When Will the Government Reconcile
Rhetoric With Reality?

LEADMARK n. - a navigational term for a mark ashore which, when brought in line with another mark, can provide a safe lead for the ship through a channel.

Although the 1994 Defence White Paper seemed to call for a reasonable level of military capability, time has proven that it can no longer be used as an all-inclusive policy guide for the future development of the Canadian Forces. While it is evident that as a consequence of the September 11th attack on America the government has been forced to examine military perspectives on the "war on terrorism," it cannot avoid assessing the need to transform our military forces to deal with 21st century security threats.

The unsatisfactory situation confronting the military was well documented by defence critics long before September 11th. Concomitantly, the Minister of National Defence's response was to the effect that defence critics were out of touch with current military realities.¹ A strange reaction because virtually every document prepared by defence critics "who cull much of their information from DND documents,² supports the claim that the CF is in trouble and the government must move quickly if it is to reverse the decline of CF operational units.

Released by DND in 1999, Shaping the Future of Canadian Defence: A Strategy for 2020 (Strategy 2020) is the keystone reference for all force development initiatives within the CF and DND.³ Strategy 2020 likely prompted the Chief of the Maritime Staff to release Leadmark: The Navy's Strategy for 2020 in June 2001. Described as a critical link to the capability-based planning framework set in place by Strategy 2020, Leadmark we are told, is not a shopping list but rather a strategic document intended to provide the rationale for capabilities required to fulfil projected naval tasks. It affirms that it is descriptive.⁴

In their To Secure A Nation: A Case for a New Defence White Paper published in late 2001, the Council for Canadian Security in the 21st Century questioned the relevance of the 1994 Defence White Paper stating, "There are today, enough 'holes' in that document - significant fresh issues not discussed, and new questions not answered."⁵

Observing that the Minister of National Defence, Art Eggleton wants a new white paper to help the forces to live within their means, one might ask, how would a new white paper impact on Leadmark's strategic plan?⁶

The faint hearted way the government handled events following September 11th suggested Canada did not have a clear strategic policy to guide the Canadian Forces. Understandably, open criticism and justifiable doubt surfaced about the combat-capability and state of readiness of certain elements of our armed forces. Incidents where openness and transparency of communications concerning military decisions seems to be wanting only serve to fuel the fires of concern.

Blatantly, the Prime Minister, Minister of National Defence and the Chief of the Defence Staff, continued to deny virtually every critical observation made by the media, retired military, defence analysts, academics, the US Ambassador to Canada and the Secretary General of NATO. Not to overlook the last two Auditor-General reports which criticized the way the government has handled defence matters, is it reasonable to assume that so many people could be wrong? Time and space do not permit an in-depth discussion of Leadmark in these pages. Suffice to say that while it makes for interesting reading, one cannot avoid asking, "where's the beef?".

The foreword to Leadmark provides abbreviated insight into its content and purpose when it accepts Strategy 2020 as the keystone reference for all CF development initiatives. Leadmark documents, in rather verbose terms, "the principles of naval strategy essential for a medium power such as Canada."⁷ In other words, as a strategic plan it aims to provide: "the rationale (the why) for capabilities (the what) required to fulfil the roles and functions projected for the navy of 2020 and beyond."⁸ And then comes the kicker, "The implementation of this strategy (the how) will be directed in a follow-on document providing tangible instructions from which staff can develop requirements."⁹ The federal budget provides the answer to the latter comment. Underfunding is to continue, suggesting nothing will change. There will likely be a continuation of the delay in negotiating a contract to replace our aging Sea King fleet (now not expected to be delivered before 2011!), plus a lot of rhetoric, debate and indecision about replacing our aging supply ships with a new class of ship capable of supporting naval task groups at sea and providing sealift in support of overseas deployments.

Sadly, Leadmark is unlikely to influence the government as the latter continues to demonstrate its unwillingness to resolve ongoing maritime equipment and force strength issues. It does however, provide the foundation for the question - when, if ever, does the government intend to provide the funds needed for the acquisition of capital equipment required by our armed forces if they intend to respond to both domestic and international tasks in the 21st century?

Question: is the Defence Minister prone to ignore his Report on Plans and Priorities 2000? In this report he stated: "Defence must strengthen its capital equipment program. The Canadian Forces equipment inventory is aging rapidly, and as the Auditor-General reported in 1998, without increased capital investment, the Canadian Forces will eventually 'rust out'."¹⁰ The latest Auditor-General's report tabled recently made a similar observation but in stronger terms. The aforementioned Minister's report adds, "At this level of investment (remember the report was prepared two years ago), defence will not be able to stay ahead of the demands associated with renewing, upgrading and modernizing its equipment over time." Defence critics claim the CF is almost at that critical point now, but everyone in government appears to disagree.

What might be regarded as a carefully planned delaying tactic came in early December when Defence Minister Art Eggleton announced that he wanted a new review of defence policy. A way of saying that he wants a new white paper that would presumably tell us what defence policy will be as Canada moves into the 21st century.

Speculation: might a new white paper prove to be a way of confirming that what has taken place in the past decade has been right for Canada? More seriously, it will likely confirm the suspicion that the government has no intention of meeting all the CF financial needs.

Everyone knows the government failed to properly fund the armed forces during the surplus boom which it enjoyed during the past few years. Understandably, it will now be more difficult to fund Canadian Forces' needs properly in this time of incipient economic recession. However, if it is at all serious about putting the armed forces on the proper footing, it cannot avoid loosening the purse strings to support the case for maintaining improved military capabilities.

Professor Martin Shadwick's commentary under the heading "The Leadmark Chronicles," found in the Canadian Military Journal, describes an acceptable reaction to Leadmark when he writes, "Some sections of Leadmark, to be sure, make constructive and thought-provoking efforts to explain why Canada needs a navy, but others fall short or smother potentially useful arguments under the dead-weight of excess verbiage."¹¹

FOOTNOTES

1. The Army That Couldn't Fight, Terry O'Neill, Alberta Report, October 22, 2001, p.14.
2. ibid.
3. Leadmark: The Navy's Strategy For 2020, Directorate of Maritime Strategy, NDHQ/Chief of the Maritime Staff, Ottawa (2001), Foreword.
4. ibid., p.6.
5. To Secure A Nation: The Case For a New Defence White Paper, Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary, November 2001. p.viii.
6. Canadian Press, "Eggleton Pushes For Defence Review," Calgary Herald, December 18, 2001.
7. Leadmark, Foreword.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. National Defence, "Report on Plans and Priorities 2000," DND.
11. "Commentary," Martin Shadwick, Canadian Military Journal, Vol. 2 No. 3, Autumn 2001, p.75.