BACK ISSUES OF THE
MARITIME AFFAIRS JOURNAL

It is our practise to post the Editorials and Tables of Contents of back issues of the Maritime Affairs Journal to the web site as each new edition of the Journal is published. Copies of back issues, while still available, can be obtained by sending a cheque or money order for $6.50 Cdn (or US$5.00) (which includes postage and handling) to Maritime Affairs at PO Box 33078, Halifax, NS, B3L 4T6.

Spring 2001 Edition

Editorial

The Other Side of Sea Power

Unfortunately, there is no such thing as a universal definition of sea power. Instead, we use a range of meanings. For instance, Eric Grove, says that sea power

...means different things to different people. It can be an almost mystical concept, a magic formula to be mouthed in awe-struck tones to scare away evil spirits such as defence ministers with non-naval priorities or air force officers with alternative means on offer of providing the state's military power on or across the oceans. To others, following in the well-trodden footsteps of Alfred Thayer Mahan, "sea power" represents a more coherent but equally universal concept, an interlocking system of forms of sea use, military and civil, which has a unique contribution to making powers great or greater still.

And there are even broader definitions than that.

Although I usually deal with the purely naval side of sea power, it is often useful to look at the broader perspectives, especially if one wants to look at the overall maritime dimension of a specific country.

Most of us are familiar with the standard litany of Canadian maritime statistics-longest coastline, seventh or eighth largest exclusive economic zone, economic dependence on trade by sea, and so on-but how many of us stop long enough to think about what these statistic really mean, not just today but in the longer term? It is easy to uphold the view of Canada as a major maritime state on the basis of those facts but the tendency is to take them for granted. Yet as we well know, the sea and the way we use it are changing constantly, and economics can make fools of us all.

At the dawn of the modern era of sea power, just over a hundred years ago, the American historian, Alfred Theyer Mahan, (who some champion as the father of maritime strategy) set out six elements of sea power which he believed could make a country great. Simply, they were

• the country's location;
• its physical nature;
• the size of the country and its overseas possessions;
• the size of its population;
• national characteristics; and
• nature of its government.

His argument, which was as much about economics as it was about politics, had a very distinct "imperial" dimension. Even after a hundred years, though, the essence of those characteristics still make a lot of sense and can be used as an analytical framework. If we apply Mahan's six criteria to Canada, and by projecting ourselves some 20-30 years ahead, we can begin to see where Canadian policy for ocean use and management should be going.

Location

In geo-politics, as in real estate, "location is everything!" It establishes the neighbourhood and the type of neighbours. Canada occupies the northern part of the North American continent, bordering on three oceans, one of which is frozen and like much of the country represents a challenge to settlement and use. The most important geographic feature is that Canada's southern neighbour, in fact only immediate neighbour, is the United States of America. This, more than any other factor, shapes the Canadian economy and much of the lifestyle. Yet, Canadians are able to remain independent despite the high degree of economic and cultural integration. Managing the relationship with the Americans is the most important requirement of government. In maritime terms, this requires a sharing of resources, respect for each other's boundaries, and a common approach to upholding the law in adjoining waters. In terms of national security both Canada and the United States must be careful not to cause the other concern through their actions or inactions. If the Americans were to believe that the Canadians were negligent in the way they managed their ocean domain and that this created a potentially dangerous situation for the United States, then the Americans would be tempted to intervene in any threatening situation. To avoid this, Canada must be seen by the Americans to be acting responsibly in its own waters in upholding the law and also preserving national security. Even though much of the Canadian ocean domain is frozen for most of the year, the sheer size of the waters under Canadian jurisdiction presents a major security and ocean management problem. Canada's geographic position is such that it cannot afford to have an unfriendly neighbour. The problem, politically, is more one of seeing how little can be done rather than how much should be done. The dividing line between negligence and effective stewardship is really quite fine. Here we need to ask whether the government is actually spending enough to ensure that Canada remains a good steward of its ocean domain.

Physical nature

Although a large part of Canada presents a challenge to economic development and settlement, the other parts of the country are rich in resources, blessed with fertile lands, and well endowed with large rivers. Since the first settlement, those features have determined settlement and thus growth, particularly through the use of the rivers for transportation and the development of large ports adjacent to the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Now, as a mature industrialized state (although some might want to argue this point), those ports and waterways are essential components of the Canadian economy. Even though some 85 percent of our trade is now with the United States and about one half of that trade moves by road and rail, trade by sea is a very significant part of the Canadian economy. That said, the global economy is fickle and trade patterns can shift in a heartbeat.

