A MARITIME AFFAIRS CLOSING EDITORIAL

Why Do We Need a Navy?

By Peter Haydon

In the January 1997 edition of Maritime Affairs we published a concise discussion of Canada's need for modern naval forces written under the pen name "Amphion." In view of the on-going debate on Canada's requirement for naval capabilities, we have decided to reprint it in a slighter shorter form because it says so much about the basic needs of a state for naval forces. The original article concluded by asking the key question, "How much navy is enough?" Amphion then went on to explain that this question has bedevilled Canadian politicians for years, and lies at the heart of the present defence policy stagnation.

He was absolutely right on all counts.

Canada is once again in the midst of yet another defence policy review — the third in the last ten years. Something is very wrong with this picture. Either the politicians are trying to reduce the defence budget even further while still having some residual military capability — a path well travelled in recent years — or the admirals, generals and defence bureaucrats are incapable of finding an acceptable and affordable mix of capabilities. Whatever the reason for the latest review, it is quite obvious that all the players in this near-continuous process have not returned to first principles and asked the fundamental question, "Why does Canada need armed forces?" from which stems the question of greater importance to us, "Why do we need a Navy?"

The Stalled Defence Review
Admittedly, some original thinking has invaded the stagnant pool of Canadian defence policy, and some analysts have gone so far as to suggest that in the future, navies and their integral air forces will be far more important than armies, because they alone can provide truly rapid reaction to crises. Others have gone even further and argued that the Canadian Army should be replaced by a small expeditionary force that could deploy with the Navy, leaving a national guard to look after domestic security. Although the deployment of a small army formation to Afghanistan drew public attention to the plight of Canada's army and its need for modernization, that deployment in itself is not adequate justification for renewal of the Cold War army structure of armoured divisions and brigades. Clearly, a far deeper examination of Canada's military requirements for the 21st century is needed.

In an open letter written and published early in 2002, General Don MacNamara, argued persuasively that the key security question facing Canadians was, "What kind of armed forces, for what kind of Canada, in what kind of world?" We agree wholeheartedly with General MacNamara in his call for a comprehensive and public review of Canada's defence and security policies. But even such a review is unlikely to change the public perception of the value of the Canadian Navy to Canada.

Out of Sight, Out of Mind, Out of Luck?
The simple fact is that until Canadians are convinced of the necessity of effective naval forces, related programs will always be a hard sell politically. This is not a new phenomena. The history of Canada's Navy is one of shifting political support for basic naval capabilities. Seen as necessary in the latter part of the First World War, the Navy was built-up as a coastal defence force only to be disbanded in the 1920s in a fit of misplaced enthusiasm for isolationist foreign policy and disarmament. A healthy rejection of Imperial Defence was also a factor. Then, as the storm clouds of war loomed again, in the 1930s, the Navy was enlarged modestly, in what could be seen as a re-embracement of Imperial Defence, but the U-boat campaign of the Second World War soon made a much larger naval force necessary. In 1945, with the war at an end, the political decision was taken again to minimize the size of the Navy despite contrary advice by the admirals who did not share the political view of "peace in our time" for a second time. Within five years, the navy was again called upon to expand to meet the call for destroyers in Korea and for NATO contingency plans to keep the trans-Atlantic sea lanes open.

For a while the Canadian Navy enjoyed political support, but by the mid-1960s this had eroded and naval planning became a nightmare as the naval staff tried to convince the ever-sceptical politicians that an effective navy made good sense. The Navy's fortunes rose again, albeit briefly, in the late 1980s and new ships were built. But the end of the Cold War saw a return of the quest for disarmament as Canada's political elite once again upheld the ideal that "we had peace in our time". Despite a quick expedition to the Persian Gulf in 1990-91, naval planning again took a back seat as disarmament initiatives and the holy grails of "soft power" and "the peaceful settlement of disputes" became a national preoccupation. (The latest pacifist diatribe, Breaking Ranks by Steven Staples, Director of the Project on the Corporate-Security State at the Polaris Institute [http://www.polarisinstitute.org/], regurgitates all those "soft" arguments.)

Promises of multi-purpose, combat-capable naval forces offered by a new White Paper in 1994 were short-lived as the government cut budgets and failed to approve the necessary modernization and replacement programs. Today, we see a Canadian multi-purpose, combat-capable task groups operating in the Arabian Sea as part of the massive coalition effort to suppress terrorism. But to believe that the Canadian Navy's fortunes have been saved by that operation is, regrettably, an act of self-delusion. A recent article (available on the Council for Canadian Security Website http://www.ccs21.org) by a Mr. Pierre Jones (a pseudonym) puts the Navy's problems into sharp focus:

Canada's naval planners have a firm and realistic grasp on what their fiscal future holds. It is by no means as clear that the future for which they will be permitted to plan is the one in which they will be called upon to operate. US Marine-style amphibious assault ships with attack helicopters and short-takeoff-and-landing aircraft, plus naval special forces, would almost certainly break the federal bank and stress the mold of Canadian naval thinking. But they would also provide Canadian forces with the punch necessary to sustain joint operations ashore and to participate effectively alongside modernized frigates and new destroyers in multinational missions.

