What Naval Capabilities Does Canada Need?By Peter HaydonJust over a year ago in a paper written for the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies I posed a series of questions that I thought should be answered as a preliminary step in determining Canada's future naval requirements.2 My concern at the time that little was being done to implement the eminently sensible defence policy laid out in the 1994 Defence White Paper and that time to begin some modernization and replacement programs was, in fact, running out. While progress has been made in setting up a contract to acquire new naval helicopters, much still remains to be done. Also, concern exists that the direction being taken by DND's blueprint, Strategy 2020, is somewhat narrow and does not have an adequate view of the longer-term naval requirements. To some it appears as a "flavour of the month" vision that could see a decline in traditional naval contingency capabilities in favour of a concept of joint operations that is, as yet, not politically endorsed. The premise from which I worked a year ago was that a navy traditionally fulfilled three functions:
In performing these functions, naval forces are clear signals to the rest of the world of their home state's right of self protection, its right to promote and protect national interests, and its right to enforce domestic and international law in its own waters. It goes without saying that naval forces also carry out humanitarian tasks such as search and rescue and provide support to the citizens of its home country in many other ways. In other words, a navy, simply, is the extension of the sovereign state over the sea. Hence, to remain sovereign and secure at sea a state needs to invest in an appropriate level of sea power. And it is that concept of investment which does not seem to be entrenched in the Canadian defence planning process. Despite fairly widespread relief that the government has finally taken notice of the extreme plight of the Navy's fleet of ancient helicopters and thus of the operational limitations imposed by their lack of reliability, concern has been expressed that the numbers proposed make little sense without a prelimi-nary rationalization of the fleet.4 As a way of furthering the quest for a sensible answer to the basic question that clearly underlies the helicopter replacement program and the need for new afloat logistics support, it may be useful to return to the series of questions I raised a year ago. By discussing each question, in varying degrees of detail, hopefully a sensible answer to the question, "What do we want the Canadian Navy to be able to do?" can be developed. Does Canada need a naval expeditionary capability at task group level? In some ways this is the critical question. From a narrow and traditional "Mackenzie King" perspective that all Canada needs is a "good workable, little fleet" an expeditionary capability of this sort is neither needed nor desirable for Canada, However, on the basis of some 50 years of recent history and on the record of the last ten years in particular, this has become a "core" naval capability. If, as Strategy 2020 would have us believe, a rapid response capability is the new direction of Canadian defence policy then obviously a related naval expeditionary capability is necessary. But has this got to be at a task group level? I believe it has to be because it may be that collective, rather than national, response planning may require that level of commitment. It is foolish, to say the least, to plan commitments to opera-tions without knowing the situation and the precise mission. Gone are the days when NATO could make contingency plans against a predictable series of Soviet actions. Now, planning can only be done under the most general of concepts until the actual employment is known. And only when the military requirement is established can the call for capabilities be issued. The best offer Canada can make under such circumstances is a self-sufficient naval task group with or without land forces, and this task group can be comprised of more than just surface ships. Submarines, aircraft, and even shore-based systems have their places. One of the advantages of the task group is that it can roll out quickly while a land force or joint task force takes very much longer to deploy. The other reason for maintaining the task group capability is that it takes that level of commitment to "buy" a seat at the table at which the crisis will be managed and the "end state" determined. A single frigate or destroyer doesn't carry anywhere near the same degree of political clout interna-tionally, other than as part of a US formation. If Canada wants a voice in the international crisis management process, it has to "ante up" from the beginning. The other issue is the operational relevance of the task group concept today. It is certainly the minimum capability for a complex national task such as evacuation of Canadians under dangerous conditions or of maintaining a prolonged presence in an area of national concern. Integrating a national task group into a multinational formation can present some problems in com-mand and control unless the task group as a whole is interoper-able with the other forces. This becomes a major factor in setting equipment capabilities. Commitment to the national task group is, de facto, a commitment to a level of technology and opera-tional capabilities. It costs a fair amount of money to maintain an effective task group structure, and thus that structure becomes a political target for those short-sighted enough not to understand the political and operational advantages of the task group concept. Does Canada need a rapid response capability under a concept where the Navy would provide sea lift and operational support to a joint task force sent on an overseas mission? The answer to this question is clearly "Yes." Why? The main reason is because this is the way of the future. The greater majority of the countries with whom we would normally align ourselves have adopted that approach to crisis management. The strategy of together, jointly, from the sea is a reality and if Canada wants to be part of the decision-making process, then that sort of commitment will be expected. However, and despite what has been said in the recent string of DND planning docu-ments, I think there is an inherent danger of the Navy placing too much faith in this concept as the rationale for the replacement for the AORs. I see several reasons for caution:
