By Anthony Griffin
LA PERLE as she appeared ca.1938. Photo courtesy the
Naval Museum of Alberta.
La Perle was a large Free French submarine with a crew of sixty.1 She
was provided to the Free French by the Admiralty as a replacement for
an even larger submarine Surcouf, which had been sunk in mysterious circumstances
earlier in the war. La Perle had refitted in New London, Connecticut in
mid-1944, and in early July of that year sailed to St. John's, Newfoundland
en route to Holy Loch, UK.
I was Staff Officer (Operations) to the Flag Officer Newfoundland Force
(FONF) at the time of La Perle's arrival, and was responsible for sailing
the submarine in her onward passage. Her course was set to avoid, as far
as was feasible, known concentrations of U-boats as well as all convoys.
As related in the series "A Naval Officer's War," episode six
in Starshell, I took a great deal of trouble with La Perle's sailing orders,
going over the prescribed routeing with her captain and noting in particular
the "safe corridor" to be maintained of twenty miles on both
sides, and fifty miles ahead and astern of her course, within which Allied
ships and aircraft were warned not to attack (as they normally would)
without establishing recognition by the appropriate signals and flares.
Above all, we ensured that all ships and establishments were informed
of the submarine's passage.
La Perle sailed at 2100Z (GMT) on July 3, 1944-on the surface at eight
knots. I watched her progress along the large, magnetized chart facing
my glassed-in office in the combined operations room. She proceeded without
incident to the mid-ocean point CHOP where, at an hour based on an agreed
approximate position, operational control of the submarine was changed
to C-in-C Western Approaches.
Shortly after that hour, I noticed that a westbound convoy, ONM 243, had
been rerouted rather close to La Perle and I notified FONF of the situation.
He came down at once to the operations room and together we gazed at the
chart, wondering if we should express our uneasiness.
ONM 243, consisting of 89 ships, including two Merchant Aircraft Carriers
(MACships), had sailed from Liverpool on July 3, destined for New York.
It was escorted by Canadian Escort Group C-5 with the frigate HMCS Dunver
(Lt. Wilfred Davenport RCNR) bearing "additional" the Senior
Officer Escorts (SOE), Commander George H. Stephen, DSC, OBE, RCNR. Five
corvettes completed the group. Although La Perle was soon given an alteration
of course, presumably to take her less close to ONM 243, she remained
well within range of the MACship's aircraft.
At 1243Z on July 8, a Swordfish aircraft from the MACship Empire MacCallum
sighted La Perle and requested instructions. There followed exchanges
of signals between the SOE, the convoy Commodore, and the MACships; also
between the SOE direct with the aircraft by radio telephone (R/T)-all
having to do with what to do.
The submarine remained on the surface, made no hostile indications and,
indeed, tried to establish recognition (which was interpreted by the aircraft
as a ruse de guerre). Finally, the aircraft signalled the group that it
and another aircraft which had also been flown off, were attacking. The
SOE informed C-in-CWA who replied, "I fear you have attacked La Perle."
She was sunk by rockets and depth charges at 1410Z. There was only one
survivor.
It was immediately apparent-especially to those of us who had been in
anyway involved in the tragedy-that "someone had blunder'd;"
that somewhere along the line-in light of the precise details about La
Perle's passage that had been so widely distributed-serious, even gross
negligence had occurred.
A Board of Inquiry was convened in Halifax. It was headed by Captain David
Laidlaw, Chief of Staff to Admiral L. W. Murray, Commander-in-Chief Canadian
Northwest Atlantic (C-in-CCNA), and included a senior French Captain and
an RNR Commander (A). The Board called many witnesses, the prime one being
of course, the SOE, Commander George Stephen.
George Stephen was a highly respected, experienced officer who had joined
the RCNR in 1934. He was an outstanding seaman who had earned a DSC, the
OBE and a Mention-in-Despatches for difficult and valuable salvage operations,
as well as a bar to his DSC for his part in the sinking of U845. He was
devoted to duty and despite a rough, autocratic manner, possessed a quality
of leadership and the loyalty of his subordinates. He was in high favour
with the naval establishment.