When Operation Apollo is over, and it may well take several more years to rid the world of terrorism, the ships and aircraft will come home to face yet another round of political cost-cutting in the misplaced belief that "we now have peace in our time". Sadly, it seems that politicians continually fail to heed the lessons of history and are more concerned with short-term pandering to the electorate than with making long-term plans for Canada's security. The Navy, it would seem will still have a gauntlet to run once the present war is won; such is the sad history of Canadian naval policy.

In a recent article on Canadian defence policy (available on the NOAC website http://www.naval.ca), Vice-Admiral Nigel Brodeur said:

With fading memories of World Wars and the Korean War, with a strong pacifist element in the Canadian population, with a very small percentage of Canadians possessing prior military experience (including parliamentarians) with all the calls for more funding for Health, Education, the Environment and Aboriginal Claims, and with the eyes of Canadians being constantly drawn to issues and events within our territorial boundaries, National Defence in general and the Maritime Forces in particular have minimal constituency with which to influence politicians, the media and the public. Therefore parliamentarians must understand that a grassroots movement in support of defence spending is highly unlikely to ever arise in Canada, and consequently it is they who must take the lead in informing their constituents of the needs of Canada's Navy, Army, and Air Force.

But will the parliamentarians take the initiative? Unfortunately, this is an unlikely scenario — they have neither the motivation nor the political will to deal with such "tough" issues. For what little comfort it provides, Canada is not alone in facing that problem. In the meantime, it pays to repeat Amphion's explanation in the hope that it will find a more receptive audience some day.

What do navies do today, and why does Canada need one?

A modern navy has two main functions:

to ensure national security and sovereignty at sea, and
to support foreign policy and overseas trade.

Let us look at those functions individually and see why they cannot be done by other organizations.
Security and Sovereignty
At the moment, threats to national security exist largely in non-military forms. We are more concerned about people abusing our waters or using them illegally than we are about any military challenge. And we naturally want to make sure that national and international laws are respected in our own waters, along with the many conventions and rules for their safe use. If those laws and rules are violated, then we want appropriate action taken by Canadians, not by someone else. This is our sovereign right and duty as free country.
To be sovereign at sea a nation must be able to control whatever takes place in the waters under its jurisdiction. This applies not just to the territorial waters within 12 nautical miles of the shore, but also to the waters of the 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and the adjacent areas of the continental shelf. Maintaining anything less than the capability to control all activities in our waters is essentially an acceptance that others can use those waters as they please and without regard to our law. This is an abrogation of sovereignty.
Being able to control what goes on in the waters under Canadian jurisdiction requires three precise capabilities:

to know exactly who is using those waters, this process of collecting information is called surveillance;
to maintain a clear expression of government authority in those waters and to investigate incidents: a patrol and presence function; and
to be able to respond appropriately to any violation of the law or threat to national security.

Although some aspects of the law can be enforced at sea by non-military or para-military agencies, they can only do so with the backing of credible armed force. In the same way that the preservation of sovereignty rests on international acceptance of a country's ability to use force as the means of last resort in dealing with threats to national security, effective law enforcement must also include the deterrent threat of sufficient force to compel compliance. A non-military maritime constabulary or coast guard does not provide this necessary guarantee and certainly cannot meet force with force in the event of a military or other violent challenge to national security.
Supporting Foreign Policy and Overseas Trade
In the days of the Cold War and collective security, the foreign policy role of a navy was self-evident. Today, that role is far more complex and more closely tied to national interests overseas. Canada's standard of living is a direct function of our involvement in the world market place. Another factor is that Canada is an active participant in the collective crisis management activities undertaken under the authority of the United Nations. And Canada is still a member of NATO, committing naval forces to Alliance formations such as the Standing Naval Force Atlantic. National interests are frequently served by direct involvement in crisis management and by general engagement in world affairs.
Naval forces can undertake many tasks to support their country's foreign policy, including:

traditional diplomatic visits to other countries to promote trade or to further good relations;
a wide range of tasks under the broad mantle of crisis management including sanctions enforcement, humanitarian aid, reconnaissance and observation, preventive deployment, peacekeeping, and intervention; and
building confidence between former adversaries through, for example, multinational exercises and training.