At the moment Canada enjoys a relatively high profile in the movement of goods within the global economy, but alternative ports and internal lines of communication exist in North America and shippers could easily stop using the Canadian system if it ceased to be competitive. It is not enough to talk glibly about being competitive in the world marketplace, as governments like to do, there has to be a parallel commitment to maintaining the infrastructure that makes competitiveness a reality. Shippers will be drawn to Canada because the integrated Canadian port and onward transportation system is efficient and cost-effective for them, and not on the basis of a bunch of political platitudes. Maintaining that system so that it remains competitive internationally should be a high national priority. But is it?

Canada is also blessed with considerable off-shore resources that have the potential to add to the national wealth-not wealth in terms of static money but wealth in terms of investment and work that contribute directly to the national standard of living. But we have seen the once-great fishery mismanaged in ways and for reasons beyond the scope of this editorial to the point where it will be many years before it recovers. With an eye to the longer-term, the fishery has to be managed in a way that benefits all Canadians not just small segments of the population so that it can be used for the collective good for decades to come. The management policies have to include not only Canadians but also those foreign vessels that use, and frequently abuse, Canadian waters. And those policies have to be enforced to prevent abuse and criminal exploitation. But are they?

Oil and gas form another potentially valuable ocean resource for Canada. This too is an industry demanding careful and far-sighted policies. It is simply not acceptable to allow partisan politics to enter into this sector of the economy. The oil and gas reserves are a valuable national asset that must be managed to the benefit of all in a way that helps reduce Canadian dependence on imported energy products. Far too many people overlook the fact that the pipeline stops at Montreal, and the eastern part of the country is largely dependent on imported energy. This makes eastern Canada vulnerable to the fluctuations of the global energy market-a strange situation when the country is a net energy exporter. Clearly, Canada needs a national energy policy that serves all Canadians. Where is it though?

Extent of territory

Canada really has three parts: the fertile southern landmass; the inhospitable but resource-rich northern lands; and the ocean domain which is almost as big as the other two. These are unlikely to change in size and it is difficult to imagine Canada gaining any overseas possessions. But the Arctic is likely to change in a way that equates to an acquisition of new territory.

The Arctic is rich in natural resources and thus represents a storehouse of essential commodities that are in limited supply elsewhere, exploiting those resources is enormously expensive because of the severe climate. But the Arctic is very likely to be subject to dramatic climatic change in the next 20-30 years as a result of global warming, and this will change its accessibility and thus the availability of those resources.

Traditionally, Canadian governments treat the Arctic with a mixture of disdain and negligence save for those occasions when Canadian sovereignty in the high north is challenged. Much of this attitude is a function of the fact that the Arctic waterways are virtually impassible for most of the year and there is little economic reason to open them up. As I said earlier, this is likely to change in the next 20-30 years. In fact, the changes are beginning to happen, albeit very slowly. Global warming could result in the opening of some of the waterways through the Canadian Arctic archipelago. If this happens, shorter and thus more economical trade routes will exist between the Pacific and the Atlantic. Even under limited ice conditions, it could easily become cheaper to move goods through the Arctic rather than using the existing sea routes and land bridges. An increase in the use of those waters has a price though. We have already seen a rise in adventure tourism in Arctic waters and it may not be long before a small change in ice conditions make resource exploration in those waters easier to conduct. With increased usage comes a higher risk of accidents and environmental damage. In other words, those waters have to be brought under a realistic Canadian management policy, not just for environmental concerns but for safety and for law enforcement. Thus, it is appropriate to ask whether Canada has a coherent, long-term Arctic policy?

Population size

Canada does not have a large population. At around 30 million the country is probably close to settlement saturation without considerable industrial expansion and increased infrastructure, and this would require an enormous financial investment. However, given the likelihood of changes to the basic Canadian climate and the pressures of overpopulation in other parts of the world, a new mass migration, such as that out of Europe in the 19th century, is not out of the question. Should that happen, the demand for goods and services would increase proportionately and, in turn, place even greater demands on the transportation system as well natural resources, especially energy. If the population does grow in this way, the "central" Canadian lack of concern for the oceans and ocean issues will have to change, as it did a century ago. A larger Canadian population will require a larger Canadian role in the global economy with a correspondingly larger dependence on the maritime dimension of the country. Has any government agency started to think about the impact of long-term population growth?

National characteristics

For all its dependence on the oceans for transportation and as a source of natural resources, Canada does not have a maritime character. Even the richness of its maritime history and heritage fail to alter the fact that the majority of Canadians think in continental terms. Their focus is more upon the north-south economic and cultural links with the United States than upon the more diverse maritime links to the rest of the world. The irony of this fact, which has been acknowledged since the beginning of the 20th century, is that while many Canadians object to and even protest the steady integration of their country into the greater North American trade structure, they refuse to accept that by taking a broader approach to Canada's relationship with the rest of the world, as implicit within a well-defined maritime culture, they would do much to ensure a more controlled integration of trade without the perception of a risk of cultural integration. Simply, a shift in focus to a more maritime-oriented national character would not only provide alternative relationships but also strengthen the unique nature of Canada. What are Canada's long-term national interests? Does globalization mean integration with the United States?