After deep examination, the crux of the Board's findings was a failure
of communications in Dunver. It is not difficult for anyone serving at
the time to see how confusion in command structure could arise in a ship
which bore "additional" a Group Senior Officer. This would apply
especially in signals, where two authorities on board, the SOE (with his
own group signals officer) and the captain (with his ship's signals officer)
shared the same operational facilities.
It became clear in the Inquiry that the whole signals procedure in Dunver,
mainly the allocation of precise areas of responsibility, was notably
disorganized. Stephen himself maintained throughout the Inquiry that although
he knew La Perle was on passage, he was not aware of her close proximity
when he received the aircraft's first sighting report. Therefore, even
though over an hour passed during which, instead of ordering the aircraft
to immediately abort the attack procedure pending confirmation of the
submarine's identity, he allowed the attack to go forward.
On receipt of the Board of Inquiry's report in Ottawa, the Naval Board
decreed that Dunver's captain, Lieutenant Davenport, had incurred "the
severe displeasure of the Department for not exercising closer supervision
over the signals of the group" (my italics). When that decision reached
St. John's, we on FONF's staff were outraged. A strong memorandum from
FONF expressing his and Captain D's critical opinion, went forward to
Ottawa requesting a reversal of NSHQ's decision. This request was accepted
and the "severe displeasure" was instead imposed on Stephen
"for failure to exercise complete control over the escorts in his
command." There the matter remained and Stephen continued as SOE.
Fifty-seven years later, out of the blue, I received a letter from a man
unknown to me, John Seale of Vancouver, who after the war became an award-winning
cinematographer with the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. He had read
the piece in Starshell and wished to make a disclosure. It was a stunning
one.
John Seale had been a young (25) leading signalman in Dunver during her
voyage with ONM 243. He was responsible for distributing daily "situation
reports" from Admiralty recording the position, course and speed
of all ships and convoys east of CHOP. He was on the bridge at the time
of the attack.
Seals says that each morning at 0800, he brought the daily signals first
to the SOE, then to Dunver's captain and first lieutenant. All three of
them were requested to sign as having seen the signals; the captain and
first lieutenant did, but the SOE peremptorily-and rudely-refused. All
of these signals showed La Perle's position. Seale also maintains that
he mentioned to Stephen on a couple of occasions that La Perle was getting
closer. He was invariably rebuffed.
When the aircraft made its first sighting report over the R/T and asked
for instructions (itself an indication that La Perle's presence was known
in the MACships) according to Seale, Stephen then seized the R/T and shouted
"sink the bastard," whereupon Seale shouted, "Sir, that
may be the French submarine!"
All this was a long time ago. It would be unfair to the memory of a naval
officer, long since departed and with a distinguished record, to pass
a further disparaging judgement on his part in this tragic affair. But
history demands the disclosure of all evidence, even if conclusions remain
elusive.
It does appear that some mysterious obsession may have gripped George
Stephen, eliminating from his mind any suggestion, from whatever the source,
that any submarine in the western ocean could be other than a U-boat.
He had, after all, been at sea continuously for over three years in conditions
demanding total preoccupation with battle-on unequal terms-against a most
dangerous and ruthless enemy. Had his judgement become impaired? Was he
sea-weary beyond rational thought? In his defence, it should be added
that a signal from the US C-in-C (COMINCH) had, erroneously, put a U-boat
within reach of the MACships' aircraft. Also, at the last moment (too
late), he did have second thoughts and did try to confirm the submarine's
identity.
Some further questions with the benefit of hindsight:
Stephen was a first class ship's captain, but was he an example of the
Peter Principle? Had he as SOE, in command of several ships, been given
an assignment one notch above his level of competence? The "severe
displeasure" imposed on Stephen was, after all, precisely because
of his failure to establish his organizational authority over his ships,
notably the MACships' aircraft which at that stage of the battle, had
become a chief weapon of anti-submarine warfare.
