Our Maritime Future

Peter Haydon

It is often said that only fools and charlatans predict the future. Yet the closing years of the 20th century have spawned a growth industry in political fortune telling. Either that old adage is no longer true or we are beset by more fools and charlatans than usual.

Most of the political concepts and social structures being proposed focus on ideals and tend to gloss over many of the realities of life. Just because the calendar changes to a new century and a new millennium, it doesn't mean that human nature or the physical properties of the world are also going to change overnight. Far from it. Although change is inevitable, it will happen quite slowly. We must accept, though, that a new phase of history has begun. This is an opportunity to re-assess where we are going and how we are going to get there.

THE BASIS FOR ANALYSIS

The end of the 45-year Cold War led to a major change in the nature of the international system. As such, it is an historical turning point. This is not a new phenomena, it has happened many times before and will almost certainly happen again. For instance, the 1648 Peace of Westphalia ended the Thirty Years War and led to irreversible changes in European society. Almost two centuries years later, the Battle of Waterloo marked the beginning of another period of European and world development. The end of the First World War in 1918 also led to a new international system. Similarly, tearing-down the Berlin Wall in 1989 symbolized the start of yet another cycle of political change. Each of these turning points, unlike the end of the Second World War which was an incomplete process, mark the beginning of a transition from one political system to another.

The world in which we now find ourselves is marked more by uncertainty than clear ideas of what lies ahead. But that is the course of history. To people impatient for change, it is difficult to accept that it takes time for the new order to emerge. We are not infallible, and there will be mistakes as the transition progresses. Old ideas and misplaced idealism often hinder the process of change because they lead to false hopes and, worse, to important decisions being made on scant knowledge. As one author recently explained, "we must be aware that we walk a narrow path between the dangers of mindless adherence to outmoded concepts and fashionable acceptance of change for the sake of changing."{1}

Before we begin to mold the future we must be sure we understand not only the past but also the present and the way society is changing The management of change requires imagination and a broad perspective rather than the short- sighted view of the future so often presented by special interest groups.

As at previous turning points in history, the new political system will emerge slowly, and efforts to speed up the process unduly could be counter-productive. Hence, demands for radical change in the way countries conduct their business, both internally and with one another, are invariably premature.

Still, a mass of nonsense is being written and spoken today about the kind of policies needed for the 21st century, particularly about navies and maritime policy. For the most part, these self-styled visionaries tend to promote political agendas formed during the Cold War rather than offer reasoned policy options for the new era. Franklyn Griffiths, for one, in his recent book Strong and Free: Canada and the New Sovereignty,{2} blends the emotion of the Canadian unity debate with standard disarmament rhetoric into a case for a "peaceful" military that would see Canada's navy replaced by a constabulary coast guard.

This makes absolutely no sense. Not only does he not understand the basic function of navies (largely unchanged in over 200 years) as instruments of state policy, he also fails to analyze the broader geopolitical circumstances upon which such a radical change in policy should be based.

One of the problems with the idea of opting for a constabulary instead of a traditional navy is that it denies the government the option of using naval forces to support foreign policy. If a country chooses to isolate itself from the rest of the world then perhaps all it needs to handle the maritime dimension of its domestic policies is a constabulary coast guard.{3} Do Canadians really want their country to withdraw from the world stage? I think not.

Another problem with that shallow view is that it overlooks the important point about sovereignty: being sovereign means that you have the right to make choices and that right is universally respected. Keeping that respect requires that you have both the necessary capabilities and the resolve to follow through on any choice you make. Not having the capability to respond to threatening incidents, especially where collective security (at sea or elsewhere) is threatened, is essentially the same as surrendering your sovereignty. What all this comes down to is that policies and plans for national security (in its broadest sense) should be made on the best estimates of long-term requirements rather than on knee-jerk reactions or untried concepts of sovereignty. That said, a great deal of policy is actually made on the fly in response arising situations and sometimes to lobbying. But policies that affect national response capabilities, especially those requiring a lot of lead time to build or acquire, should not be developed without first considering all the alternatives and measuring the cost of not being able to respond to specific situations.