The natural flexibility of naval forces provides government with the ability to respond quickly and appropriately to an international crisis. Moreover, a commitment of naval forces to an uncertain situation can be made without incurring unduly high physical or political risks and without the need for huge logistic support organizations. Also, warships have the mobility to extricate themselves from a deteriorating situation as well as the self-protection systems to continue the mission and survive. Coast guard and para-military units have neither this capability nor the special status granted to warships by international law. A warship is a symbol of a country's concern and commitment to resolution of a crisis, and it is a symbol that can be put in place very quickly.
What naval forces for Canada?
Few countries can afford to maintain two navies: one for domestic security and sovereignty enforcement and another to support foreign policy. Most maintain one navy in sufficient strength to undertake both roles. The question is "How much navy is enough?" To answer, or at least to begin answering, that question, we have to look briefly at the nature and conduct of naval operations.
The common denominator is the need to exercise control over all activity in an area of ocean. This is as true for sanctions enforcement as it is for law enforcement, protection of shipping, or support to an amphibious or other intervention operation. The concept of sea control is not new and has been validated during a century of naval activity. The three dimensions of sea control were mentioned earlier:

surveillance;
patrol and presence; and
response.

Although just about every ship and aircraft can do at least one of these tasks, the best and most economical means of exercising control over an area of ocean is to use a combination of units and systems.
But is it absolutely necessary to have the "full control" ability? As already established, without an ability to respond to all challenges to national security, the idea of being sovereign at sea is unrealistic. However, maintaining full control of all national waters all the time would be prohibitively expensive and difficult to justify today. The solution, which is a compromise, is to maintain a balance of sufficient capabilities to carry out surveillance and allow a timely response to be made to any incident as it develops.
For this to work, the first requirement is to gather information and maintain a selective patrol and presence capability. This must be backed-up with an adequate response capacity: adequate in terms of both availability and capability. This calls for a carefully crafted balance of aircraft, submarines, and surface ships supported by shore-based surveillance systems and the necessary infrastructure.
Today, foreign policy commitments are met by the same ships, submarines, and aircraft used for domestic contingencies and routine surveillance and patrol. Seldom, if ever, are naval units maintained purely for foreign policy tasks. This may have been the case during the Cold War, but it cannot be substantiated now. The only exception is if a country decides it will maintain a rapid deployment capability for a small and specialized land force. Canada does not have that capability although it has been discussed and could become a reality.
Deciding on the precise number of ships and aircraft and their respective capabilities is necessarily a political function. Only the political decision makers can balance the risks of being unable to respond to situations against the desire to spend as little money as possible. However, such decisions must be made with the full benefit of naval advice with the assurance of public understanding and support.
Summary
So, what are the implications of not having enough naval capabilities or even of having no navy at all? First, we would not be sovereign at sea and would have to rely on others to defend our shores. Second, our ability to enforce our law at sea would be limited. Third, we would diminish our status in the community of nations because we could not take part in international crisis management and would be unable to participate in protecting our own overseas national interests, especially maintaining the free flow of international trade. We would thus have no say in the outcome of a crisis that affects us.
In essence, a navy with its maritime air forces allows a maritime nation, such as Canada, to do two things:

fulfil the responsibilities implicit in claiming jurisdiction over certain bodies of water; and
further our international relations and contribute to good order at sea to the benefit of the country and its economy.

Can non-naval forces do this? They can certainly do some of the work, but they cannot do it all. Only naval forces have the necessary flexibility to be credible extensions of government authority in all situations. A navy, simply, is the extension of the sovereign state over the sea. In this, it is unique and necessary if the state wishes to remain sovereign and secure as well as make a meaningful contribution to world order.

Today's Situation
Amphion's explanation was written long before the awful events of September 2001 and the resulting new concerns for homeland security. In closing, it is appropriate to make an observation on the maritime dimension of homeland security. We will not repeat the facts because they were discussed in detail in the Spring 2002 edition of this journal.

What concerns us though is the thought expressed in Sharon Hobson's article, "the forced abandonment of the naval task group concept is imminent, and within three to five years, the Navy will be reduced to an offshore territorial defence navy concentrating on homeland defence, and even that would have to be conducted under the direction of the United States Navy." This is indeed a scary thought, especially in the light of the enormous contribution Canada's Navy has made to world order. How sad it would be to squander the valuable experience gained over the past ten or so years simply because the return on that investment was misunderstood.

It would be lunacy of the highest order to expect the Navy to assume the full scope of homeland security and ocean management responsibilities. It is neither trained nor configured for it, and it would be enormously expensive to effect such a transition. The role of the Coast Guard, on the other hand, is to provide the full range of marine safety services — not just Search and Rescue, but also maintenance of aids to navigation, supervision of certification of masters and mates of merchant vessels, and ensuring the physical safe condition of merchant ships and recreational vessels.