Nature of its government

Appropriately, the last item concerns the nature of the government. Here, there is not much to add to what has been said already other than to review the performance of government in the maritime sector. It seems that the present Canadian government, in keeping with the attitude of its predecessors, has little direct interest in maritime issues; its concerns are more continental in nature. While this is understandable from the perspective of the importance of managing the relationship with the Americans, it is incomprehensible from the perspective of the vitally important function that Canadian maritime activities play in the generation of national wealth and thus the general well-being of its citizens. It also ignores the longer-term maritime issues. Simply, the maritime dimension of Canada is not being taken seriously by government. The list of maritime failures and shortcomings speaks for itself:

• the fishery has been mismanaged and remains subject to abuse;
• the ports and related transportation systems do not receive the political support they need to remain competitive in the global marketplace;
• the domestic shipping industry has been allowed to decline;
• the shipbuilding industry has been allowed to die;
• no comprehensive plan exists for the enforcement of the law in Canadian waters, and resources to conduct law enforcement operations are in decline;
• the off-shore oil and gas industry does not put Canadian requirements first;
• there is no plan for the integrated management of Arctic waters;
• Canadian sovereignty in Arctic and other northern waters is not being upheld at a time when usage is growing and the potential for abuse increasing.

Is this responsible stewardship?

Conclusion

Contrary to the beliefs of some, there is absolutely nothing to fear from change provided it is managed sensibly. On a broad scale, changed needs to be implemented in a way that does not disrupt economies or societies. In doing this, the organization implementing change, invariably a government, needs to explain why the change is taking place, what will take place, and how individuals will be effected. One of the problems today, when we are in the midst of a period of widespread change, is that governments are not doing a very good job at explaining either the process or the longer-term implications.

For those interested in history, a somewhat similar situation existed in Europe in 1848, but the concerns of the people then were as much about food shortages as they were about the impact of the Industrial Revolution. In that situation, government inertia also became a major factor. In fairness, though, governments sometimes have to play "catch-up" when faced with far-reaching changes that they have not initiated. Uncontrolled, such change can be de-stabilizing. The solution is that government has to stay ahead of issues and trends and be prepared to guide change from its onset. This requires some form of a national vision. But does such a vision exist today?

What concerns us is the apparent lack of long-term planning in government today. We seem to be stuck with adminstrations whose concerns are more for making short-term problems go away and appeasing special interest groups rather than taking the initiative and investing in Canada's future. The maritime dimension of the country is but one example of where such long-term planning is needed, and this planning should begin now before the effects of change take hold and close out options.

In as much as Mahan claimed that sea power could make a country great, it can be said today that when a country fails to manage its ocean dimension efficiently its position in the world will decline. In terms of long-term planning for its maritime dimension, Canada gets a failing grade. That could be changed if the government could be convinced to take the entire oceans sector more seriously.

Peter Haydon

Articles in the Spring 2001 Edition of Maritime Affairs include:

"Canada's Mine Countermeasures Capability Revisited" by Michael Westwell is the first of a two-part article looking at the history of Canadian naval mine warfare activities. The second part will appear in the Summer Issue of Maritime Affairs.

"Remembrances: The Pre-War Fleet" by LCdr Russ Freeman is the second instalment of his fascinating autobiography and tells the story of a young sailor in the Royal Canadian Navy immediately before the outbreak of the Second World War. His travels take him in the destroyer HMCS Saguenay to the West Coast, through the Caribbean, and to King George VI's coronation in London.

"Containerization and the Globalization of Sea Borne Cargo Transport: Bigger, Faster, Safer?" by Heinz Gohlish. At last,an eplanation in term we can understand how the container industry works and just what is happening to it today as it expands.

"The Last Patrol" by J. David Perkins tells the saga of the Canadian commanding officer of HM Submarine D3 in the last year of the First World War.

"The Paymasters of the Royal Canadian Navy 1910-1945" by LCdr Mark Watson explains how the "Pusser" or "Paybob" became an integral part of the both the seagoing Canadian navy and its shore support system. Part of a longer and more detailed analysis, this article is rich in stories of those early Paymasters.

There are two critical reviews of recent books: Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams, and David R. Segal, eds., The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) and Julie H. Ferguson, Deeply Canadian: New Submarines for a New Millennium (http://www. Crossroadspub.com).