The bottom line is that I have yet to see anything that convinces me that the Army is serious in re-structuring itself in a way that it can provide a force compatible with the rapid response capabil-ities being assembled by the Americans, British, Dutch, Spanish, etc. and the latest DND documents do not reassure me that political approval for such a radical capability shift is certain. In designing the replacements for the AORs prudence would indicate that their fleet support capabilities not be compromised. If the Navy loses the AORs, the whole line of dominoes begins to fall: the task group concept goes; the ability to command a multinational formation is in jeopardy; sustained operations are no longer possible; and I suspect there may be helicopter implica-tions as well. In many respects, it is a fleet logistic support capability that separates a jeune école or coastal navy from one that has international relevance. Is it useful for Canada to be able to exercise tactical command of multinational naval forces? There can be little doubt that being able to command a multina-tional formation and actually doing it pays dividends politically and militarily. Not only does it assure a place in the decision-making process, it also provides input to the evolving doctrinal and tactical changes that the "first team" navies make. The other dimension of this is, though, that a national task group must exist as the vehicle by which future Canadian multinational command-ers gain experience. The Canadian Navy can point with pride to the accomplishments the various multinational and NATO force commanders who have come from their ranks. Does Canada need to maintain its naval commitment to the NATO naval forces? Despite the mutterings of a few "nay-sayers", NATO remains a useful international organization and the standing naval forces have proven their diplomatic utility as well as their operational value. With Canada's proclivity for active internationalism at the lowest possible cost, integrating a ship into a NATO formation provides an enormously good return on a modest investment. However, there are a couple of caveats that may take a little explaining politically. First, for the commitment to be meaning-ful, the ship must be useful operationally, there simply isn't room to carry a passenger when serious work has to be done at sea. Thus the ships sent to work with NATO must be able to look after themselves if the going gets rough, and they must be able to contribute something to the collective operational capability. What we begin to get out of this aspect of employment is that the self-sufficient ship able to defend itself has become the funda-mental naval requirement. To that, though, I would add that the ability to work with ships of other navies to achieve a common objective is every bit as important. In many ways, it is this requirement that sets the equipment capabilities of individual ships. In terms of 21st century naval capabilities, any concept of "niche" roles is ridiculous other than in truly specialized func-tions such as mine countermeasures, or for the major navies in areas such as amphibious and aircraft carrier operations. The fact is that, in the future, warships are more likely to be deployed, to both home and distant waters, in contingency situations than under carefully scripted scenarios. The ships simply don't have time to come home and reconfigure, they need to sail with all the capabilities that might be called upon to help resolve a crisis. Multinationally or nationally, the dominant trend in sea power is for multi-purpose destroyers and frigates to work in larger multinational formations. However, the other tools of sea power-submarines, aircraft, and fixed sensors-are no less important. The traditional concept of "task organization" is as important today as it was yesterday. To be significant, a modern navy needs a range of capabilities that can be applied to different situations. The one thing we can be certain of is that no two crises will be the same. This calls for versatility not only in a state's naval forces but also in its entire military structure if it is to remain relevant on the world stage. Should the Canadian Navy retain the capability of operating within a US naval formation? In many ways, my comments concerning NATO formations apply here. Operationally, though, it is probably more important to retain the ability to integrate a Canadian frigate or destroyer into a US carrier battle group than it is to be able to work with NATO. I am not about to make any attempt at second-guessing the future of European security, but it does seem that a greater European naval cohesion is emerging and I think it quite likely that a European naval task group, not like the WEU task group that operated in the Adriatic but something fully autonomous, will be deployed quite soon. The British role in that venture is uncertain I think. While they will probably join out of curiosity, we should not see that as a firm indication of longer-term security policy. I add this here because I sense a strengthening of the UK-US military link, especially in rapid response to crisis.6 The question then becomes one of Canada's military relation-ships with those two states. The Americans need us for many reasons, not least of which is that we act as a counter to percep-tions of US unilateralism. The slow drawing apart of the United States and Europe, as much a function of the desire to cut back on "Clintonian" adventurism in foreign policy as in any shift to a more isolationist position, will make Canadian involvement in US crisis management operations ever more important. While this may be unpopular in some Canadian political circles, it is a reality of international, continental, and domestic politics. We are likely to find in the future that Canada's interests are invari-ably served by joining with the Americans in international crisis management operations. It is in this capacity that the submarines will become valuable politically. The Americans do not have that precise capability and find working close inshore more difficult and with a higher risk factor than they would like. A Canadian diesel-electric submarine could easily become an essential component in a predominantly US