This paper, initially published by the Canadian Institute for Strategic Studies (CISS) as Strategic Datalink No. 79 in Augist 1999, is re-published on the NOAC/Maritime Affairs web site with the kind permission of CISS.

Peter T. Haydon
CISS Senior Research Fellow

Over the years, Canada has been extraordinarily well served by its navy in both home and distant waters. In the past decade Canada has, particular, through its navy, maintained an effective and valuable contribution to international security in the Persian Gulf, Africa, the Caribbean, and the Adriatic. The navy has also been used to further Canadian interests overseas in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Americas. The ships have also taken part in a number of humanitarian support operations. In addition, the navy has maintained a presence in home waters conducting surveillance and helping uphold good stewardship of the waters under Canadian jurisdiction.

It was such a diverse naval role that the 1994 Defence White Paper saw as necessary and made plans for the continuing upkeep and modernization of the fleet and its aviation capability. Yet only four years after that wise document was published, it would seem that Canada's naval capability is facing a significant reduction.

Even though a new defence review, albeit internal, is still in an early stage, it is progressing and rumours abound. However, it is impossible to tell the difference between a government "trial balloon" and speculation by members of the press. Nevertheless, that major capability reductions are being discussed publicly is reason enough for concern over the govern-ment's commitment to the 1994 naval policy.

One has to wonder why a naval policy that most saw as a sound only a few years ago is under scrutiny so soon. In all likelihood, it is a function of the never-ending crisis in managing the Canadian defence budget, particularly the unending "commitment-capability gap" where there are never enough "means" to achieve the desired "ends". Worse, no government seems willing to provide the necessary funds to create a better balance. Another reason may that political support for the 1994 policy is eroding due to belief that security can be achieved exclusively through "soft power" and that military force is redundant. In either case, the issue has a great deal to do with the perceived return on the investment to Canada from the existing naval capability.

To make some sense out of the present warship and helicopter "numbers game" being played in the press and to get some feel for the longer-term implications of naval force reductions it is useful to undertake a brief cost-benefit analysis.  

Canadian naval roles

Underlying the 1994 policy was the assumption that Canada needed a naval force capable of carrying out a wide range of missions and related tasks to support government policies at home and abroad. These fall roughly within three traditional core functions:

• provide for the security of Canada from the sea;
• carry out "constabulary" tasks in Canadian waters; and
• support Canadian foreign and international security policy.

The dividing lines between these functions are not easily drawn. One of the problems is that in the potentially unstable era in which we now live naval forces are required to conduct the greater part of their work in a grey zone that is neither peace nor war, especially when operating under a UN mandate. In many such situations violence is an ever-present threat that could be unleashed without warning. Under these situations, ships are deployed in a combat-ready condition even though the immediate task may not call for that degree of readiness. In these ambiguous situations, combat capability is needed as much for self-defence as for meeting the political objective.

The 1994 Defence White Paper struck a balance between the three functions in establishing that Canadian maritime forces would keep a "multi-purpose, combat-capable task group" on each coast. Those task groups were established notionally as being "comprised of up to four combatants (destroyers, frigates or submarines) and a support ship, with appropriate maritime air support." Also, the navy would be able to deploy one of those groups and individual ships to support UN or other multinational operations as well as meet all domestic requirements.

The tasks Canadian naval forces can be called upon to do fall into three broad categories.  

Combat or near-combat tasks

• Take part in international security operations with either a naval task group or single ships and submarines for extended periods as part of a NATO formation, in a UN force, or with a US Task Force.
• Defend Canada and North America, in conjunction with US forces, with ships, submarines, maritime patrol aircraft, coast defence vessels, and port security units. Although these tasks are considered an unlikely requirement today, they still cannot be ignored completely because one can never discount the unexpected.
• Provide support for land forces under a range of situations from rapid response to crisis to sealift and the provision of combat logistic support, as HMCS Preserver and her embarked Sea King helicopters did successfully for the 1992 Somalia operation.
• Participate in UN Chapter VI operations such as sanctions and quarantine enforcement, verification and monitoring, supervising cease-fire and other disengagement agreements.