The basis for proposing changes to policy must, therefore, come from a full understanding of both the prevailing circumstances and the trends in the dominant factors. In terms of ocean use and of the importance of oceans to the country as a whole, many factors need examining: trade and shipping, boundaries and boundary disputes, management of ocean resources, conservation of the ocean environment, the nature of coastal communities, crime and terrorism at sea, navies, and marine industries. One could also add other factors such as recreation, wildlife, etc., but they generally have less political impact than the ones listed above. Because there is so much interaction between those factors, it is sometimes easier to look at the future problems of the maritime world under four headings:

• trade and shipping;
• the UN Law of the Sea Convention;
• disrespect for law at sea; and
naval power.

A quick review of those topics shows their complexity and makes the point that developing sound naval and maritime policies for the next century is not easy.

TRADE AND SHIPPING

The oceans are still the "great highway" upon which much of the world's business depends, and this is not about to change. And it is in everyone's interest to make sure that trade continues to flow. Because the movement of shipping can be constrained at any one of the choke points through which much of it passes or by restricting the use of major ports, it is quite easy for one country (or even a group of individuals) to hold part of the world economy to ransom. The trading states (and some of the multinational corporations) naturally want to prevent this happening and, should it happen, they want order restored as quickly as possible. Their motivation is a very simple function of economics.

But who are the countries whose economies stand to be hurt by a disruption in trade? It should not be a surprise to anyone to find that it is the worlds largest economies which have the highest degree of dependence on trade. In terms of tonnage handled each year, the largest traders are the G-7 countries plus Saudi Arabia, the Netherlands, and Australia. However, the extent and exact nature of those dependencies varies. Saudi Arabia, for instance, is completely dependent on oil exports, while Canada's economy depends on the export and import of a wide range of commodities to generate some 30-35 percent of its GDP. The portion of GDP attributable to trade in the United States is lower, reflecting a more mature and diversified economy, but still an economy with significant trade dependencies because it is not fully self-sufficient. The Japanese and European economies are likewise highly trade dependent. There are some much smaller economies that also depend on trade. For the most part, these are single industry economies in countries not able to support their populations.

These dependencies are, in fact, important factors in maintaining a healthy world economy. Disruption of international trade, especially key commodities like oil, can thus have widespread economic impact. And countries will inevitably band together, as they did in the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War, when these vital interests are threatened.

It doesn't take much to disrupt trade. Regional instability or, in some cases, an act of terrorism can have considerable impact on the flow of trade. For instance, what would be the effect of closing some of the key shipping choke points? If the Dover Strait could not be used, for instance, hundreds of ships a day would have to be diverted through already congested waters. Shutting down the Kiel Canal would have a similar effect. On the other hand, several alternative routes are available if the Malacca Strait could not be used. Closing the Strait of Gibraltar, however, would have an enormous effect because the 140-150 ships that pass through that strait each day would overload the Suez Canal. The only option would be to use ports on the Atlantic and Indian Oceans and rely on overland routes.

With the exception of the Strait of Hormuz and the Dardanelles, alternative routes exist for the main choke points, but the routes are longer and having to use them pushes up the cost of transportation. However, the market usually adjusts quite quickly. For instance, when the Suez Canal was closed from 1967 to 1975 the shipping system adjusted to the alternate route and was able to keep costs down by shifting to much larger tankers. Today, pipelines exist that could cope with a closure of either the Suez Canal or the Strait of Hormuz, but only if the Bab-el-Mendeb (at the entrance to the Red Sea) remains open.{4}

Recent changes in shipping patterns have reduced the number of vulnerabilities. The Panama Canal, for instance, is becoming a far less important waterway other than for tourism and the US Navy's need to move ships between the Atlantic and Pacific. Also, greater use is now made of the North American land bridge for much of the container traffic moving between the Atlantic and Pacific. But these changes in traffic patterns invariably place greater emphasis on the security of ports.

Ports have, in fact, become far more vulnerable and need to be considered carefully in assessing threats to global economic stability. What we are seeing is the growth of a limited number of super-ports that serve as distribution points (hubs) for regional transportation networks. Rotterdam handles well over 250 millions tonnes a year; Kobe, Singapore, and Shanghai each handle between 140 and 150 million tonnes; while the largest North American posts (Vancouver and New York) handle some 80 million tonnes. Halifax is still a relatively minor port but could have a promising future if the decision is made to modernize the container handling facilities so that the port can accommodate the next generation of vessels.

