition forces in the Arabian Sea has been commendable.

Not without concern, our frigates moved off to the Arabian Sea with forty year old Sea King helicopters. A factor which regardless of the gung-ho comments of those who fly the old beasts, deprived the frigates of the multiplier effect new state-of-the-art helicopters would bring to the total frigate weapon system.

The readiness component is as important as the sustainability component. The latter was a relatively unidentified concern until people realized the length of time our ships would be deployed away from Canada. Sustainability, a new term in the lexicon of the interested Canadian, refers to the ability of our ships to maintain a required tempo of operations over an extended period. It could, sometime in the not too distant future, become an even more important issue. Perhaps more so than our "can-do" senior military are prepared to admit today.

Granted we have our supply ships to provide logistic support to ships operating in the Arabian Sea. However, this does not preclude the fact that for good reason, our frigates will continue to be rotated back to Canada on six month intervals. The question is: when will the rotation cycle, say at the end of eighteen months action with the coalition forces, start to create maintenance routine pressure on the ships, and more importantly, physical as well as mental stress on the personnel who find themselves caught in a demanding rotation schedule? We have been told that stress is not a serious issue for most sailors, but how long will this hold true?

We know that a lengthy period in a combat zone requires a stream of resources to be committed to sustain the forces at an acceptable level of readiness. Certain levels of maintenance can be undertaken during a six month deployment period. However, there are times when days at sea, high speed operations and general demands on the ship and its crew, are much higher and more demanding than they would be if the ship was operating out of its home port in Canada.

Sustainability then calls for increasing system stockpiles of high usage items, most of which will be high cost, and as suggested, used at a higher rate. The longer our ships are rotated into overseas operations - at the present scale and rate - and assuming that the underfunding of the armed forces continues, the faster the navy will move toward a serious crisis situation.

As the potential for crisis deepens, the other components of operational capability - force structure and force modernization - will become more difficult to manage. The government will have no choice but to create a better balance of spending, focusing more sharply on increasing defence spending. Reacting more realistically to increasing force strength at a faster rate will place greater demands on the training system and hence, more stress on an already "fraying" system.

Meeting the operating costs and equipment needs, and certainly doing more than talking about force modernization which demands replacement of existing weapons platforms as well as refurbishment and upgrading of others, must take on a high priority.

This will not be an easy task since there is a great deal of catch-up to accomplish before the CF reaches the point where operational capability of our forces will provide for domestic and international security measures Canada will require in the 21st century.

To add to the complexity of the problem, one has the feeling that our leaders are refusing to recognize the seriousness of the world situation which demands closer attention and action. All coming at a time when the CF should be developing and implementing plans for the modernization of our military, dealing with the revolution in military affairs, and setting up for the yet to be fully understood transformation of our forces.

Added to the above is yet another set of problems which has been sitting in the wings for years; problems related to building up the CF's air and sea lift capability, maintaining a viable maritime patrol capability, providing land forces with effective firepower from the air (which means acquiring attack helicopters), a weapons-effects simulator, and lastly a capability referred to as ISTAR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance), an equipment suite which would provide the army with the ability to see what is "out there" in all weather, day or night.

Last, but certainly foremost insofar as the navy is concerned, is replacement of the Sea King helicopters. This programme will remain on the back-burner until the navy stops claiming the overage helicopters are capable of doing a good job and are safe - an example of the "can-do factor" carried to the extreme. The claim that the Sea Kings are safe because of good maintenance is accepted. However, what is one to think when the news report of a frigate returning from the Arabian Sea tells us that the normal routine of flying off the Sea King to transit to Shearwater as the ship approaches Halifax, was cancelled because the aircraft was not considered safe to launch.

Political interference regarding the Sea King replacement programme has been evident since the Prime Minister cancelled the EH-101 contract in 1994. The question is: why does our government continue to deny our modern frigates the inherent utility and force-multiplier of a new shipborne helicopter equipped with a diverse range of avionics, sensors, weapons systems, etc.? The maritime helicopter is a significant force-multiplier in that it provides a wide variety of functions from simple utility roles, to applied tactical roles. As a point of interest, has anyone in DND or NDHQ explained to the politicians that organic helicopters are platforms vital for use in tactical assignments? They extend the sensor and weapon range of a frigate, effectively becoming the eyes, ears and long-range sting of the ship.

Time and space obviously does not permit a detailed explanation of the many tactical roles assigned to shipborne helicopters. Size limitations and equipment fitted in the helicopter determine the capacity to undertake roles other than simple utility roles.

What our frigates need - and they need it soon if they are to be regarded as an effective multi-role maritime asset - is a new helicopter that will fulfil all the necessary requirements.

This is essential if our ships are to continue to be sent on NATO and UN missions; missions which our political leaders are only too ready to undertake without any apparent concern for the potential of combat action.

They appear to have no understanding of the fact that those who are sent to carry out these missions, are frequently improperly equipped or supported.

One Liberal MP has already decided to break ranks and criticize the government for the eight year delay in replacing the Sea King. Hopefully others will follow his move!