The popular "In My Opinion..." section has opinion pieces and letters on China's emerging maritime strategy, the navy's plans for a new logistics support vessel, and comments on Maritime Affairs itself.

© Copyright Maritime Affairs 2001

BACK ISSUES OF THE
MARITIME AFFAIRS JOURNAL

It is our practise to post the Editorials and Tables of Contents of back issues of the Maritime Affairs Journal to the web site as each new edition of the Journal is published. Copies of back issues, while still available, can be obtained by sending a cheque or money order for $6.50 Cdn (or US$5.00) (which includes postage and handling) to Maritime Affairs at PO Box 33078, Halifax, NS, B3L 4T6.

Fall 2000 Edition

Editorial

With a new government imminent we have to wonder what the future holds for Canada's maritime dimension. Will it get the political attention it so desperately needs? If we are to believe all the pre-election rhetoric then perhaps some key issues may be held in a brighter political light. Maritime Affairs has several concerns that we hope will be high on the next government's agenda: shipbuilding, helicopters, and oceans management top that list. This edition of the Maritime Affairs Journal addresses various aspects of those policies and programs.

The past few months have, however, been marked with two particularly significant tragedies that we believe need acknowledgment. The loss of the Russian submarine Kursk brought home to those of us who have served in submarines the risks associated with those vessels. It is fair to say that many of us have survived crises at sea and have thought on more than one occasion that our survival was in doubt. But it is the families who wait ashore who face the greatest uncertainty and do so bravely not knowing the fate of their loved ones. Our deepest sympathies go to all those who lost family members in Kursk.

It was a human tragedy that unfortunately became trapped in the media feeding frenzy for sensationalism. It was sickening, to say the least, to hear so-called "experts" speculate on speculation in the light of the uncertain situation aboard the crippled submarine with so little regard for the anxiety of those who had family aboard Kursk. Enough said!

The other tragedy was the terrorist attack on the USS Cole in harbour in Yemen. Our sympathies also go to the families who lost members in that explosion. Recent first-hand accounts of the situation in Aden as the Cole begins to get itself seaworthy are telling, not only of the awful conditions but also of the state of mind of the survivors. The stench below decks was so bad that the crew had to sleep on deck despite the 90 degree plus temperatures. The electrical power system was damaged and so there almost no light throughout the ship. Despite what has been said officially, resentment and suspicion of the local community exists, and the Cole's crew was naturally leery of eating anything prepared ashore.

How easy it is to forget that warships are symbols of their home state and thus vulnerable to any lunatic who wants to make a statement against that state. Yes, those ships can be protected, and they can be kept out of potentially dangerous waters and ports, and extensive security measures can be put in place. But what kind of signal does that send to the host? More importantly, what kind of host would perpetrate that kind out outrage against a guest? The world is not the wonderful, friendly "global village" many would have us believe. It is still wracked with resentment and hatred that fuel the fires of cowardly violence.

Many states, including Canada, use their navies to support foreign policy initiatives and this requires that individual warships and their crews go "in harm's way" from time to time. Members of coast guards and other government agencies charged with the preservation of law and order and safety at sea must also take risks in doing their work. It is unconscionable, therefore, that governments not provide safe equipment-vessels and aircraft-for those people to use. It is also totally unacceptable when political rather than operational considerations are allowed to determine what new equipment is bought.

If Canadian governments, of whatever political stripe, intend to keep on using the military to support foreign policy initiatives, they should accept the basic fact that parts of the world remain violent and Canadian servicemen and women thus have to run risks to do their political masters' bidding in those places.

Canadian warships and their helicopters, which serve as extensions of the ships capabilities as well as having unique capabilities of their own, are frequently put in harm's way in government service. How many Canadian warship, for instance, have been deployed to the uncertain waters of the Middle East? More than most people recognize! What would happen if a terrorist cell chose to make their statement against a Canadian warship? After all, in their eyes we are part of the coalition led by the "Great Satan" and thus a potential target. If the government intends to use its navy and coast guard as instruments of its foreign and domestic policies, there should be an acceptance that the men and women who go forth to do the government's bidding be given the best equipment possible.

We have said much of this before and we will say it again until the government accepts that it has an obligation to ensure the physical safety of its seagoing servants.

The new maritime helicopter: "Lowest Priced Compliant" Purchasing Policy is Wrong

The government has finally initiated the Maritime Helicopter Project (MHP), but has established a convoluted, costly, and high-risk procurement process that if retained could be disastrous for the project. One of the most worrisome aspects of that process is the government's radical shift from a procurement policy based on "best value" to one that will select the new maritime helicopter and its mission systems based on bids that are "lowest priced compliant" (LPC).