What emerges from all this is that the key factor in preservation of traffic flow is diversity. For instance, international cargo is now handled in several large United States' ports thereby giving the country strategic flexibility. European dependence on Rotterdam (particularly its function as main the port of entry into the extensive internal transportation system) creates a vulnerability which cannot be completely offset by using Antwerp. The vulnerability of a port and the impact disruption can have on the economy was seen in the aftermath of the Kobe earthquake. The disruption was caused more by damage to the support infrastructure (roads and rail lines) than to the actual port facilities. A major transshipment port served by only a single rail line is very vulnerable to disruption.

We also need to look at the main commodities being shipped because they too are a factor in determining vulnerability. Today, as in the past, four commodities dominate world bulk cargo traffic. Annual trade in these commodities averages:

• one billion tonnes oil;
• 300 million tonnes of iron ore;
• 300 million tonnes of coal; and
• 175 million tonnes of grains and cereals

Finally, we need to look at the ships themselves. Not only because they are the means by which trade is kept flowing but also because of the political need on occasion to protect shipping. There are several important issues.

Declining profit margins in the shipping industry have led to a dangerous situation whereby safety is often sacrificed in the interests of reducing operating costs by shifting to flags of convenience instead of national registries. Unfortunately, the operation of the flag of convenience fleet is largely uncontrolled and unmonitored. Today, for instance, masters of vessels cannot always communicate with pilots and often cannot understand the regulations governing the ports their ships use. Often, members of crews cannot communicate with one another save in a rudimentary fashion. Masters, mates, and engineers are often under-qualified (with suspect certification). And vessels are often poorly (at best) maintained.

The erosion of national "flag" merchant fleets raises the issue of who is ultimately responsible (or accountable) for a particular ship. Owners are often merely holding companies (often numbered Swiss bank accounts); agents are concerned only with the movement of a cargo (the ownership and destination of which can change in mid-voyage); and the master is nothing more than a vehicle driver with a schedule to maintain.

On the other hand, the value of cargoes has grown dramatically, particularly with the use of higher capacity vessel, and in some cases cargo-owners and traders are prepared to accept high risks to obtain and deliver those goods. This was seen in both the 1987-88 Tanker War and the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War, where tanker operators willingly accepted physical risks and very high insurance rates to keep the oil flowing.

The traditional concept of states protecting merchant ships under the national flag is fast fading. Instead, a concept whereby the importance of the cargo governs the need for protection seems to be emerging. But there is, as yet, no framework for the protection of multinational shipping interests, merely a fuzzy concept of presumed corporate rights and sovereignty that has yet to be linked to a parallel concept of collective accountability.

It is becoming clear, though, that collective requirements to protect shipping do exist. The safe and timely delivery of humanitarian aid is obviously one such example. The protection of refugees could be another. In national terms, the need to ensure the flow of a vital commodity could also lead to the use of military power to protect shipping. One only has to ask how long would the United States and other major industrial countries stand idly by if Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz. The point is that the naval decline of the traditional major maritime powers (save the USA and possibly France) without a corresponding decline in the economic importance of seaborne trade, in an uncertain and sometime unstable world, puts trade firmly on the international security agenda.

THE UN LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION

The 1982 Convention gave countries the right to administer resources within their 200 nautical mile economic zones. Freedom of navigation and other traditional sea-going rights in those zones were guaranteed for the ships of other countries. But the enormous increase in the size of the ocean areas that fell under national jurisdiction created resource and boundary disputes. Because those resources have the potential to generate wealth, disputes over their control can lead to confrontation.

It is naive to believe that regulation and negotiation alone will resolve those disputes. National interests are often so compelling that states find it necessary to take the law into their own hands to bring about a speedy solution, as Canada did during the 1995 "turbot" crisis.

Because the seeds of escalation often lie within seemingly narrow disagreements, early resolution of maritime resource and boundary disputes serves the collective interests of the international community. Under some circumstances, this can make external intervention necessary for the common good. The complex South China Sea boundary issue is a good example of a maritime dispute with the potential for escalation.