The maritime dimension of homeland security calls up a host of new tasks largely beyond the capability of either the Navy or the Coast Guard at the moment. Meeting those new requirements demands that we look again at the whole Canadian requirement for naval and coast guard capabilities. Both organizations provide Canada with the degree of security its citizens call for, while also providing Canada with a meaningful voice on the world stage. Any thought of trying to merge the two organizations is stupid and shortsighted. Although a degree of common skills do exists, they are but a small part of the overall capability requirements.

Yes, the Canadian Coast Guard is in considerable difficulty through mismanagement and under-funding and has reached the point where it cannot meet its mandate, but that does not mean it cannot be returned to an effective condition. And there is absolutely no reason why the Coast Guard cannot eventually assume a great part of the homeland security role. The Navy has an important function today in the management of violence at sea in both home and distant waters. This requires a precise set of skills. The information management skills — command and control if you wish — just happen to be applicable to ocean management tasks as well as complex international operations. The Navy can also carry out boardings and be a presence in home waters as well as in situations like Op. Apollo. As Amphion explains, this is one of the benefits of having a professional "blue water" navy. But a well-managed state also needs a Coast Guard comprised of professional mariners to complement the Navy.

The State of the Navy Today
Just how good is the Canadian Navy today? To some it is highly effective and well able to meet the demands of Op. Apollo. To others, as Sharon Hobson explains, the future is not so rosy. Pierre Jones also provided a rather grim view of the longer-term state of the Navy:

The existing Canadian navy, in short, is good, but living on borrowed time. The international environment, the pace of technological change, and the nature of likely enemies pose increasing risks. Domestic problems include a distressingly impervious political caste, deep?seated recruitment and retention shortfalls, and public ignorance of the navy's role, mission, and capabilities. The most obvious procurement palliatives — new maritime helicopters, fast sealift and at–sea replenishment vessels, and new command–and–control and air defence destroyers — are at various stages of planning. More distant possibilities, including stealth vessels and arsenal ships, remain pipe dreams. Of them all, only the much–delayed, much–revised helicopter program might materialize. The most obvious doctrinal fix, closer tactical integration with the USN, is already well in hand, but it is at once practical necessity and political powder keg.

Are the established projects the right ones? The navy's coastal defence vessels constitute an expensive cautionary tale. Its new British-built submarines, plagued by technical difficulties and in search of a mission, may prove another. In operations against irregular enemies that may field both large numbers of low-tech ground forces and small numbers of highly lethal air- and sea-denial weapons, how might Canada's current or upgraded navy perform? What value, say, would the acquisition of all currently envisaged naval systems have added to the fight in Afghanistan? Not much.

We may not agree with the full extent of that view, but if one relied on the Canadian media for that information, that is certainly the conclusion one would reach. Public relations is not the Navy's strongest suit; in fact, the whole military's is lacking in this respect.

Unfortunately, the majority of Canadians know little about defence in general and less about what the Navy provides for their country. When views are expressed they are invariably reflect the employment and activities of Canada's Army — the seemingly perpetual lightning rod for media scrutiny. The other misguided trend in what passes for Canadian public opinion on defence matters is that the Americans will look after us.

That, of course, is sheer nonsense. Admiral Brodeur's article discusses that naive view of national security:

The 1909 fiction that Canada would be protected by the United States under the Monroe Doctrine has its counterpart today among those who profess that Canada need not worry about defence because the United States would be obliged to protect us in the event of attack. Stephen Leacock's warning that sacrifice and self–reliance is the only path to national greatness has been forgotten by a hedonistic Canadian society as "lofty in their own estimation" as in Leacock's days. His admonition that "We cannot accept unpaid the sheltering protection of another state" is being foolishly disregarded by those who fail to perceive that the American people are not possessed by "philanthropic lunacy" and that they will exact payment for any defence they believe attributable to Canada — one way or another — be it trade sanctions, natural resources or industrial takeovers.

The point he makes, and which has been made over and over again but never heeded, is that sovereignty and the maintenance of effective military forces are companion political concepts. As Amphion explained, without an effective navy, "we would not be sovereign at sea and would have to rely on others to defend our shores."

The Navy is the key to Canada's sovereignty.

Unless we, the naval community at large, can answer the question, "Why do we need a navy?" to the satisfaction of the majority of Canadians we risk losing this valuable and valuable part of our national fabric. If we don't do it, nobody else will. And that is the sad truth about today's situation.

Peter Haydon is the editor of Maritime Affairs and a Senior Research Fellow at Dalhousie University's Centre for Foreign Policy Studies.