LPC may be a suitable method to decide the purchase of simple and straightforward items such as office furniture, but it is entirely inappropriate for complex and costly projects such as the MHP.

To be compliant, a bid must satisfy just the minimum requirement for each of the hundreds of items in the overall project. Therefore, in the LPC process a bid could offer an inferior overall product, but so long as it "complied" with all the established requirements the government would be obliged to select that bid if it was lowest priced.

There will be no professional judgment involved in the overall selection process - only that applied by the many technical evaluators deciding if particular aspects of a bid "comply". If a company offered a clearly better solution to the overall requirement, or to important components of the requirement, but came in at a price just a few dollars more than a much less satisfactory one, by the new rules of the game it could not be selected. One wonders why the government established a system that automatically refuses an offer that could be significantly superior but marginally higher priced? Perhaps, as some have suggested, there was some nefarious political motivation behind its decision! Concern about the price side of the "best value for the price" equation could easily be dealt with by imposing a price cap below which a best value solution must be bid.

The Air Force staff has done a very credible job of trying to articulate quantitatively the hundreds of individual "requirements" involved in the project. However, as we have experienced with our Sea Kings, operational requirements change over time. It is difficult enough identifying and detailing all the specific requirements needed to deal with today's many and multi-faceted missions, let alone catering for the uncertain future. The possibility of not including all requirements, properly described, is a very real concern in the LPC process. But there is an even more fundamental issue here. New ship borne maritime helicopters not only have to complement the very modern ships from which they will operate, but it is important that these helicopters purchased today have the versatility and growth potential to serve as a fundamental component of Canada's Maritime Forces for the next 40 to 50 years.

When such important matters as versatility, growth, flexibility and superior quality are brought into the discussion, we are emphasizing the crucial principle of "value". Overall value is admittedly more difficult to quantify than hundreds of specific requirements, and this makes a selection process more challenging. However, it should be obvious to the government that with these high cost crown projects it has a responsibility to Canadian taxpayers to demand best value for the dollar. Astonishingly, the government has stated in the rules for this project that it will adhere to Government Contract Regulations which very much stress "value", not LPC. Thus, the government has unaccountably decided to violate its own procurement principles.

Perhaps the government's hangup concerns the notion of "superior value". In fact, the current Prime Minister, as Leader of the Opposition during the election campaign of 1993, attacked the "superior value" of the helicopter selected to replace the Sea King and pejoratively labeled it a "Cadillac". Doing so he hit the right political buttons that impressed the ill-informed public; but he also sowed the seeds of the politically deplorable situation his government finds itself in today. Back then he would have been justified in challenging the high-cost overall project, but the fact that the chosen helicopter was a high tech modern aircraft was never the real issue. And this is why.

Governments of both parties had long ago realized that Canada couldn't afford the large Navy required to fulfil our country's great maritime responsibilities and obligations. Rather, it was decided to have a navy of few, but excellent ships. We chose to exploit the fortunate fact that Canada is a technologically advanced and highly educated nation. To compensate for the few numbers, our ships would take full advantage of the latest technology. That meant that succeeding governments had deliberately, and with no apologies, decided that our ships and embarked helicopters would be of the highest operational quality. Call them Cadillacs if you wish, but do so with the knowledge that our nation had knowingly opted for Cadillac quality in order to reap the significant "force multiplier" benefits of a "superior value" modern helicopter.

What do we mean by "superior value" when discussing combat equipment? In April 1998 the Auditor-General blasted this government for wasting taxpayers' money by purchasing military equipment that was not suitable for combat duty. His report stated that post-Cold War budget cuts "have resulted in the acquisition of equipment with low military capability¼ equipment that cannot completely perform the missions that justified its purchase". He went on to report that "Purchasing equipment that cannot do the job does not represent value for money". It appears that for the MHP, the government has completely ignored the Auditor-General's admonition, and has opted for the very opposite of "best value" for this important combat equipment.

In short, the government's purchasing regulations say "best value", the Auditor-General says that the Government must purchase combat equipment of "best value", and good sense dictates that "best value" must be the overriding criterion for the purchase of new maritime helicopters to replace our Sea Kings. The concept of "lowest priced compliant" is just not good enough for such an important, complex and costly crown project such as the MHP.

Everyone would be a winner, particularly the government, if it established a purchasing policy for the MHP that emphasized "best value" within an allotted price envelope. Is the Government responsible enough to reject its initial "lowest priced compliant" policy for such an obviously superior "best value" one? That is the test.

