Toward Canada's Ocean Strategy

"Because the safe, reliable routing of ships is vital to Canada economic viability, Canada must optimize sea transport while ensuring that safety standards, accessibility and environmental protection are maintained."

That optimistic statement from a new government discussion paper on Canada's ocean strategy is all well and good in theory, but one has to ask whether those aims are actually achievable?

One of the problems with government today is that a belief prevails that by making laws and regulations problems will just go away. This seems particularly true for oceans issues. In reality, it is the enforcement of laws and regulations dealing with ocean use that constitutes responsible ocean management. Admittedly, the plan for a new Oceans Strategy lays out some pretty impressive enforcement objectives, but can they be achieved? There is good reason for scepticism.

In 1994 the government promulgated a new Defence White paper which was the result of an extensive, if not exhaustive, coast-to-coast public review. The majority of knowledgeable people agreed that it was a sensible and affordable policy -- especially its naval dimension. But now, a mere three years later, the maritime and naval communities are still waiting for that policy to be implemented. In particular:

the deal on the highly affordable surplus British submarines has still not been closed;
replacements for the over-age Sea King maritime helicopters are nowhere to be seen;
the overdue life extension and modernization for the Aurora maritime patrol aircraft, central to responsible ocean management, is still stalled; and
plans to replace the three operational support vessels (AORs), fundamental to the naval task group concept and to our national ability to respond quickly to crisis, seem equally stalled.

These programs not only allow Canada to meet its international obligations and make a modest contribution to a stable international system, they are also cornerstones of our overall ability to be good stewards of our ocean domain. In fact, these programs have the potential to make a major contribution of the new oceans strategy. One would think that if the government is truly committed to the new strategy, the necessary procurement programs would be implemented. Or is the new strategy to be yet another hollow document in the same way that the 1994 Defence White Paper has lost much of its significance?

Another reason for concern is the significant down-sizing of the Coast Guard and national ocean science capacity. Under the recent merger of DFO and Coast Guard, the fleets were integrated under a concept whereby the "new" Coast Guard provides marine services. Also, a 25 per cent fleet reduction is being carried out. The focus of the new structure will apparently be on icebreaking, navigation services, rescue, safety, and environmental response with less attention given to conservation, protection, and science. Projected fleet sizes for vessels capable of working well out to sea are quite small, with only a mere handful of larger vessels in each region.

The Coast Guard fulfils some very important functions in the overall ocean management process, and several of those jobs cannot be delegated to other departments or privatized. For instance, even though naval vessels can provide much of the necessary presence and patrol functions in Canadian waters and provide platforms for actual enforcement of fisheries, environmental, and resource laws, there are times when a warship sends too strong a message. That it was Coast Guard vessels that confronted the Spanish fishing vessels during the 1995 "Turbot Crisis" rather than warships prevented escalation. Nevertheless, it was the availability of warships nearby that allowed the Coast Guard to be effective "enforcers" of the law. Also, only the Coast Guard can, at the moment, provide a government presence in northern and Arctic waters, other than in the height of summer of course.

The Navy and the Coast Guard are key members of the same ocean management team, functioning independently yet interdependently. Why, then, does it seem that government is more interested in reducing their capabilities rather than endorsing their important role in making the new oceans strategy a reality rather than token legislation.

The Bedford Institute of Oceanography (BIO), once a highly respected international centre of excellence has had its operations cut back severely with the result that many key ocean research programs can no longer be carried out. Admittedly, some research and development can be done by the private sector, but the government must lead in some of these areas. If the intent of the new oceans strategy is to be honoured, the government must commit to the scientific program as well as to the other key aspects. To be a world leader, we have to do more than just make a token commitment.

Another concern lies in the actual enforceability of some of the new regulations concerning ship safety. It is foolish to think that compliance can be assumed in all cases. One of the foremost issues is the problem of basic comprehension of orders and procedures. As Michel Pouliot, president of the International Maritime Pilots Association (and a St. Lawrence River pilot) explained recently "the Captain will hopefully speak some English (the mandated language of professional marine communications), and the other officers may speak a few words, but it would be impossible to hold a conversation of any sort." Even simple instructions and guidance are often enormously difficult to communicate.

When the Gold Bond Conveyor foundered and sank with all hands in a severe storm off Canada's eastern seaboard a few years ago, concern was raised that the weather forecast provided to the ship just before sailing may not have been understood. The Master and his Mates simply may not have understood enough English to comprehend the forecast. Moreover, in an era where ships must operate on very small profit margins, the cost of a delay in sailing may have to be borne by the Master. The much-vaunted global economy is a hard task master, often more concerned with profit than environmental issues.

Another problem facing maritime legislators is the change in the character of the shipping industry. No longer is a merchant ship identifiable as an extension of a particular state, and the problem is far deeper than just its flag or registry. The modern merchantman is indeed a reflection of the global economy.

Most ships today have multiple owners with financial, legal, and operating arrangements that makes it enormously difficult to determine who is responsible for the vessel.
A cargo, especially oil, can be sold or traded many times during a voyage.
Certification of Masters, Mates, and Engineers is no longer a control mechanism on professional standards.
Crews are multinational and frequently hired at the lowest cost from impoverished countries; they are poorly fed and invariably badly treated.

Continuing to actively protect the marine environment by "improving the standards for ship and crew safety" as the new Canadian oceans strategy intends, is going to be much more difficult than the mere enactment of new regulations. Legislation without enforcement meaningless; as is the passing of new laws without due thought to their actual enforceability. If Canada is to be a good steward of it ocean domain, it has to put its money where its mouth is and spend the necessary money on the all-important enforcement and scientific programs that turn theory into good practice. The government's track record in this respect is reason enough for scepticism.

Peter Haydon