The Moment of Truth Has Arrived

Identify the Issues and Options
Then Build a Better Vision

In what has become a hallmark of successive federal governments, Canada's military has been given a new Minister of National Defence part way into the government's current mandate, and at a time when many see the forces in a near crisis situation. The replacement of the Hon. Art Eggleton as the Minister of National Defence (MND), came at a time when the Canadian Forces (CF) have been described as beyond the point of collapse; an observation confirmed by the Liberal chair of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs (SCONDVA), when he is reported to have agreed that the Forces are in dismal shape after decades of government cuts.¹

As Allen Macartney wrote in a Halifax Herald article, "the state of Canada's military should surprise no one."² We are all aware that throughout the term of office of the recently fired Art Eggleton, defence experts, military planners, veterans' organizations (including your own Association's National President who appeared before the Commons Defence Committee³), journalists, academics, parliamentary committees, Auditor-General's reports, etc., have drawn constant attention to the underfunding of the Canadian Forces. This underfunding has accounted for serious equipment deficiencies, personnel shortages, quality of life and low morale issues throughout the Forces. Indeed, the situation begs the question: how does the Canadian government reach the conclusion so many authorities and individuals can be wrong in their assessment of the state and effectiveness of our armed forces? Especially when one reads the following in the most recent SCONDVA report (May 2002): "In June 2001, we tabled our Report on Plans and Priorities where we recommended inter alia, that the government re-examine its spending plans for the next two fiscal years with a view of increasing the budget for the DND. Finally, in November 2001, our Committee tabled its report, State of Readiness of the Canadian Forces: Response to the Terrorist Threat, wherein we again recommended that DND's budget be increased. Here we also call for a greater emphasis on strategic lift, as well as an increase in Special Forces."⁴

It is generally accepted that neither the Prime Minister nor his all-important Finance Minister, has ever expressed much interest in defence. Regrettably, until 9/11, the modus operandi of government when dealing with the effectiveness and state of readiness of the armed forces, was to mislead Canadians concerning the real truthful issues and options that have been, and are, open to the CF. All of which prompts the questions: what are the real truthful issues and options that have been, and remain open to the CF, and what is the vision the government has, or should have, concerning Canada's armed forces? These are critical questions, especially when examined in the light of the appointment of a new MND who must move through a steep learning curve before he is in any position to make a truly worthy assessment of what ails the CF. But wait … hope may merge from a series of reports and statements emanating from government and military circles.

The May 2002 SCONDVA report provides a hint as to some of the issues which will confront the new MND, the Hon. John McCallum. The report outlines twenty-five recommendations, each of which demonstrates conclusively that in addition to resolving the equipment replacement problems and a host of other issues confronting the Forces, there is an urgent need to review Canada's defence and foreign policy. Time and space preclude comment upon each of these recommendations, however, the Committee's concluding remarks are worth noting when they say their report, "is only one element in the debate on this country's relationship with the rest of the world, reminding Canadians that much of the influence that we can and do exert on world affairs, depends on maintaining and improving our military capabilities."⁵

In a June 22 article in the National Post, J. L. Granatstein reminds us of several important issues which place the entire armed forces deficiency issue in a framework which the government especially, as well as the new MND, cannot be allowed to ignore. First, he reminds us that opinion polls have shown Canadians think their military forces need repair and should be cooperating more closely with the United States. He names three key think tanks which have added their voices to the swell of public support for the military. They are: the Fraser Institute, the C. D. Howe Institute, and the Institute for Research in Public Policy. He leaves us with a thought provoking message when he writes, "If the think tanks on the right are putting their tax-cutting proclivities aside to argue for rebuilding the military, something has changed in Canada."⁶

The scope of the problem confronting the CF is complex. So much so that one is hard-pressed to identify a starting point for discussion. This is especially true when considering the issues, options and vision which, of necessity, should be the focal point of our politicians and Canadians who have an interest in the state of their Navy. Let's use the state of readiness as a starting point.

Are the forces operationally ready, and for what? Perhaps enlightening to many of us, one notes the recent Auditor-General's report which states that NDHQ management had decided to reduce the readiness levels of CF equipment because of budget constraints, and because the international situation no longer warranted high levels of readiness.⁷ An interesting observation since neither the MND nor the senior military consulted Canadians about their decision, indeed, they blatantly ignored the many first-rate reports pointing to the weaknesses in Canada's defence.

It took the events of September 11th to bring forward an obviously changed position regarding the perceived state of affairs within the CF. Notwithstanding the efforts of the government to tell Canadians all was well, and certain military leaders telling us our combat readiness was the best it had ever been over the past ten years, NDHQ had no choice but to acknowledge that the state of military equipment, the inadequacy of air in-flight refuelling tanker capability, air and sea lift capability, and by extension the operational readiness of the forces was being questioned.

Which brings us to the point where one reminds the MND of the problems cited by the Chief of the Maritime Staff (CMS) when he appeared before the SCONDVA committee.⁸

But first, a brief history lesson concerning the Navy. In WWI, WWII and Korea, the Canadian Navy was the first of our armed forces' elements to deploy to the war zone. In the case of operations related to the so-called War on Terrorism, our Navy was obviously the best prepared element following September 11th to deploy its resources, when they sailed for the Arabian Sea on Operation Apollo.