Even though many of the maritime boundary disputes created as a result of the 1982 Convention have been resolved, several have yet to be addressed and some might even be contested again:

• the former Republic of Yugoslavia;
• Greece and Turkey in the Aegean;
• the Black Sea;
• Gulf of Guinea; and (of course)
• the South China Sea.

There are also several other boundary and resource disputes with the potential to involve outside parties. The Falklands- Malvinas situation, for instance, remains unresolved in the eyes of the Argentines, and there are still several contentious boundary issues in the Persian Gulf.

From these few examples it is easy to understand the international community's concern that a seemingly small maritime boundary incident could escalate quickly because of regional politics.

DISRESPECT FOR THE LAW AT SEA

Today, there is a growing disrespect for both state and international law at sea. Instances of illegal transportation of persons and goods are rising. There has been an increase in illegal migration by stowaways and by boatloads of people as we have seen in the Adriatic and the Caribbean, and even in Canadian and US waters. Drugs, arms, and other contraband are moved by sea on a routine basis and their movement is hard to stop. The level of American effort presently put into countering the movement of narcotics by sea is enormous but barely dents the operation. If governments want to stop the flow of drugs they must be prepared to mount far-reaching interdiction operations at sea as well as in the ports and on isolated shores. The cash return on a successful drug shipment is now sufficiently large that a very high degree of risk is acceptable. Somehow, the political will to remove that incentive has to be found.

Illegal fishing operations, conducted without regard for the conservation of species or for national controls, still take place in several parts of the world by vessels flying many flags. International agreements provide some measure of control when the states party to those agreements enter into them in good faith. But what happens when vessels operating under flags of convenience violate the law? For instance, with whom do you negotiate when a vessels flying a Liberian flag breaks the law? Liberia is in a state of chaos, if not anarchy, and a concept of accountability on the part of the registry never really existed. Clearly some other form of enforcement capability is needed. But who will authorize that action?

Keeping this rather grim saga going, piracy and barratry are both on the rise. Moreover, the practices of some pirates constitute a direct environmental threat to the immediate waters and coastline. It is not uncommon now for a gang of pirates to board a ship, kill the crew, take off whatever may be of value and then leave the ship to drift unattended. In some cases, acts of piracy are even believed to be condoned by the state rather than have to face the problems of coastal communities who have lost their livelihoods. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) has been studying piracy for more than ten years without having done anything to bring about its decline. Is this realistic?

Yet another instance where the law is being broken flagrantly is in the illegal dumping of pollutants and hazardous materials in the waters of impoverished states unable to police the areas under their jurisdiction. This inexcusable behaviour is taking place routinely off the coast of West Africa, but no one is doing anything about it. Why? I suspect it is just too difficult politically, and until some organization decides to actually do something about it, the practice will continue unchecked.

There is a growing concern that while the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea sets forth a magnificent legal regime for ocean management it does absolutely nothing about enforcement. One only has to ask what it would take to get the UN or the IMO moving to stop the abuses in West African waters to realize that the Convention is hollow legislation and that both the IMO and the UN are moribund bureaucracies when it comes to actually preventing such abuses.

The point here, simply, is that eventually something will happen to trigger an international demand for action and the politicians will, as usual, look to navies to carry out the necessary surveillance and enforcement operations. Why? Because there are no other forces capable of doing it. Navies are becoming, once again, the guardians of security at sea.

NAVAL POWER

Since the end of the Cold War the relative levels of naval power have changed in many parts of the world with an accompanying belief by some governments that they can resolve their differences by force of arms at sea (by threat or actual use of force) without fear of escalation. As a result, a less stable maritime environment is emerging. The general trend in naval modernization is towards numerically smaller fleets but with ships of greater capability. A modern frigate/destroyer has the capacity of at least two of it predecessors. Similarly, submarines have become far more versatile. Rather than assess fleet capability in terms of guns and total displacement it is more appropriate (and infinitely more useful) to measure naval power as a function of the size of ocean area over which a country's navy can exercise full control.

