New Naval Helicopters
Beware or Expedient Solutions

Our government realizes the urgent need to replace the Navy's Sea King helicopters with modern maritime helicopters, and made a commitment to do so in its 1994 White Paper on De-fence. However, what should be a solemn and respon-sible pledge to provide our new and very capable naval aviation ships with equally modern ship-borne helicop-ters, is now seen by some in government as a burden - a monkey on its back that must somehow be dealt with. Hence, you will hear the cry: "the Cold War is over so the Navy no longer needs a helicopter such as the one chosen in 1993", (the EH-101 of the NSA pro-gram cancelled by this same government). From this they con-clude: "all that is required today is a cheap, 'minimal' helicopter capa-bility at sea". If given the chance, it is highly likely that this government would try to shed the monkey by providing a helicopter of questionable utility that the Navy would be stuck with for the next 30 or 40 years, and it would still cost Canadians hundreds of millions of dollars. Sadly in this case, wasting millions of dollars on a marginally capable helicopter is an attractive political option.

The above warning is not based on conjecture - a precedent has already been set by this government. As reported in the 23 September, 1996 Globe & Mail, "Ottawa put a Coast Guard helicopter in the Nova Scotia fishing community (of Yarmouth) for political reasons¼ the BO-105 Eurocopter is a poor fisheries patrol aircraft and is not properly equipped for search and rescue missions at night, internal docu-ments of a parliamentary committee indicate. Rather, the aircraft is a "minimal response" to a promise last year from the fisheries minister (Brian Tobin)."

Why is a maritime helicopter that is just a "minimal response" to a political com-mitment not good enough for Canada's Navy? First we must look at the opera-tional requirements. Yes, circum-stances have changed since the early 1990's, and that will modify some of the roles and hence the mission systems needed in the new helicopter. But, and this is an important "but", the basic requirements for a modern maritime helicopter remain unchanged. As this gov-ernment explicitly ac-knowledged in its own Defence White Paper, the Navy needs capable and robust ship-borne helicopters - ones that are also affordable.

A capable maritime helicopter means that the vehicle and its mission systems must be able to fulfil the roles assigned it by the government. This further means that the helicopter must be able to operate from our Navy's eighteen aviation capable ships, that it must have the range and endurance to do its jobs at sea, and that it must have a cabin large enough to accommodate mis-sion systems and stores, the tactical crew, and other requirements such as search and rescue survivors or medical evacuation patients. So, basic requirements still call for a capable helicopter large enough to do the job, fitted with modern navigation and communica-tion systems, and probably a proper search radar. After those basic requirements are met, then other mission systems must be added to fulfil the assigned roles. Before looking at roles and mission systems, it is important to understand what is embraced in the government's other stated requirement - a robust maritime helicopter.

A robust helicopter must not only be tough enough to operate safely and effectively from our relatively small destroyers and frigates in some of the most challenging weather and sea conditions in the world (the North Atlantic), but under these severe conditions it must also be reliable. Reliability is crucial. It is the unreliability of embarked Sea Kings to respond when required, together with the growing high costs of keeping them airworthy, that are the primary reasons our venerable Sea Kings are no longer good enough for our mod-ern Navy. Fortunately, many modern helicopters now have the built-in reli-ability required. Together with inherently reliable he-licopters and mission sys-tems, a robust maritime helicopter capability must also include a responsive logistic support system. It should be clear that just any helicopter will not do, no matter how cheap to purchase.

Yes, during the Cold War antisubmarine warfare (ASW) was one of the prime missions of our maritime helicopters. The Sea King was required to fulfil other roles such as surface surveillance, fleet utility tasks, and clandestine operations, but the greatest challenge and hence the need for greatest attention was on maintaining its ASW capability. And yes, since the end of the Cold War the emphasis on ASW has been re-duced because of the demands of other high priority missions. But, the need for a ship-borne helicopter to be involved in the defence of its own ship and those it is tasked to protect from a submarine threat is still very much a reality that must be faced. With over 600 subma-rines in the world today, many operated by rogue nations or by those who could become our adversaries, turning our back on a capability to deal with a subma-rine threat in a combat situation is to court disaster. So, as well as maintaining a submarine defence capability, what other operational requirements will be demanded of our new MHP?

In the government's own words, new maritime helicop-ters must be "multi-purpose and combat capable". It is the multi-purpose requirement that will drive the mission systems that must be installed in the MHP, and it is fulfilling this multi-role capability that will proba-bly demand an even more sophisticated mission system pack-age than that called for in the NSA program.

So, those who say that we should be able to get by with a less demanding helicopter program today than was required ten years ago may be in for a rude awakening.

While the public is not aware yet of the details of specific missions required of a multi-role MHP, the general requirements are clear. In the unclassified 1998 Defence Planning Guidance, DND's definitive mission document, the "DND has developed eleven scenarios based on White Paper commit-ments that reflect the spec-trum of tasks the CF could be called upon to perform." Starting with scenarios of the high-est combat challenge they are:

• Collective Defence - a war fighting capability: Canada's NATO commitment;
• Defence of Canadian/US Territory - includes threat warning and attack assessment;
• Peace Support Operations (UN Chapter 7) - restor-ing peace: a combat capability;
• National Sovereignty/Interests Enforcement - surveillance-investigation-action;
• Aid of the Civil Power - restoring law and order including operations potentially hostile situations;
• Peace Support Operations (UN Chapter 6) - naval embargo, boardings, guns trained;
• Evacuation of Canadians Overseas - presumes a permissive evacuation;
• Surveillance/Control of Canadian Territory and Approaches - drug smuggling, etc.;
• International Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief;
• Disaster Relief in Canada; and
• Search and Rescue in Canada.