• Establish or reinforce Canadian interests by maintaining a military presence in specific areas as a signal of Canadian concern over a potentially threatening situation.
• Conduct operations, exercises, and port visits with navies of other countries as part of larger confidence-building initiatives (such as NATO's Partnership for Peace) and generally in support of Canadian foreign policy objectives.
• Evacuate Canadian nationals from dangerous situations, or merely standing by ready to evacuate Canadians as happened in Vietnam in 1973-73 and on several occasions in the Caribbean in the 1970s and 1980s.
• Carry out international humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations.

• Reinforce national sovereignty by maintaining a presence at sea to uphold Canadian interests in a particular situation, especially in areas where a boundary or access to resources may be in dispute as in the 1995 turbot "crisis" with Spain.
• Conduct disaster relief operations in Canada.
• Conduct operations at sea in aid to the civil authority. These include surveillance and apprehension of suspicious vessels, supporting fisheries monitoring, and deploying port security units, as during the Halifax G-7 Summit.
• Conduct search and rescue operations in Canadian and adjacent waters.

Maintaining the capability

In 1994, the Defence White Paper contained the fundamentals of a plan to maintain those capabilities well beyond the turn of the century. Since then, however, very little has happened to advance those plans other than the acquisition of the four Victoria-class submarines. The Sea King helicopter replacement, in particular, remains in political limbo as the aircraft themselves suffer the effects of age that even the efforts of extensive maintenance cannot overcome.

Perhaps the most puzzling aspect of future Canadian naval policy has been the rumour of retiring destroyers and/or frigates as a way of trying to make an inadequate defence budget meet the expectations of the 1994 policy. In acknowledging that the 1994 objectives cannot be met within the present budget, a defence review - perhaps better called a defence rationalization reminiscent of that preceding the 1971 Defence White Paper - is underway and drastic measures to re-match "ends" and "means" are being considered. It now seems entirely possible that the present financial and equipment situation could be used as the motivation for a major change in the 1994 naval policy.

Without a strong constituency for a standing Canadian navy, it becomes quite easy to see naval force reductions as a means of solving the money problem. The difficulty with this approach is that is that the longer-term implications are not being considered. This, in itself, should be no surprise. Governments seldom take the long view of an issue, preferring for understandable political reasons, to take the short view that seldom extends beyond the remainder of the current mandate. It takes foresight and courage to embrace a concept of long-term planning that is likely to pay more dividends to one's successors than one's self.

The final force structure has to be one that does not put the country at risk. This can only happen by taking a long hard look at long-term requirements and the full implications, over the longer-term, of specific force reduction options.

Implications of fleet reductions

To understand the implications of making decisions on the basis of short-term planning considerations it is useful to look at the implications of a series of naval force reductions scenarios. This could reveal what the government could expect from its navy if it capability were reduced. These scenarios concern only the destroyers, frigates, support ships, and their integral helicopters. This collective capability represents a series of closely interrelated programs that can be studied clinically in terms of the consequences of changing the numbers of vessels in service. It is also very clear that a linkage exists between naval replacement programs and the future helicopter fleet size.

Governing Criteria

In assessing the operational effectiveness of warships and their ability to carry out specific tasks, many factors must be taken into account. For instance, the importance of holding a trained crew together to preserve operational effectiveness and, where applicable, weapon certification requirements. Today, administrative requirements often take precedence over unit cohesion. This might make some sense where the deployment schedule has some flexibility, but when the number of units in service is reduced without a parallel reduction in tasking the primacy of operations over administration has to be upheld.

The need to ensure ample time within a force employment plan for unit rotation with sufficient time to carry out pre-deployment training and weapon certification is equally important. The lessons of not making sure this happens should be self-evident. The Canadian Navy faced a similar problem between 1950 and 1954 when it was required to keep three operational destroyers in Korean waters while also meeting NATO commitments in the Atlantic. Meeting this operational requirement stretched the navy to its limits and imposed huge demands on people, ships, and support systems.

