The Government's Juggernaut
To Military Downsizing

Dare one suggest that the decade of the nineties has been one in which Canada's foreign and defence policies have evolved on an ad hoc basis under a government which refuses to recognize the seriousness of the changing international situation? This is especially true in the post September 11, 2001 period, when at its peril, it continues to ignore the importance of fulfilling the needs of the armed forces.

With so many conflicting headlines concerning the war on terrorism, now is not an easy time to comment on the state of readiness or combat-capability of the Canadian Forces. Witness the parade of confusing statements the government has proffered concerning the deployment of the military to Afghanistan, the possibility of terrorist activity in Canada, the apparent inadequacy of intelligence gathering by the poorly funded Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), our questionable immigration policy, and finally, our military leaders stating the CF is in better shape today than at any other time during the past decade.

Recognizing the existing CF air and sea lift deficiencies, surely the government and the military recognized that the deployment of our forces to Afghanistan would not be trouble free. Canada's ability to deliver support to NATO and UN commitments was clearly threatened by the obvious shortcomings of what can best be described as a "frayed" and "fatigued" military.¹

The navy is generally in good shape, excluding the Sea King and pending support ship issues. The failure to deliver replacement helicopters for the Sea King has meant that our frigates have been deprived of the important multiplier effect new helicopters would deliver to the ships' tactical capability. Without a modern weapon system, the Sea King has resorted to a carrier of water, hewer of wood role for the USN Arabian Sea task force. Briefly, they are not equipped to be assigned a full tactical role that would call for a tactical equipment capability this helicopter does not possess.

Other CF deficiencies appear in a variety of forms. The lack of reliable air and sea lift capability comprised a deficiency which impacted directly on the deployment of the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI) to Afghanistan. Having to rely on the US to squeeze in on a space-available (read: "stand-by") basis, small groups of the total deployed force, was an embarrassing experience for our military.1 Reaction of the US Ambassador to Canada regarding our air lift problem was enlightening. He said, "US military does not mind transporting Canadian troops and equipment to war zones, but it is about time Canada developed its own strategic air lift capability."² That comment could have a great deal of relevance should our forces ever be required to make an emergency withdrawal from a war zone and have to go on "stand-by" to board US aircraft, or as an alternative, quickly locate a leased aircraft contractor prepared to send their aircraft into a war zone.

The ever-present force strength issue, the rust-out of CF equipment, and the problem of insufficient resources and logistic support to sustain forces for lengthy periods once deployed overseas, must give our military planners migraines. Thankfully, our forces in Afghanistan have access to the supply support system provided by the US.

The aforementioned comprise an impressive list of deficiencies which the PM, the Chief of the Defence Staff and a bevy of senior military leaders deny are a problem.

Before one starts out on a mission of criticism of our senior military leaders, it must be recognized that generals and admirals are servants of the government and therefore have little choice but to go along with the decisions made by their political masters. Witness the complacent reaction to Deputy Prime Minister John Manley's observation that, "Our influence in foreign policy terms is in part, a function of our ability to deliver in defence terms.³ Or do the politicians honestly feel that being shielded by three oceans and the most powerful nation on earth, Canada is not vulnerable to threats?

The government's blissful response concerning the threats in the world may well have accounted for the code of denial which politicians and military leaders have followed throughout the decade of the nineties.

Even so, there are questions to be asked, e.g., could so many critics of our military capability be wrong? More important, who's been telling the truth? Surely we cannot accept the word of the Prime Minister who has repeatedly suggested our forces are well equipped, especially when compared to the forces of our allies who, as the Canadians For Military Preparedness say, "… now pay polite lip service to our military capabilities, if and when they acknowledge them at all."⁴ How many honestly believe that the PM's suggestion the lobbyists for the armament industry and retired generals with a "1939" mentality, played a part in creating a false impression of Canada's combat readiness?

Critics suggest the government has misled the Canadian public about the true nature of Canada's ability to meet national and international threats to our security. The most recent escapade appears in the form of charging the military budget $101 million to purchase new Challenger jet aircraft to replace the existing military Challengers which are used to fly the PM and his cabinet around the world. The Chief of the Defence Staff maintains the replacement is not warranted. Concomitantly, the air force urgently requires strategic air lift capability to deploy military personnel and their equipment abroad and to respond to domestic emergencies.⁵ It is suggested politicians have been quietly attempting to win votes by redirecting funds from defence to special interest groups, enforcing political correctness and social engineering on the military, all to the detriment of purchasing new equipment and maintaining recognized training standards.