Table of Contents

• Hanington Millennium Essay Competition - Second Prize: "Canadian Naval Force Generation in the Twenty-First Century" by Lieutenant-Commander Ken Hansen. A very thought-provoking article talking about readiness and sustainment of the fleet.
• "Maritime Enforcement in Canada's Oceans" by Glen Herbert. At last, a simple and clear explanation of how the various Canadian government departments interact in managing Canada's vast ocean domain.
• "The Return to Dunkirk" by Rear-Admiral R.W. Timbrell, DSC, RCN (Ret'd). The author looks back on his experiences at Dunkirk in the light of a reunion held there last summer.
• "G.T.S. Katie: The High Cost of Cut-Price Transport" by Heinz Gohlish. An industry professional looks at the "Katie" fiasco and sheds some light on the enormously complex world of charter shipping and how Canada might be able to avoid such incidents in the future.
• "Navigable Waters Protection Act" by Marc-André Poisson. The author discusses the need to update the NWPA to make it even more effective.
• "Op Toucan" by Capt(N) Roger Girouard. The commander of the Canadian Joint Task Force in East Timor provides a superb summary of the Canadian role in that UN operation.
• Book Reviews: (1) Latham B. Jenson, Tin Hats, Oilskins & Seaboots: A Naval Journey, 1938-1945 (Toronto: Robin Brass Studio, Publishers, 2000). 312 pages, including some 170 illustrations, maps, diagrams and photos. Paperback $24.95 by Doug Thomas, and (2) J. David Perkins, The Canadian Submarine Service in Review (St. Catherines: Vanwell Publishing, 2000). 208 pages, including many unique illustrations and diagrams. Hardcover $34.95 also by Doug Thomas.

(Unfortunately additional copies of this edition of Maritime Affairs are not available. Reprints of individual articles can be ordered by sending a cheque of money order for $2.50 Cdn or $2.00 US to Maritime Affairs, PO Box 33078, Halifax, NS, Canada, B3L 4T6.)

Spring/Summer 2000 Edition

Editorial

As you will see, this commemorative issue of Maritime Affairs has become a double issue. This was not our original intent, but so much excellent material came in that we felt it necessary to publish it all under one cover.

What you have in this edition is a small window through which to look at select perspectives of 90 years of Canadian naval evolution with a very clear picture of some of the future problems. For instance, the Hanington Essay Competition winner and other papers deal directly with the question, "What kind of fleet does Canada need in the years ahead?" What these essays show is that the march of technology seems relentless and this will drive changes in the structure of the Navy. But with the ever-increasing cost of staying in step technologically with our major naval partners one has to wonder if the Canadian Navy can afford to stay relevant on the world's stage.

The present trend towards non-combat functions-as derivatives of the now-ambiguous term peacekeeping I suspect-which the Canadian military seems intent on following, could see the Navy become an international logistics unit rather than a real navy whose ships, submarines and aircraft symbolize a state with concerns and interests which it is prepared to defend.

Also, there is a hypnotic effect that draws people to believe that new technologies will be a panacea for a beleaguered Canadian military. "Ah!", they say, "the Revolution in Military Affairs has changed everything and we must plan a new world." What they overlook in their enthusiasm are two well-established facts: (1) that the world has been through such "revolutions" before and that their impact has invariably been over-estimated and (2) that the present so-called revolution is, in fact, unsustainable economically and industrially. We simply don't have the money to keep on embracing new technologies at the rate they are being developed. For if we did, we would be forced to throw away new systems before they had been given a chance to prove their operational value. As many are now realizing, a technological revolution has to be integrated into an evolutionary process unless we are prepared to bankrupt ourselves on the altar of technology.

In naval terms this may cause some problems for advocates of "integrated battlespace management" in which conflict will be managed in cyberspace without the need to put humans at risk. The point remains that in the future navies will still have to undertake many tasks that do not call for "hi-tech" solutions and may carry some personal risk. While it will be necessary for Canadian naval units to be able to work within a multinational "hi-tech" formation in the future, that requirement doesn't exclude the need for "lo-tech" solutions to other problems. The greatest strength of a modern navy is its versatility, and it makes absolutely no sense to sacrifice this asset in pursuit of false gods-either that of high technology or that of "soft" power-in the belief that they hold the key to the future. The future is, in fact, too uncertain to make such irrevocable changes.

These are important issues demanding public discussion. In this, Maritime Affairs will devote the Fall 2000 edition to the interwoven issues of Canadian naval and oceans policy for the 21st century. You are encouraged to join the debate.

