Victoria Class Submarines

According to some, the Canadian Navy has a serious submarine problem. For instance, Scott Taylor wrote in the Halifax Herald on Monday 9 December, 2002 thought it was "Time to cancel purchase of sub-par subs". His article is worth repeating in full because it shows very clearly how a little knowledge can be a dangerous thing.

Ever since the Canadian government announced in 1998 that it was entering into a lease-to-own contract for four used British submarines, mishaps and delays have plagued the project.

After only three years in service with the Royal Navy, the Upholder-class diesel-electric submarines were mothballed by the British in 1994. Although the leasing arrangement had been negotiated around this time, it took another four years for Prime Minister Jean Chretien's cabinet to approve the purchase.

Everyone in Canadian naval planning circles realized that some refurbishment would be required to make the Upholders seaworthy again. But no one foresaw the magnitude of the work that would actually be involved.

Although the Upholders are newer than the 40-year-old Oberon-class boats that our sailors used to operate, the British subs had never been on the navy's wish list as a replacement. It was common knowledge that the Brits were having a lot of teething trouble with their Upholder design. Meanwhile, the Dutch, German, French, Swedish and Australian navies were all developing superior submarines.

But the Liberal government decided it would be far cheaper to buy used, unreliable subs as opposed to new efficient ones, and the deal was done.

It was only when our submariners began to take possession of the British subs that things really began to unravel. Numerous embarrassing media reports surfaced about the project: all the hulls needed extensive re-welding, the British had sealed up torpedo tubes to prevent leaking, and it was discovered that at least one of the Upholders had a bent frame (indicating the sub had been involved in an undisclosed collision).

Last year, when CBC correspondent Dan Bjarnson set out to document the historic cross-Atlantic delivery of the first new sub, renamed HMCS Victoria, the trials and tribulations experienced by the crew turned the report into a comic adventure.

Equally hilarious was then-defence minister Art Eggleton, who was constantly trying to spin the sub purchase into something positive. After the discovery of yet another setback, which will delay the submarines from entering operational service until 2004, Eggleton delivered his master stroke. According to his logic, Canadian taxpayers should be happy that we not only saved money by buying used subs, but that the navy was continuing to save money by not deploying them. (Presumably, if these submarines were actually at sea, they would use fuel, the crew would consume rations, etc.)

At the moment, two of the four subs are undergoing additional repairs in Canada, while the other two are still at Barrow-in-Furness, England, and in the process of being handed over by the Royal Navy.

During this summer's sea trials of the HMS Ursula (that was soon to be renamed HMCS Corner Brook), the most serious incident to date occurred. A flare torpedo tube remained open after being fired, and the sub took on 800 to 1,500 litres of sea water before executing an emergency surfacing.

Sailors on board were badly shaken up by the near catastrophe. Twenty-year veteran Petty Officer Gerry O'Keefe experienced severe trauma and the rest of the crew expressed grave concerns about sailing on board Ursula-Corner Brook again.

Both Royal Navy and Canadian Defence officials tried desperately to downplay the incident. Instead of calling it a flood, the official spin was that the sub "experienced an ingress of water." When the report stated that "no one was injured," they chose not to mention O'Keefe's mental distress. Likewise, when the crew refused to set sail aboard the sub, Defence spokesmen on both sides of the Atlantic portrayed the issue as routine. Media reports likening the incident to a mutiny were officially denounced as "exaggerations."

Until the Ursula flooded, the British media had been blissfully unaware of any problems associated with the Canadian submarine deal. After running a few paragraphs to announce the 1998 lease, the story faded away.

Now the London papers, in particular the Sunday Express, have picked it up again. The first articles were sympathetic to the plight of the Canadian submariners, who are forced to spend months away from their families in remote Barrow-in-Furness, and are unhappy with the "rustbuckets" the Royal Navy foisted upon them.

It did not take long for the Royal Navy to return fire. After the stories broke, workers from BAE, the shipyard contracted to refit the subs, began calling reporters to anonymously express their displeasure with the Canadians.

The gist of the backlash is that the Canadian navy "simply doesn't have the expertise. We (BAE workers) go out with them all the time to hold their hands. . . . They are too frightened to take control. . . . When the flood happened, our own (BAE) men were on board too, and none of them are suffering from PTSD (post-traumatic stress disorder)."

Another recurring theme in the British insults is that the Canadians are uneducated, unsophisticated, backward colonials. "This is all new to (the Canadians), it is a big learning curve. I don't know what they had before, probably canoes," said one BAE worker who claimed he represented the views of his colleagues. "(The Canadians) are not up to it."

The submarine squadron is the elite of the Canadian navy, and submariners wear their hard-earned dolphin badges with deserved pride. It is my experience that these submariners, while often eccentric, are dedicated, competent professionals. Given their experience operating 40-year-old Oberon submarines, one can hardly call these men cowards.

It is high time for the Canadian government to scuttle the entire Upholder deal. Given that these submarines will be out of commission for the first six years of an eight-year contract, the British are certainly in breach of the original terms of the lease. Simply cancel the remaining payments and tell the Royal Navy to come and collect their property, at their expense.

In addition to his (seemingly continual) reliance on hearsay rather than fact in editorializing, Taylor misses a number of key points which distort his view of the situation.

First, ownership of these four submarines allows Canada to stay in the submarine business. This was a major consideration in committing to this program in the first place.

Second, no one ever expected the re-activation of the vessels to be an easy task. Modern submarines have never been mothballed before and there are many technical problems associated with getting them back to sea safely.

Third, throughout this program, safety has been a paramount consideration, and if this causes delays, so be it -- people are too important to take shortcuts.

Fourth, submarines are now high technology platforms. Not only are they superb and cost- effective surveillance systems able to remain at sea for extended periods, but they are also test-beds for new and emerging underwater and information systems technology. Ownership of modern submarines, even it takes a little while to make them safe for sea, gives Canada the opportunity to be a world leader in underwater and many other technologies.

The point is that having modern submarines serve Canada's interests at home and in coalition operations around the world.

More importantly, the Victoria-class submarines represent a prudent investment in Canada's future maritime security, even if they take a little while to reach full potential. This is the key point that most of the media repeatedly miss.

That journalists such as Taylor and, presumably, their editors find it easy to "shoot from the lip" rather than take the time to do the full research and ask the right people the right questions is symptomatic of a larger problem.

As we have said in this journal on many occasions, to be credible in the eyes of the Canadian public, the Navy must devote more time to its public education program. Simply, the Navy must legitimize itself in the public eye by answering the question, "What function do you perform which obligates society to assume responsibility for your maintenance?" Yes, the Navy has done a magnificent job in the Arabian Gulf during Operation Apollo, but how many people really know the extent and the value of the work done? Unless the Navy wants to surrender the field to the nay-sayers, it cannot afford to sit back and rest on its laurels. It must explain every facet its function, including the place of submarines in a modern naval force.

In July, 2002, Vice-Admiral Gary Garnett (Vice-President Maritime Affairs for the Navy League of Canada and a former Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff and a former Commander Maritime Forces) wrote an excellent editorial on submarine. It can be found on the NOAC website <http://www.naval.ca>

Peter Haydon is the editor of Maritime Affairs and a Senior Research Fellow at Dalhousie University's Centre for Foreign Policy Studies.