Today, it is possible for quite small navies (in numerical terms) to have the ability to influence the outcome of events in a limited area provided they have the technical capability. However, for a navy to actually determine the outcome of a situation, the power projection capabilities of aircraft carriers, nuclear-powered submarines, amphibious forces, and fleet support have to be added to the sea control capacity. In this, the basic sea power equation has not changed.

Decline in the global reach of the traditional naval powers, other than the United States, and possibly France, has indirectly increased the probability that a government could use limited naval power to achieve a political objective quickly. In much the same way that Saddam Hussein attempted to seize Kuwait in a mini-blitzkrieg, some other leader might try to settle a dispute quickly by force before other countries take notice.

This leads to the question of which countries have increased their naval capability and their reasons for doing so. The first part of the question is relatively easy to answer; the second part is quite difficult but there are some clues that can help understand the changing situation.

The Asian navies, for instance, present an interesting analytical problem because the reasons for the present growth in naval strength are ambiguous. The South China Sea is obviously one reason, but there seems to be a degree of mutual suspicion, especially in SE Asia where Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand are all building up their navies. Korea and Taiwan are also in the process of modernizing their navies, but both countries have well defined threats and thus national security is a valid concern.

China has increased its naval capability significantly in the last 10 years with significant implications for regional security. Once merely part of a coast defence strategy, the PLA Navy is now central to a new strategy based on a maritime security zone not unlike that used by Japan. This, of course, includes the South China Sea and a requirement to be able to project the necessary degree of power into that sea to determine (rather than influence) the outcome of any future dispute.

India has reaffirmed its intention of remaining a regional naval power and has plans to keep its fleet modern. What is interesting is the fact that India presently has far more naval capability than its neighbours. One has to wonder why.

Russia and its Navy remain enigmatic, mysterious, and shrouded in mystery. On the one hand, they have no money to maintain some relatively new ships while on the other they continue to deploy SSBNs, SSGNs, and SSNs into the Atlantic and Pacific to shadow US naval forces. Also, they deployed a small carrier group to the Adriatic and were able to coordinate some of their operations with other naval forces in the region. This can hardly be labelled proliferation but that level of activity is hardly indicative of a defunct navy. There is reason to believe that the Russians want to be part of the next naval coalition and I believe they have every intention of using what is left of the strategic maritime capability as an instrument of foreign policy. In the post-Yeltsin era (which is likely to be more authoritarian and nationalist, perhaps under General Lebed's hand) we should expect to see a greater Russian presence at sea, particularly in areas where they have long- standing foreign policy interests such as the Middle East. This could cause problems.

Navies have become high-tech and expensive. Modern naval arms races, if that is what is taking place between many of the Asian navies, are thus an expensive process. In general, only those countries with healthy economies can afford to maintain efficient navies. Those who cannot must face the consequences and accept the fact that they cannot exercise complete control in their ocean areas over which they have legal authority. The question that this situation begs is whether it is acceptable to have maritime security maintained by a select few navies. This seems to be the trend at the moment.

The point is that rather than being the dinosaurs of a past era, navies are very much a part of the future. Especially those with the ability to work collectively. Because naval forces can be deployed relatively quickly, do not require an extensive logistic support train, and can be deployed with very little political risk, the tendency will be for politicians to use navies increasingly as instruments of diplomacy and as part of the early crisis management process.{5}

POTENTIAL FOR CONFRONTATION AT SEA

Those who claim that because the Cold War is over we now have peace in our times simply do not understand the nature of the present international system. As I hope I have explained, the potential for confrontation and dispute at sea is now far greater than at any time in that last fifty years. Not only do we have fairly widespread potential for resource and maritime boundary disputes, we also have a marine environment in which there is far greater disregard for law. If all that is not enough, there are many places where confrontation on land could easily extend into the adjoining oceans.

Although we cannot predict where a confrontation is likely to take place, we can prepare ourselves to respond to a range of probable crises.{6} Where are the potential trouble spots? I have mentioned a few in discussing specific problems, but we have not actually thought about where diplomatic efforts should be focused or where naval forces might be called upon to undertake some form of crisis management role.

There are some high risk situations. The South China Sea boundary dispute has the potential to escalate with widespread consequences for regional security and for the freedom of navigation. Miscalculation, perception of threat, or even frustration on the part of any one of the major participants could become the catalyst for escalation. Also, a change in the status quo could draw in external states such as the United States, Japan, or Australia.