Regardless of which side of the argument one assumes, it is apparent that as long as the DND budget is underfunded, Canada will continue to move in the direction of creating a demilitarized army and less effective air and maritime forces. In the long run, the CF will be hard pressed to even respond to domestic emergencies, a task usually given to our understaffed and poorly funded reserve forces, or to properly patrol our coastal waters and air space. And least of all, contribute to and sustain for extended periods overseas, combat-capable, loudly acclaimed interoperable forces of any size.

Notwithstanding the government's obvious reluctance to provide the CF with the personnel and equipment to undertake the many tasks the politicians believe Canada should accept from the UN or NATO, our maritime forces attached to Operation Apollo are doing a commendable job. Thankfully, the Friends of Maritime Air (FOMA) have kept a watchful eye on the performance of the Sea Kings deployed with our ships in the Arabian Sea. As one of the most well informed and reliable sources of information concerning the use and effectiveness of these helicopters, a few observations taken from a recent unpublished FOMA paper, are deemed appropriate to mention here.⁶

FOMA confirms the Sea King has deficiencies that only a new shipborne helicopter will address. Specifically, the Sea King's design lacks the growth ability to generate and distribute more electrical power and data within the aircraft, and therefore, to transmit or receive similar data from other ships and aircraft. This makes it a questionable effective tactical weapon. In other words, the aircraft lacks a data link to exchange data. It also needs an integrated navigation system that would allow it to exchange accurate geographic positions of our own aircraft and contacts important to the task group. The inadequate Sea King communications suite prohibits full exchange of information with all members of the task group … and the list goes on.

Many government reports claim the Sea Kings are being employed with great success. We accept the claim that good ship-based maintenance ensures the helicopters are safe to fly. What DND reports conveniently fail to mention is that missions the Sea Kings undertake represent a small subset of tasks of the total mission for which maritime helicopters are doctrinally tasked to perform under the yet to be approved Maritime Helicopter Programme. Statement of Requirements.

The delay in awarding the contract for a new shipborne helicopter borders on reprehensible. Even if the contract were to be signed tomorrow, the new aircraft would not likely begin to come on stream before 2011. Meanwhile, Sea King air and maintenance crews justifiably take pride in their performance in Operation Apollo.

At this writing, twenty-three years has elapsed since the finalization of the original shipborne aircraft statement of requirements in 1979. One Liberal MP has already decided to break ranks and criticize the government for the eight year delay in replacing the shipborne helicopter contract.⁷

The contract, cancelled by the PM as an election promise made in 1993, has cost the Canadian taxpayer $500 million. An unidentified source tells us there is a possibility of a further $400 million which could come as a consequence of implementing a new contract procedure if and when the final contract is awarded. Add to this the heavy charges that have been expended keeping the geriatric Sea Kings in the air beyond their originally planned replacement date, and one soon concludes the PM's cancellation game was a very costly political move.

There is an obvious disconnect between what the government tells us and that which it is prepared to do in practical terms. One thing is certain, the Sea King replacement programme must take top priority. The sad part of this whole story is that if the Sea King and other important military equipment programmes have not been started when the next federal election takes place, national domestic priorities such as health care, education and the usual pork barrelling can be expected to resurface and supplant the real security needs of our country. Should this happen, the CF will experience further setbacks which will prevent our regular and reserve forces from dealing with basic domestic and international emergencies.

FOOTNOTES:

1. Jim Farrell, "Disorganized Airlifts Leave Canadian Troops Waiting For Gear," Southam News, February 2002.
2. Mike Blanchfield, "Cellucci Suggests We Buy Our Own Planes," National Post, February 20, 2002.
3. Jim Travers, "Share Defence Or Be Tossed Aside," Toronto Star, February 26, 2002.
4. Canadians For Military Preparedness web site, www.c4mp.org follow link to opinion.
5. Editorial, National Post, April 10, 2002.
6. Col.(Ret'd) Lee Myrhaugen, "Sea King Successes In Operation Apollo do not Negate Need for Replacement," unpublished paper, Friends of Maritime Aviation, April 2002.
7. Mike Blanchfield, "MP Joins Helicopter Backlash," National Post, February 11, 2002.