Provision has to made for the unexpected. We are not masters of our destiny and accidents will happen. A sound force plan must incorporate an element of flexibility that takes misfortune and the unexpected into account. Yet, it is too simplistic to merely say that if the primacy of operations is maintained all will be well. The key fact is that the primacy of operations has to become the principle focus of the entire military system. Herein lies a problem largely created as a result of a series of changes to the way in which the Department of National Defence is administered. What has happened is that the military has become a "department" rather than a "force" and as such it is subject to political pressures in situations where there should be none. That bureaucratic solutions to fiscal woes are being pursued at the expense of operational considerations is but one example of the sad situation now existing within DND.

Force reduction scenarios

As long as force reductions are being contemplated as solutions for budgetary problems, it is useful to continue with the cost-benefit analysis of some hypothetical naval force structure options. This can be done through four scenarios.

Scenario "A" - Status Quo

Scenario "A" is actually the status quo ante of mid-1998 before the third operational support ship (AOR) was laid up. It is the minimum force structure needed to meet the full intent of the 1994 White Paper of sustaining naval expeditionary forces and of keeping individual units with the NATO Standing Naval Forces. An important aspect of this force structure is that it makes provision for extended deployments of a naval task group under conditions similar to the Korean and Persian Gulf Wars while retaining a degree of flexibility in home waters. Maintaining this capability requires replacement of the four Iroquois-class destroyers and the three AORs in less than ten years, and replacing all the Sea King helicopters in the very near future. This means a commitment of several billion dollars over a ten-year period. It also requires leaving naval manpower levels at no less than they are at present and probably with a modest increase to provide the necessary training flexibility-something that does not exist today.  

Scenario "B" - Short-Term Fleet Reductions

This scenario would see the fleet reduced by one complete surface task group (two destroyers, 3-4 frigates and an AOR) to achieve short-term savings in personnel, operations, and maintenance (PO&M) costs. Laying up these ships would not necessarily effect longer-term replacement programs without a complete rationalization of future naval capability requirements. In operational terms, however, the impact of dropping to a single task group structure would be significant because it would limit overseas deployments to one or two individual ships for prolonged periods or a full task group for a few months. Essentially, the ability to sustain a task group deployment for an extended period (beyond about 3 months) would go, and with it the ability to maintain a task group on each coast. The net effect would be to exclude Canada from any long-term commitment (beyond a single ship or perhaps two) to international maritime security operations. In all probability it would also lessen Canada's ability to assume tactical command of multinational formations. Hence this would amount to a major erosion of the 1994 policy. It would also be only an interim step in determining the final naval force structure because decisions would still be required on all three major replacement programs (destroyers, AORs, and helicopters).  

Scenario "C" - Long-Term Fleet Reduction

This scenario would see the fleet reduced by four destroyers and one AOR. (The AOR has, in fact, already been laid up.) This option has both short- and long-term fiscal advantages as it would obviate the need to replace the four Iroquois-class destroyers and would reduce the AOR replacement requirement to two. It would also have a significant impact on the helicopter replacement program. Despite short-term gains in PO&M and longer-term capital benefits, this scenario would impose a heavy operational burden. The first penalty being that without adapting exiting vessels to provide the extended command and control and area air defence capabilities of the Iroquois-class, the task group concept would not be as versatile. The option of converting four frigates has been raised and would be essential if the integrity of the task group concept is to be maintained in its present form. With only 12 frigates and two AORS, any thought of sustained task group operations goes and it would be impossible to maintain an operational task group on each coast.  