One must wonder why the Board of Inquiry did not call every person on
the bridge of Dunver at the time to give evidence. Leading signalman Seale,
a key witness, was in hospital at Halifax, but his evidence could certainly
have been obtained. This ought to have clarified the question of Stephen's
doubt as to La Perle's actual daily position, a question which the Board
of
Inquiry had to leave unanswered.
The attitude of Dunver's captain and first lieutenant after the event,
is strange and questionable. Both of them saw the daily position reports
and signed as having seen them. They were aware, according to Seale, of
Stephen's refusal to sign them. They said not a word about this at the
Inquiry. "Loyalty" to Stephen? Could this have happened in a
trial by court martial with active prosecution and defence? The question
does in fact arise-whether or not, in view of the gravity of the incident,
the Board of Inquiry would have been justified in recommending the trial
of Stephen by court martial. A possible explanation of why this route
was not taken was to avoid the greater publicity of court martial and
the risk of a row with de Gaulle who was already considered difficult
enough to work with!
When ONM 243 was rerouted bringing her close to La Perle, should a signal
from C-in-CWA have gone direct to Escort Group C-5 to be passed to the
convoy Commodore and MACships-warning them of La Perle's close proximity?
The answer-based on good staff work-is "yes." C-in-CWA can hardly
be exempted from some blame for the disaster.
Another baffling wonder is the failure of the aircraft to draw any conclusion
from the totally unhostile attitude of the submarine when sighted. Can
one really imagine a U-boat sitting on the surface for over an hour, neither
opening fire nor submerging, while the aircraft formed up for attack?
Not the U-boats that Starshell readers will remember!
The sinking of La Perle was one of the most grievous affairs in the history
of the Royal Canadian Navy. In the extensive research on this matter following
receipt of John Seale's letter to me, I have had the privilege of working
closely with Dr. W. A. B. Douglas, our eminent senior naval historian.
He has considerably revised the original draft covering the La Perle incident
for the official history, and his exceptional account of it, to be published
in an up-coming issue of the Canadian Military Journal, will provide much
more detail than is possible here.
The evidence of John Seale has added a new dimension to the tragedy of
La Perle, but mystery remains.
FOOTNOTES
1 According to information received from Dr. W. A. B. Douglas, the source
of the number of men in the submarine at the time of the incident (60),
was based on the statement of the single survivor when he came on board
HMCS Hespeler, to the effect there were 60 men on board at the time, including
two RN-a Lt. and a PO-and that there were 15 survivors who drowned, leaving
him as the only one. The "official" class complement of the
French Saphir-class minelaying submarines was only 44.
2 Both All the Worlds Fighting Ships 1922-1946, Conway Maritime Press
(1980), and Warship Profile 26 - Rubis, Free French Submarine, by VAdm.
d'Escadre H. L. G. Rousselot, Profile Publications Ltd., UK (1972), refer
to this class of submarine without the definite article "La."
All official signals and correspondence regarding this matter refer to
"La Perle." The sole survivor apparently referred to the boat
simply as "Perle" which could have been a matter of translation,
since the survivor's statement is not verbatim, but summarized in English.
The Public Archives of Canada archival reference for both these footnotes
is RG 24, Vol. 11128.
EDITOR'S NOTE - Anthony Griffin is the author of the superb eight-part account of his wartime experiences "A Naval Officer's War," published concurrently in the Spring 1999 through Winter 2000/01 issues of "Starshell." He is a Life Member of Toronto Branch. We commend and thank John Seale for having the courage, fifty-seven years after the fact, to come forward with his account of what happened on the bridge of DUNVER on that tragic day in 1944. He was interviewed in person by Dr. Alec Douglas and Tony Griffin in Toronto, following his disclosure.
Copyright © 2001 Anthony Griffin
All Rights Reserved
(Originally published in Vol. VII, No. 15, Summer 2001 issue of Starshell)