Canada's naval ships with embarked helicopters have been involved in the past seven years in operations reflecting all of the above scenarios except the top two. Those top two are the scenarios which demand the highest combat capability that the government pro-claimed essential in its White Paper, and it is this capability that must be in place and exercised by our ships and helicopters before called to combat. As an aside, the latest Auditor General's Report to Parlia-ment was very critical of this government purchasing military equipment that when put to the test proved to be not combat capable.

These scenarios taken together form the basis for the roles and capabilities required of Canada's naval forces, which include as its primary force its modern aviation warships and their embarked helicopters. So, in assessing those roles it becomes clear what opera-tional capability is required of the new MHP helicop-ter. Without going into a detailed assessment of mis-sion systems' capability as related to assigned roles, one can still conclude that at a minimum the MHP must have the capability for:

• Surface Surveillance, Reconnaissance and Tar-geting - calling for a good imaging radar, ESM equipment, FLIR and possibly Low Light Level TV, possibly Night Vision Goggles, possibly data link, and data/video recording devices.
• Sub-Surface Surveillance, Targeting and Attack - this is the capability which will cause the most controversy, and could include dipping sonar, sono-buoy processor and dispenser, ESM, perhaps MAD, the same radar required for surface surveillance, and torpedoes.
• Casualty/Medical Evacuation, Cargo/Troop Trans-fer, Search and Rescue - calling for hoist and cargo hook systems, troop seats and litter kits, plus the search equipment already covered in the Surface Surveillance capability.
• Self Protection in Combat Situations - with new roles requiring shipborne helicopters to operate in potentially hostile waters close to the shore, and even supporting forces in hostile areas inland, a combat self protection capability takes on a height-ened importance. It includes such equipment as warning systems (radar, missile, and laser), counter-measure systems (jamming, chaff and flare dispensers), NBC (nuclear, bacteriological and chemical) protection equipment, and a general purpose machine gun.
• Navigation and Communication Systems - part of the basic requirement mentioned earlier. Includes such systems as GPS, secure radios and SATCOM.

It is hoped that this brief recapitulation of the essential operational requirements needed to fulfil the govern-ment's multi-purpose roles for the MHP demonstrates that purchasing a small fragile helicopter, no matter how cheap the price, will not do. Yet, apparently some naive interest is being shown at this time in a naval version of the Bell helicopter recently purchased for our Army.

Apart from reports that some in the Army seem not pleased with either the operational capability or the field durability of this built-in-Quebec helicopter (named the Griffon), and statements in the Auditor General's Report that specifically criticize the govern-ment about its Griffon purchase, some basic facts should clearly show why the Bell 412 Griffon in any disguise should not even be contemplated for the MHP.

As explained earlier in this paper, cabin size is impor-tant for the MHP. The volume in cubic meters for the Bell 412 is 6.24, compared to the Sea King at 28.0 and the EH-101 Cor-morant at 29.0. The cabin height in the Bell 412 is just 1.25 meters (a little over four feet) compared to 1.92 (a little over six feet) for the Sea King, and 1.83 (still over six feet) for the EH-101.

The maximum take off weight for the Bell 412 is 5,398 kg, com-pared to 9,752 for the Sea King and 14,600 for the EH-101. More importantly, the max-imum useful load for the Bell 412 is 2,257 kg, and this trans-lates into mis-sion payload capability. Both the Sea King and the EH-101 have almost double that maximum use-ful load. As well, the Bell 412 operates on skids which cannot be used on our ships. This proposed Bell maritime heli-copter has been named the BH 412EP Sentinel.(All data is from Jane's All the World's Aircraft 1997-98 and Peri-scope's USNI Military Database).

Two other important factors highlight the difference between today's Maritime Helicopter Project (MHP) and the early 1990's New Ship-borne Aircraft (NSA) program, and they both relate to the White Paper's affordability requirement. It is clear now that the NSA became a runaway high-cost program, with large chunks of the program being used for other unrelated matters and to sustain costly never-ending development projects.

Despite media and political hype at the time, including the deadly "Cadillac" slur, the price of the basic heli-copters was not the critical cost escalator. So, the first new fac-tor is that those re-sponsible for the MHP seem deter-mined to fund only the essentials of this program, and they seem equal-ly resolved not to let the MHP become a "develop-mental cow".

The second factor is the realization today that about a third, and some say up to a half of the cost of a major program such as the MHP is wasted on practices that add no value to the final product. While another paper will be required to outline all these wasteful practices, (such as a costly procurement process, exor-bitant PW&GSC fees, and a heavy Canadian industry premium), it is important to note here that they are all under political control. If this government is serious about reducing the cost of the MHP, it has a golden opportunity to demonstrate fiscal responsibility while at the same time providing the Navy with the maritime helicopter capability it requires at an affordable cost to Canadians.