Catalyst for Confidence: 25 Years of INCSEA

David N. Griffiths

As public attention focused on presidential activities during Richard Nixon's historic visit to Moscow in 1972, the heads both navies were quietly signing an agreement on "Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas". In the quarter-century since, "INCSEA" has become one of the most enduring and resilient of confidence-building measures. From its bi-polar Cold War origins, the concept has been adapted and adopted wherever there is a will to transform interaction at sea from confrontation to cooperation.

Throughout the 1960s and '70s, the nuclear superpowers engaged in what US Admiral Zumwalt described as "an extremely dangerous, but exhilarating game of chicken". This "game" was to cause damage and cost lives. Soviet naval units frequently shadowed and often harassed or interfered with naval forces of the US and its allies. Western navies, especially that of the US, tested Soviet resolve and professionalism and responded in kind to harassment. The motives on either side would be familiar to any observer of a rivalry in which an aspiring contender is challenging and testing the reigning champion.

Some incidents were deliberate expressions of policy, while others were attributable to over-aggression or inexperience. American carrier-based pilots reportedly flew sufficiently low over Soviet warships to snag radio wires between masts with lowered tailhooks. Soviet warships were often commanded by comparatively junior officers because of rapid fleet expansion. For both sides, the greatest worry was that a small, unintended spark at sea could unwittingly ignite the nuclear fuse.

This issue came to a head 1967. On two consecutive days, Soviet warships collided with the American destroyer Walker in the Sea of Japan when it manoeuvred to prevent interference with carrier operations. The troubling result was not so much at sea as in Washington, where Congressman (later President) Ford proposed that US warships should henceforth be authorized to respond with gunfire. It was a graphic illustration of how actions by relatively junior commanders at sea can arouse political passions, overreaction and the threat of war.

The "Walker Incident" prompted the US government to propose "Safety at Sea" discussions. Shortly afterward, a Soviet naval aircraft crashed into the Norwegian Sea while "buzzing" the carrier Essex during flight operations, killing all 7 crew. Potentially serious misinterpretation was dispelled by Essex's prompt reporting and transferring recovered bodies to a nearby Soviet warship. But still there was no response to the "Safety at Sea" suggestion. Two years later, in 1970, a Soviet destroyer collided with the British carrier Ark Royal, killing two Soviet sailors. Two days later, the USSR finally signalled that it was prepared to host talks in Moscow. Between October 1971 and May 1972, naval officers engaged in two intense rounds of negotiations in Moscow and Washington, resulting in the document signed during the Moscow Summit. It was an operational agreement between navies, not a diplomatic treaty. The value of this "sailor-made" approach soon became apparent.

The first major test came with the 1973 Arab-Israeli (Yom Kippur) War. Despite the volatile situation and almost 100 Soviet ships intermingling with US forces, no serious incidents occurred. The second and diplomatically more significant success followed the 1979 Soviet incursion into Afghanistan. Although the US froze much normal government-to-government dialogue in protest, annual INCSEA consultations continued. Despite occasional postponements and curtailment of social activities, this channel of communication could stay open because it was a practical, non- political arrangement dealing simply with safety and the removal of ambiguity.

INCSEA did not prevent all incidents, but provided an effective mechanism to keep them from escalating out of proportion. During salvage attempts for the Korean airliner shot down over the Sea of Japan in 1983, Soviet ships and aircraft initially behaved prudently toward US and Japanese vessels but later, unaccountably, became obstructive. Instead of counter- harassment, the Americans used INCSEA procedures to protest. The activities stopped. More significantly, to the amazement of diplomats present, the matter was clarified frankly and openly between naval delegates during the consultations which followed. In 1984, the Soviet carrier Minsk struck the bridge of a US frigate with flares. The US protested. Having heard the Soviet perspective at the next consultation however, the US Secretary of the Navy made a public statement. "Let's say that there are two plausible side to that story" he said. "The Minsk skipper may not have been all on the wrong side." That kind of candour, and the mutual confidence engendered, would have been unthinkable before INCSEA.

In 1986, the United Kingdom signed its own INCSEA with the USSR. There were slight changes in wording from the US model, but the main features remained identical. In 1988, Germany concluded a similar agreement, followed in 1989 by Canada, France, and Italy. Ironically, as the Cold War thawed and the USSR disintegrated, bilateral INCSEAs with Russia became increasingly popular. As of today, Russia has 12 bilateral INCSEAs with others still being negotiated. There are several reasons. In some cases the work was already underway. In others, political uncertainty made establishing navy-to-navy relationships even more prudent. Most significantly however, the mandatory annual consultations called for in all Agreements provide an invaluable non-political opportunity to explore other avenues of cooperation. As mutual confidence have increased and incidents declined, the concept of "staff talks" developed, adding a series of informal discussions on matters of mutual interest following the formal consultations.

Not all INCSEAs involve Russia and not all are bilateral. Germany and Poland signed an agreement in 1990. There are also reports of discussions at least being considered between Turkey and Greece, and between India and Pakistan. There have also been moves toward multinational and even worldwide INCSEA arrangements. The idea of an international agreement was raised at the United Nations in 1985 and Sweden proposed a text in 1989, although nothing came of it. The USSR was a particular supporter of multinational approaches, in part because of the sheer logistic burden of conducting so many bilateral consultations.

Since 1989, Canada's navy has accumulated wide INCSEA experience. The agreement with Russia still exists, and consultations still occur within the context of the broader cooperative relationship. When Canada accepted the role of facilitating maritime confidence-building in the Middle East Peace Process in 1993, one of the first initiatives was to institute discussion of a regional INCSEA arrangement. This was the first time anywhere that naval and other maritime professionals had met to address a specific multilateral approach. In Asia-Pacific too, the multilateral idea has been explored, particularly within the Western Pacific Naval Symposium at which Canada is an observer.

While the details may vary with circumstances, the INCSEA principles of simplicity, direct navy-to-navy dialogue and a non- political focus on safety have been validated time and again. Far from being a relic of the Cold War, the INCSEA concept continues to be a relevant, useful and effective catalyst for confidence-building at sea.

David Griffiths is a Research Fellow at Dalhousie University's Centre for Foreign Policy Studies. Readers wishing citations for this article or related information may contact the author through Maritime Affairs.