Table of Contents

• Hanington Millennium Essay Competition First Prize: "The Revolution in Military Affairs and the Canadian Navy in the 21st Century" by Lieutenant-Commander Mark Tunnicliffe. The title speaks for itself, and the author provides a controversial discussion of these issues.
• "Rear-Admiral Patrick David Budge, DSC, CD, RCN (Retd)" by the late Captain Vernon Howland, RCN (Retd). A delightful vignette of one of the RCN's more colourful admirals.
• "Remembrances. In the Beginning¼." by Lieutenant-Commander Russ Freeman, CD, RCN (Ret'd). The first instalment of a series of articles about a naval career that spanned several decades of change in Canada's young navy.
• "HMCS Sackville Still Serving Canada" by Len Canfield
• "A Timeline of Canadian Achievement in Naval Technology" by Pat Barnhouse and Michael Young. This article is a snapshot of some of the significant technological developments in Canadian naval history-in the broadest interpretation of that term. It is part of a work in progress that the authors plan to develop further.
• "The Anti-Submarine Helicopter Program of 1963" by Colonel John Orr, a former Commander of the Maritime Air Component (Atlantic) who has flown the Sea King helicopter through five operational tours. As he concludes, in acquiring 41 Sea Kings and converting nine DDEs the RCN proceeded to lead the world in the operation of medium-sized helicopters from escort vessels. Despite the problems encountered along the way, the vision of those who went before was fully justified.
• "Canadian maritime operations in the 1990s" by Doug Thomas. In this article some of the key activities of the Canadian Navy in the last decade are described, showing clearly that Canadians do indeed get an excellent return on the small investment made in their Navy.
• "Submarines and the Canadian Navy Today-One Man's View" by J. David Perkins. A well-known and authoritative author on Canada's submarines provides an interesting overview of this rich aspect of our naval history.
• "The Naval Reserve in 2000" by Commodore Raymond A. Zuliani. A good short history of Canada's Naval reserve and the vital roles it has played in war and peace.
• "Why we need task groups today" by Commodore J.D. Fraser, Commander of Canadian Atlantic Task Group. A fascinating saga of search and rescue operations at sea demanding all the skills, patience and courage of the crews of the Canadian Task Group.
• A "transformational" fleet for Canada in the 21st century by LCdr Richard H. Gimblett, PhD. A provocative discussion of non-traditional concepts of fleet structure.
• "Naval aviation - seeking a steady deck" by Major Brian Northrup, a naval aviator for 22 years, accumulating some 3,500 hours in Sea Kings, who also flew Army helicopters for eight years, provides a fascinating summary of the use of aviation in Canadian naval operations. He also raises the difficult issue of the identity of today's naval aviators wearing Air Force uniforms but an integral part of the Navy.

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Winter 2000 Edition

Editorial

Canada, technology, and the sea

We hear a lot these days about the relentless march of technology and the onset of the Information Age in which we apparently now live. To some the advent of the high-speed computer, the internet, fibre-optics, and a host of related technological innovations herald the beginning of a new era comparable with the dawn of the Industrial Age over 200 years ago. To the military, the net effect of technological progress amounts to a revolution. But there are some sceptics who question the whole process and what it means.

There are problems with the notion of a technological revolution, or in the military case, a revolution in military affairs-the RMA as it is known. For instance, revolution usually implies sudden, violent, unparalleled change involving all aspects of society. Despite some contrary views, the transition from the Agricultural to the Industrial Age two centuries ago was neither sudden nor particularly violent. However, it was unparalleled and eventually had widespread social and economic implications but in an evolutionary rather than revolutionary manner. The present transition to the Information Age has yet to show any revolutionary characteristics; it is not violent, it hasn't come upon us suddenly, and whether it is unparalleled remains to be seen. We have to ask whether computers and through them widespread access to huge volumes of information will have the same sort of impact on society as mechanization which systematically changed the fundamental nature of society. It's too early to tell yet. However, we can see already that some parts of society are being changed by new technologies while other parts are still trying to reap the benefits of the Industrial Age. For instance, Afghanistan, Cambodia, and many African countries seem locked into the Agricultural Age and virtually immune to change. When it comes, though, change in those countries will have to be revolutionary to keep pace with the rest of the world.

What all this means to us "Westerners" is that new technologies will continue to have a huge effect on just about everything do, especially at sea where the opportunities for applying new science and technology abound. Because many of those technologies are expensive to put into general use and because of the natural reluctance to discard existing systems and ships while they are still useful, the tendency is to introduce new technology systematically. It is only when a window of opportunity opens-as when a new project or a replacement program coincides with the availability of a new technology-that new systems and concepts can be exploited in a cost-effective way.