Scenario "D" - Small Navy

The last scenario would see the four Iroquois-class destroyers and the remaining AORs paid off as a means of removing the need to replace those vessels and also of reducing the numbers of new helicopters needed. Obviously, short-term financial gains would accrue from the greatly reduced PO&M, but the operational impact of doing this would be considerable. The task group concept would be gone, leaving Canada with the ability to only commit one or two individual ships to international security operations. The navy's ability to support army or joint operations would be severely limited with this force structure. Any thought of commanding a multinational formation would be remote under the circumstances as Canada would not be able to gain the necessary prior experience in formation command. Overall, this would reduce the political leverage Canada presently gets from high-level participation in multinational naval operations. The impact on domestic operations would also be significant in that ships would not be able to remain on patrol for more than 7-10 days (depending on weather conditions) before having to enter port to refuel.

Helicopter implications

The implications of the four scenarios on the Sea King replacement program are equally interesting. Here a simple table explains the interaction between that program and the various fleet reduction plans. It will be assumed that:

1. approximately two-thirds the fleet will be operational at all times;
2. helicopter detachments will only be assigned to operational ships; and
3. the numbers of helicopters shown in the table make no provision for training, maintenance or attrition..
4. A conservative estimate is that regardless of how many aircraft are required to support the fleet twelve (12) additional helicopters would be needed to meet proficiency and safety requirements.

One of the things that stands out is that helicopter numbers fall off quite quickly if the fleet size is reduced. But one must challenge the validity of that approach to program management as it is a very obvious case of putting the cart before the horse. The function of the helicopter is to support the ship and the task group at sea, and not the other way around. However, recent experience has shown that the Sea King helicopters are also widely tasked for domestic operations such as the Manitoba flood, the ice storm, the Swiss Air disaster, and innumerable marine search-and-rescue tasks. Although the Sea King provides both a national and naval capability, it makes sense to settle the issue of fleet size before determining the number of helicopters needed.

In resolving fleet size, the one question the government must answer, and it can only be the government, is "What do we want the Navy to be capable of doing?" Some will argue that the government answered that question in the 1994 Defence White Paper. That may have been so in 1994, but since then there has been little political commitment to upholding that overall capability requirement. Hence, one has to conclude that the 1994 policy statement is now out-of-date, and a new naval policy statement is needed.  

Defining a new naval policy

The four scenarios provide some indicators of the impact on operational capability of some hypothetical fleet reductions. The full national impact, in terms of Canada's ability to make a useful contribution to international and national security, can be assessed through a series of political questions:

• Does Canada need a naval expeditionary capability at task group level?
• Does Canada need a rapid response capability under a concept where the navy would provide sealift and operational support to a joint task force sent on an overseas mission?
• Is it useful for Canada to be able to exercise tactical command of multinational naval forces?
• Does Canada need to maintain its naval commitment to the NATO naval forces?
• Should the Canadian navy retain the capability of operating within a US naval formation?
• Does the navy fulfil a useful function through its visits to foreign countries and exercises with foreign navies?
• Should the navy conduct constabulary tasks in waters under Canadian jurisdiction?
• If so, to what extent?
• If not, which government agency should do it?

In some circles even tinking in these terms is heresy because it calls for a complete reappraisal of the need for a navy. Yet, if we are honest with ourselves, such an exercise is necessary to answer the question "What do we want the Canadian Navy to be able to do? Such exercises are not new in the complex history of Canada's defence policy. A very thorough rationalization of all Canadian military capabilities preceded the 1971 Defence White Paper. This was followed in 1972 by an even more comprehensive naval force structure rationalization that resulted in the fleet and maritime air capability that exists today. It was not a simple process, but it proved that with or without the Cold War, Canada needed multi-purpose, combat capable maritime forces. The responsibilities of ownership of a huge off-shore realm, and the belief that Canadian national interests and security were best served through active internationalism, in which a navy was a key component, were undeniable strategic imperatives.

As the past ten years have shown, a navy is indeed an effective and versatile extension of government over the oceans at home and abroad. Reducing the navy's present capability will reduce Canada's ability to influence events at sea. It stands to reason that the on-going defence review must not be public but also must proceed on the basis of determining what is best for Canada in the long-term rather than as a process to meet the needs of short-term fiscal goals or transient ideologies.

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