The Persian Gulf remains volatile, not just because of the Arab-Israeli problem but also because of regional suspicions and disputed claims of rights over off-shore oil and gas reserves. A low-key (for now anyway) regional power struggle is also going on. This could have widespread implications. For instance, Iran technically has the ability to close the Strait of Hormuz, and even though Oman is quickly increasing its naval capability, only American, British, or French forces could keep the Strait open. The presence of Euro-American naval forces in the Gulf is a stabilizing influence. However, the respective governments may tire of having to keep those forces there. If they are withdrawn, an opportunity for Iran to seize control will be created.

The Balkans remain a problem. The Dayton accord is only holding together because the US, NATO, and other European forces are there and have a mandate to enforce the partition. But how long are the Europeans prepared to keep their forces there? The Canadians pulled out of Cyprus after almost 30 years of merely separating the two factions without resolving their differences. Is this the future for the Balkans? The consequences of a return to unchecked violence in the region (with the probability that it would soon spread to draw in Macedonia and Albania, and thus Greece and the other Balkan states) is frightening. It could easily become the spark that ignites an Eastern Mediterranean war.

The other high risk maritime scenario is terrorism. There is a clear danger that extremism, perhaps spurred on by frustration at the lack of progress in addressing demands (regardless of how ludicrous they may be), may turn to maritime targets. The potential political leverage (in both economic and environmental terms) that could be gained by targeting an oil terminal, a very large tanker, or even a choke point should not be overlooked. Neither should one ignore the real value of a fully-laden container ship.

We live in a largely unstable and unpredictable world. As stated earlier, it is premature to believe that navies are no longer needed. In fact, it is more likely that governments will place increasing reliance on navies as the initial instruments of crisis management and preventive diplomacy. Much of the work navies will be called upon to do will involve multinational forces and command structures.

CONCLUSION

Where does all this leave us? These are not simple issues. To the uninitiated they are, in fact, remarkably complex. And to those who dabble in them without understanding their full nature or their interdependence are liable to make serious errors in judgement. For a country as dependent as Canada on ocean use and having responsibility for an ocean domain almost as large as the country itself, maritime security should not be dismissed lightly as merely another dimension of national defence policy to be brokered as part of the political process. Instead, maritime security should be studied and discussed openly and new policies made only after careful consideration of all the facts. Above all, Canadian maritime security should not be allowed to become just another issue for special interest group politics. It is far too important.

In as much as national unity is quintessential to our survival as a country, the continuing security of the oceans that encompass much of our country is essential to it remaining sovereign.

NOTES

1. Admiral William A. Owens, High Seas: The Naval Passage to an Uncharted World, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995), p. 177. Back to Text

2. Franklyn Griffiths, Strong and Free: Canada and the New Sovereignty (Toronto: Stoddart, 1996), pp. 67-8. Back to Text

3. The Canadian aspect is discussed by Bruce Fenton in "Foreign Policy and Naval Forces: A Canadian Perspective" in Maritime Security Working Papers Number 3, May 1996, pp. 67-79. Back to Text

4. This is discussed in more detail my article "The Middle East as a Maritime System" in Peter T. Haydon, ed., Naval Confidence-Building in the Middle East, (Halifax: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 1996), pp. 39-74. Back to Text

5. In some respects, one can come back to a single question over whether a need exists for standing and on-call naval forces beyond the present NATO structure. Several scholars have made a case for a UN naval force to be available to "show the flag" in areas of concern. But can such a force be assembled, deployed, and put to work in the political climate within the UN today? I suspect not. More significantly, real problems are not going to be solved by what will be, in reality, little more than tokenism. Back to Text

6. The problem faced by the governments of most industrialized countries is that foreign policy has become largely reactive. Something happens somewhere and a government has to decide quickly whether its interests are affected and, if so, how they should respond. Also, governments have to decide whether they will respond to calls from within the UN system to support crisis management operations in places and situations that may not directly affect national interests. Back to Text

Peter Haydon is a Naval Analyst and Research Fellow with Dalhousie University's Centre for Foreign Policy Studies and the Director of Maritime Affairs.

© Copyright NOAC 1997