Notwithstanding this first-class response effort, the CMS, as reported by SCONDVA, expressed reservations concerning the state of readiness of the Navy.⁹ At this point it should be noted that the Hon. Mr. Eggleton, then-MND, in an obvious attempt to divert criticism of the situation confronting the navy, army and air force as related to the war in Afghanistan, stated that circumstances suggested the 1994 Defence White Paper was no longer a valid policy document. He announced that a new public defence review would be held. The long overdue defence review would let the forces know what they were expected to be able to do. Actually, the Navy with Leadmark, The Navy's Strategy for 2020, and the Army with Advancing With Purpose, had already made an effort to determine the best direction to take to meet the challenges of today and tomorrow. The Army Strategy set out their resources as efficiently as possible to fulfil their commitments.

Until the government states unequivocally that the 1994 Defence White Paper is no longer valid as a policy document - and incidentally, some people believe it is still a relatively acceptable policy document, as long as the government provides proper funds for its implementation — all one can do is speculate as to what are perceived to be the issues confronting the Navy.

One perspective claims the issues confronting the Navy can be briefly identified as: personnel shortages (causing HMCS Huron to be side-lined for want of a crew), cancellation of the EH 101 contract and the prolonged delay in replacing the overage Sea King helicopters, and preparing a statement of requirements for new supply/support ships which will facilitate the acquisition of a sea lift capability together with maintaining an under way replenishment capability for our own maritime task groups.

The direct extract from the SCONDVA report reads as follows:

Among the problems cited by the Chief of the Maritime Staff were:

• The Navy will not be able to deliver its mandated level of maritime defence capability without additional resources.
• The increased cost of fuel, combined with no flexibility in operating budgets, will lead to a reduction in fleet operations.
• Maintaining a balance between sustaining current capabilities at a minimum level, investing in "quality of life,"generating savings for the future and implementing change, remains elusive (if for example, we concentrate on future technologies and save for these by not investing in current capabilities, we might run into problems if called upon for an extensive deployment).
• The Navy faces serious personnel shortages in a number of trades and specialities.
• Force development studies for major ship and system modernization are in jeopardy due to lack of funds.
• Aircraft fleet reductions, national procurement reductions and a shortage of personnel, will have a direct impact on the Navy's ability to conduct surveillance and control of Canadian territory.

Now let's put some of our own cards on the table with an interpretation of what the CMS told SCONDVA.

First, what is about to be said here is entirely speculation. The issues which will be introduced are strictly the author's interpretation of the CMS' comments.

The Navy needs more and better equipped ships and aircraft if it is to undertake the task of properly patrolling and providing effective surveillance of our territorial waters, including those in the Arctic. The proper training experience ashore and afloat for all personnel, will not be forthcoming because of the shortage of funds. Reacting to the revolution in military affairs (RMA), and the transformation of the CF, as well as the improvement of interoperability and joint forces concept, will be held in abeyance while the CF waits for proper funding.

The Navy has personnel problems which will take years to correct, even if recruiting programs attract large numbers of people. The time to train and assign new recruits to meaningful, important tasks, will take time. More importantly, where are the people to train these new recruits, especially when we hear that trainers have been removed from fleet schools to fill critically needed positions afloat? While the personnel shortage issue accelerates, the Navy will be hard-pressed to develop plans for new sea lift capability or under way replenishment ships. While the Navy's ship replacement issues go unattended, Canada's struggling shipbuilding industry will disappear. There will be no capability to build ships when the go-ahead is given. One might add that countless Canadian firms lost contracts, and more important, the opportunity to build a successful electronic support system capability was lost when the EH 101 contract was cancelled.

Briefly, as a result of misguided policy, SCONDVA concluded that the problems identified by the CMS "have the potential to severely degrade fleet operations and effectiveness." Followed by a comment which concluded "as if the foregoing were not enough, the Navy may also be saddled with the responsibility of Arctic sovereignty and security patrols as the polar ice melts."¹⁰

Finally, it should be noted that both the Chief of the Air Staff and the Army Chief of Staff delivered similar pessimistic messages concerning the state of the CF.

The twenty-five SCONDVA recommendations provide a first step to forming a sound foundation for the development of a more effective CF which will be capable of reacting to the revolution in military affairs, and undertake a long overdue transformation of the CF resulting in a more effective interoperable military force.

Canadians have a stake in seeing that our armed forces adjust to the new world out there. The new MND has a greater responsibility, that of carrying the correct message to his caucus colleagues with the warning that the time has arrived when action must take precedence over vague political rhetoric.

If political expediency takes over, the future of the CF will be lost. In the meantime, as responsible members of the NOAC, our task is to inform our fellow citizens of the undesirable situation the government has created. More importantly, we must let our Members of Parliament know in no uncertain terms that they are part of the problem if they continue to accept the status quo of inactivity on the part of our government.

FOOTNOTES:

1. Allen Macartney, "Last Post for Canadian Armed Forces," Halifax Herald, June 18, 2002.
2. Ibid..
3. Report of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs, May 2002, p.55.
4. Ibid., p.2.
5. Ibid., p.82.
6. J. L. Granatstein, "Better Days Ahead for the Military," National Post, June 22, 2002.
7. Report of the Auditor-General of Canada - 2001, p.1. Report of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs, May 2002, p.23.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid. p.24.