Are the Canadian Armed Forces On A ...
MISSION IMPOSSIBLE?

Often, a country's military lack of combat power tends not to be admitted by either the military or the government leaders, and for good reason, it is always in everyone's best interest to say that the military is in good shape. At least this is what those who have studied the causes of war have concluded.1 One of the more critical observations tells us, "Often, however, soldiers are unwilling to risk the political heat from giving their superiors an accurate appraisal of an unpleasant military situation."2

This is not to suggest this always happens in Canada's National Defence Headquarters, but it does prompt one to ask serious questions about the possibility the traditional division between our senior military officers and public servants seems to be blurred; supporting the suggestion that political decisions seem to be ruling the day, even in the most mundane of military matters.

In his 1999-2000 Annual Report, the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) warned that tough choices are in order if Canada is to ensure the sustainability of the Canadian Forces.

Checking out the headlines of six of a nine-part series on a military in decline, written by David Pugliese and published in the Ottawa Citizen, warns that the time for tough decisions has arrived.

FORCES TO AXE TROOPS AND BASES, tells us the CDS is prepared to "cash in" up to 3,000 soldiers in order to find funds to help pay for much-needed equipment. 500 Air Force personnel who currently provide electronic warfare and air force combat support are on the CDS' hit list.

FORCES' TOUGHEST BATTLE: HR (Human Resources), opens with the observation that the CDS has stated, "the Canadian military would be the employer of tomorrow." Then we are told that defence analysts and critics maintain the armed forces are headed for a crisis in recruiting. The Minister of National Defence adds his input after the article was published, announcing that Canada expects to contribute 400 soldiers to a 4,200 member peacekeeping operation in Ethiopia! Next comes a comment made by a senior official in the Auditor-General's office who is reported to have said, "The government is not providing the public with essential information to be able to discuss the highest level of defence management issues."3

FORCES TO CONTRACT OUT KEY COMBAT SUPPORT SERVICES describes what is probably one of the most controversial issues existing throughout the armed forces, i.e., the implementation of the government's Alternate Service Delivery Programme policy. A policy intended to contract out as many military functions as possible. NDHQ plans to sign a $420 million deal with a private contractor to provide aircraft and pilots to perform jobs now being done by military personnel and equipment. Privatization of the military supply system is on the list. Information obtained via the Access to Information Act confirms that even with a reduction in the level of service, it will still cost more to have industry handle the jobs. Privatization of military functions through the alternate delivery service plan was to save $200 million by 1999. The Auditor-General found the programme was saving only about $68 million.

HIGH TECH - LOW PERFORMANCE states the obvious, "Sophisticated equipment requires money and advanced training, both in short supply in the Canadian Forces." Citing examples found in the three services, we are given a list of incidents wherein serious equipment usage problems prevail. In the main, poor training, the sophistication of the equipment, and cuts to budgets that prevent more practice firings, account for expensive mistakes.

Added to all this is a new issue. The Canadian Forces have yet to decide how they will deal with the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). Basically, RMA means Canada must be prepared to spend more money on sophisticated technical equipment and certainly more money on advanced training. Two needs which politicians and the civilian cadre in NDHQ apparently refuse to recognize, while they focus their attention on implementing the alternate supply delivery policy.

WHITHER OUR WARRIORS describes the debate that our forces are becoming a kinder, gentler, and ultimately ineffective fighting machine through lowering fitness standards to accommodate women. Critics claim this change has been instrumental in producing an army unsuited for soldiering. Time will tell.

THE POLITICIZATION OF THE OFFICER CORPS strikes a sensitive note. It leads off with the statement, "It's a common complaint among soldiers and defence analysts that senior commanders put the political well-being of the Defence Minister ahead of their troops." Examples of cover-up cited in this article will not be discussed here. Suffice to say they lend credence to the statements made in Dunnigan and Martels' book, "How To Stop A War" referred to previously (see footnotes).

There are more articles to come in the Citizen. Hopefully they will all serve to prompt Canadians to recognize that the apparent lack of Canada's commitment to multipurpose, combat-capable forces, raises serious questions about the credibility of our foreign and defence policies.

Meanwhile, will somebody please pass me the Tylenol!

FOOTNOTES:

1 James F. Dunnigan & William Martel, "How To Stop A War," Doubleday (1987).

2 Ibid.

3 Ottawa Citizen, Oct. 18, 2000, "Culture of Secrecy Blankets DND Spending" by Mike Blanchfield.

(Originally Published in Vol. VII, No. 12, Autumn 2000 issue of Starshell)