task force operating in the littoral zone of an area in crisis. Does the Navy fulfil a useful function through its visits to foreign countries and exercises with foreign navies? As long as Canadian governments embrace the policy of active internationalism, the value of the Navy in supporting diplomatic initiatives will be considerable. A point often overlooked is that while we become more deeply integrated into the US economy and into American culture (as are most other industrialized countries as a result of mass electronic media and entertainment), we will find that the use of warships as instruments of diplomacy is one of the ways by which Canadian independence can be shown. It is only crisis management that will become increasingly together, jointly, from the sea not the general conduct of interna-tional relations, which will remain a state prerogative. Here, the point will have to be made to the political leadership, that integration into US and NATO naval formations does not undermine Canadian sovereignty, rather it tends to strengthen Canadian sovereignty because each mission is a function of choice. Similarly, independent warship visits to other countries and exercises with the forces of other navies serve to reinforce Canadian sovereignty. A key point here is that we should attempt to get away from the idea that sovereignty is a territorial thing; it is in fact about the right to chose the course taken in a particu-lar situation. Warships operating nationally are as symbolic of that right of choice as are warships within a multinational formation. Should the Navy conduct constabulary tasks in waters under Canadian jurisdiction? Why should they not undertake those tasks? It makes absolutely no sense to have two independent naval forces unless the country is operating on a scale similar to that of the United States where the US Navy is largely an extension of American foreign policy and the Coast Guard has much of the domestic security responsi-bility. It is normal for "medium" power navies to have both domestic and international responsibilities; it makes more economic sense. There are those in Canada, though, who would convert the Navy into a coast guard with small vessels to patrol the "contiguous waters". In proposing this they not only dismiss the foreign policy function of the Navy which has served Canada so well for the last decade, but they also display a clear lack of understanding of the nature of the waters under Canadian jurisdiction. They are anything but benign. In fact, they represent a very complex security problem if managed responsibly. Not only must Canada carry out its ocean responsibilities effectively, it must also be seen to be doing so by neighbouring states. You don't just throw a bunch of small boats out on the sea and call that responsible management of the ocean domain. Having a Coast Guard to serve as the first level of response to problems in home waters is convenient and allows much of that work to be done with minimum force. However, without the backing of a more robust instrument of force, the Coast Guard could not act in that manner. If so, to what extent? Navies are instruments of state policy over the sea. Thus, the extent to which they carry out any specific mission is a function of government directive. The present concept of graduated response to problems, or crises should they arise, in home waters seems to work well. That those operations are coordinated by the Navy makes sense as the Navy has the necessary capabilities, as the government directed it to develop in the early 1970s. As we saw during the 1998 SwissAir 111 disaster, the resources of all agencies with maritime mandates are needed in a major crisis. Thus, the answer to the question, albeit somewhat flippant perhaps, is that naval capabilities are needed in various degrees. The 30-year history of Canadian intergovernment departmental cooperation has served the interests of Canadian remarkably well. But that said, the fact remains that each of those depart-ments bring unique capabilities to the table. If not, which government agency should do it? If we rephrase this question as, "Should Canada have only a coast guard?" it is easier to address. Clearly, there are those who believe that the Navy is redundant and that all that is needed is a coast guard, but it is also clear that that perspective is not based on any great understanding of the maritime dimension of the country. The shift to a coast guard would have some profound and lasting effects, for instance:
Simply, the shift to a coast guard would help accelerate the marginalization of Canada on the world stage. There are those who would say that Mr. Axworthy has already started this process with his notions of "soft" power and by deliberately attempting to twist the American nuclear tiger's tail. What far too many Canadians do not understand is that their Navy is a symbol of the state itself. When technically proficient and operationally credible, naval forces exemplify a state with those very characteristics: a strong state with the ability to take a stand on an issue. Similarly, effective multinational forces, such as the NATO Standing Naval Force, show an even greater commitment to international order. On the other hand, token forces are just that: tokens showing little resolve to commit to anything and probably have no real intention of paying whatever price may be exacted for maintaining order. Conclusion So, what does all this add up to? This paper essentially advocates the one thing many serving naval and military leaders probably do not want to hear: continuing the status quo-but for good reason. The status quo has proven that it provides an excellent return to Canada and Canadians for the relatively small invest-ment made in naval capabilities. Reducing or removing any of the present capabilities, overall capabilities rather than specific equipment-related capabilities, will have an adverse effect on Canada's ability to play a meaningful role on the world stage. In this I believe that the Navy is the embodiment of the Canadian desire to be active internationalists, especially in the 21st century, which the Americans have already tagged as being a "naval century". Notes
Peter Haydon is the editor of Maritime Affairs and a Senior Research Fellow at Dalhousie University's Centre for Foreign Policy Studies. Copyright © 1999 Peter Haydon |