Underwater Legends

by Senator Colin Kenny

The proposed purchase of four slightly used submarines from Britain to replace Canada's existing submarine fleet bought in the 1960's has received much attention and comment. The issue has been before cabinet, and they are having difficulty making up their minds. Unfortunately, as has been the case with other high-profile defence programs, much commentary on the buy is inaccurate or misleading. At least four big myths about submarines are often repeated.

1. The navy wants submarines mainly so it can stay in the "big-leagues" with the British and Americans.

False.

Submarine operations are not a "big-league" naval role. No fewer than 44 countries currently operate submarines, including Albania, Algeria, Syria and Venezuela. Submarines are an essential component of any effective naval force.

2. The purchase price is only the tip of the iceberg, the real cost of the submarines will be much greater.

False.

The new submarines will actually save money in operating costs. The operating costs of the British submarines will be less than the costs of our existing submarines, and expensive refits of our submarines, to keep them going into the 21st century, would be avoided. Infrastructure and "Canadianizing" costs are included in the purchase price.

3. Submarines are an expensive way to perform a limited number of roles, which are not relevant to the modern security environment.

False.

As well as their primary defence role, submarines can and have been used to detect and pursue drug smugglers, to conduct fisheries patrols, and (though not Canadian submarines) to enforce United Nations sanctions. They ensure that demonstrations of Canadian presence in support of, for example, diplomatic initiatives, cover all dimensions, and they force our allies to keep us informed about their submarine operations off our coasts. In performing sovereignty tasks, submarines are much less affected by weather than aircraft, and can be 5 to 10 times cheaper for task requiring continued surveillance over days, such as pursing a drug smuggling vessel into Canadian waters. Their effectiveness was confirmed by a 1993 study conducted for the Department of Fisheries which found that patrols could have a significant deterrent effect, since the fisherman would never know whether a submarine was present or not.

4. In times of fiscal restraint, we should not be buying submarines when we cannot afford to maintain social programs.

False.

Defence spending is not an alternative to social program, but a complement. Our armed forces are an insurance policy providing the security within which we enjoy pensions, health care, child care and education. Take away that insurance, and one day the rest might be taken away by someone else. In any case, eliminating the submarine funding, or even the entire defence budget, will not alone solve our deficit problem and thereby save all other government programs. The defence budget is already to small for that. Other things are going to have to give. In these circumstances, what we must look for are highly relevant, cost-effective ways to make the investment in our security, both physical and social.

The relevance of submarines for Canada is compelling. We are a maritime country, as even a cursory glance at the map makes clear. We are linked by sea to trading partners and allies around the globe. And we know form the experience of two world wars how vulnerable those links can be to submarines. Submarines remain one of the greatest threats we would face if tensions, confrontation or even war return. And that threat, distant as it may seem today, could re-emerge much faster than we could re-develop submarine skills, it we let them disappear.

Submarines are the most effective defence against other submarines, and are essential to maintain the anti-submarine skills of our other naval forces. We must maintain a modest readiness to respond to a renewed military threat. In the meantime, submarines help protect our sovereignty and can be used to support United Nations operations.

As for cost-effectiveness, the submarines will be swapped for the use of existing training facilities in Canada: no money will change hands. And, as noted above, their operating costs will be lower than our existing submarines. Examples of equally cost-effecting purchases are, I suspect, few in Canadian government history.

Senator Colin Kenny was a member of the 1994 Special Joint Committee on Canada's Defence Policy.