The point is that to be truly effective change has to be managed efficiently and with imagination. The price of getting it wrong can be high. For instance, the Polar 8 icebreaker of the late 1980s, which would have been an unequivocal statement of Canadian commitment to national sovereignty in the Arctic and to Arctic science generally, was pecked to death by the sparrows of political mediocrity and special interest groups devoid of any national vision. Similarly, the world-class shipbuilding facility developed in Saint John to build the navy's patrol frigates has been allowed to wither through government inertia at a time when many government ships need replacing.

Shipbuilding is not the only problem area though, many other parts of our maritime sector-so important to the Canadian economy and to our high standard of living-have been put at a disadvantage through lack of political priority. Why?

As we have said many times in this journal, Canada and its economy depend on the use of the oceans for their overall well-being. We are a major trading nation, and we have invested heavily in the off-shore oil and gas industry as well as in other ocean resources. It is hard to count the exact number of jobs that come directly and indirectly from our many ocean activities, but the number is significant.

Part of the problem lies in the fact that you can't see the ocean from the gilded towers of Bay Street, and it is all too easy to forget that many of the fortunes those towers now represent grew from humble and often maritime origins. Without belabouring the point, it has become the trend in Canada to think in "continental" rather than "maritime" terms when, in reality, it was the oceans that shaped this country originally and continue to do so today-unless, of course, we wish to surrender our independence.

Unfortunately, the maritime dimension of our country is in need of higher political priority in several areas, all of which can be directly linked to opportunities to invest in new technologies and science. The shipbuilding industry, for example, is in a state of near collapse and unable to compete internationally because of a combination of unfair subsidies in other countries and a domestic economic climate that strangles new initiatives. This makes no sense at a time when government orders for new work could be placed easily. It would also make sense to give the shipyards some tax relief as an incentive to let them compete for work in areas such as Canadian off-shore oil and gas industry. Why do we have to let all this work be done off-shore?

It is surely time to get serious about the Arctic and build new ships and exploit new technologies to take the lead in using what has been called "the last true scientific laboratory" and finish the job of learning more about the impact of change in the Arctic environment on the world as a whole. Why not build some new ships that would not only serve to enforce Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic but could also make meaningful contributions to science.

And we still have a huge resource potential in our waters, some natural and some living, but a need exists for good stewardship of those resources and for the enforcement of Canadian and international laws in those waters. At the moment we do not have the resources to do this fully, and it is in this sector that new technology can be applied to the important task of surveillance and of monitoring and of simply learning what goes on in our waters. It is not a question of "use it or lose it" rather it one of "look after it so that others will not abuse it".

Last but certainly not least, let's finish the job of modernizing the navy so that it can continue to represent our country around the world and to make an important contribution to world order as well as play a lead role in preserving Canadian sovereignty at sea. It is not militarism to advocate the modernization of the navy, it is merely an acknowledgement of the fact that the navy has given an excellent return on the investment Canadians have made in it over the years.

When technology is exploited efficiently, everybody wins: research and development (R&D) is given opportunities to prove new technologies, industry has an opportunity to modernize and retain a skilled workforce so that it can compete internationally; employment and thus training opportunities are created; and services are provided more efficiently. Simply, the country as a whole benefits from exploiting new and emerging technologies, but it takes political courage and a vision of what the country should look like in the future to provide the leadership necessary to take advantage of the opportunities those technologies offer.

The transition from the Industrial to the Information Age has only just begun, and if the lessons of history remain valid, that process will take several decades to complete. In the meantime, we should not forget that the infrastructure that makes this country work is largely a function of the Industrial Age-albeit now with the help of Information Age concepts and systems-and that those technologies have not yet been made redundant. The application of new technology should be evolutionary rather than revolutionary, but government leadership and, in some situations, sponsorship is a necessary catalyst.

Table of Contents

• "Submarine Cables: A Traditional 'High-Tech' Ocean Use" by Glen Herbert and Scott Coffen-Smout examines the increasing role being played by fibre-optic cables in oceans management and maritime security considerations.
• "RCN Official History" by Michael Whitby, Chief, Naval History Team, at the Directorate of History and Heritage at National Defence Headquarters, Ottawa, reports on the plans for the Canadian Naval History Project.
• "Command/Control and Air Defence Replacement Program (CADRE): A capability for the 21st century" by LCdr DS Thomas examines some of the options for replacing the existing Tribal-class destroyers and for retaining their unique air-defence and command and control capabilities.
• "Marine War Risks - The Commercial Solution" by Heinz Gohlish examines the complex world of marine insurance in wartime and near-war situations.
• Book Reviews: Two reviews of: Joseph T. Jockel, The Canadian Forces: Hard Choices, Soft Power. (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1999) ISBN 0-919769-91-8, Paperback, 132 pages. $25.00. One by Denis Stairs of Dalhousie University and the other by Doug Thomas.

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