Naval.ca/article - Submarines Make Sense

SUBMARINES MAKE SENSE

Far more than the opposing rhetoric!

Certain disarmament advocacy groups would have us believe that submarines and therefore antisubmarine warfare (ASW) are merely Cold War relics today. This, of course, is abject nonsense, as anyone who keeps current on contemporary military and security issues will tell you. Yet, despite the weight of evidence, the ill-informed rhetoric continues. Perhaps it is time again to dispel some of the more prevalent submarine myths perpetuated by the disarmament groups.

Much of the nonsense touted about submarines renders down to three myths:

ASW was only a Cold War naval capability;
the primary function of a submarine is to attack shipping; and
what little submarine activity takes place today can be monitored from space.

In fact, one could run these together into one big myth: "Submarines serve no purpose and are thus redundant."

To those who choose to deny the facts and refuse to understand the march of technology such a sweeping statement might make sense. Also, choosing to think in that way provides a way out of having to face reality about global insecurity and about a whole range of other subjects that have to do with the management of violence.

Let's try to make sense out of the submarine issue by looking at the first three myths about submarines.

Myth 1 - ASW was only a Cold War naval capability

The essence of this entrenched myth is that the peace groups have yet to realize that ASW has two dimensions: strategic and tactical. The former is a function of national survival, the latter is a function of simple self-defence. To the disarmament advocate, only the threats to national security matter. This myopic view is not only a denial of some principles of international law but is also a highly selective interpretation of the facts.

When first introduced as an instrument of seapower, the submarine's purpose was to sink enemy warships in coastal waters. Quickly, though, it evolved into an effective commerce raider, and by the middle of the First World War the anti- shipping role included merchant shipping as well as enemy warships. This was repeated during the Second World War and occasionally submarines also carried out shore bombardment and minelaying tasks. In both World Wars submarine warfare became a decisive factor. Had the allies not been able to defeat the German U-boats in 1917 and again in 1943, the outcome of both wars might have been very different. Similarly, the inability of the Japanese to counter the American submarine campaign in the Pacific was one of the factors leading to their defeat. But antisubmarine warfare is not easy and requires extensive resources, as Canada found out during the Second World War.

During the Cold War, largely through the march of technology, submarines acquired two distinct roles: tactical anti-shipping (against merchant and warships), and as a part of the balance of strategic forces (both in the form of missile-firing submarines and in countering them) at sea. As in the two World Wars, the expectation was that submarines would be instrumental in determining the outcome of any East-West confrontation. And as in the 1940s, the reinforcement of Europe from North America would have to run a submarine gauntlet. Defeating the Soviet submarines thus became an essential element of NATO strategy.

Because missile-firing submarines posed such a devastating threat to society, the strategic dimension of submarine operations dominated the thoughts of most people outside the professional military-strategic community. As a result, other submarine functions were almost completely overlooked. Thus, in the closing years of the Cold War, advances in general submarine capability as a result of new technologies and their application, and thus their increased tactical flexibility received little attention.

The disarmament community, blinkered in their perspective of undersea operations, missed this change and its impact on seapower. But changes were also taking place in basic nature of naval forces as a whole and submarines became part of the "balanced, multi-purpose fleets" that most maritime nations developed. For Canada, the transition to a multi-purpose rather than narrowly specialized navy began in the early 1970 when the Trudeau government required that the Navy be able to carry out more tasks than just ASW.

For submarines, this meant that instead of just undertaking traditional offensive roles, they were used increasingly in defensive roles, on ocean surveillance tasks, as instruments of diplomacy, and on a wide range of law enforcement and verification tasks. That some 40 different nations now maintain modern submarine forces totalling over 750 submarines, attests to their continued value as flexible instruments of seapower and in maintaining maritime security.

But this new versatility has not reduced the offensive potential of a submarine. It can still be used in traditional roles with great efficiency when necessary. As the Argentines proved in 1982 and as the North Koreans showed last year, the mere suspicion that a hostile submarine may be present is enough to change the concept of operations. With submarines forces widely dispersed around the world and, in several cases, owned by governments whose strategic aims are suspicious, the potential for their use to oppose a legitimate intervention operation is high. When one realizes that significant submarine forces exist in all the places where the potential for conflict is high, the reality is that ASW is far from being a defunct capability.

Admiral Owens of the US Navy, put the situation into clear context in saying: "It may be enough to know where the other submarines are. As long as they are not interfering with our primary mission, all we need to know is where they are and how to avoid them." And if they cannot be avoided, then it is incumbent on the naval forces to ensure their own safety and the safety of those entrusted to their care. The fastest way to deter an intervention from the sea, legally constituted or not, is to attack the ships before they reach the area of operations. As the British experience in the 1982 Falklands War and the recent NATO experience in the Adriatic prove, the mere presence of a submarine can radically change the way an operation is conducted and greatly increases the degree of risk.

In Canadian terms, as long as the government intends to use its Navy as a contribution to collective global security operations, the ships have to be able to function in multinational forces and able to operate in the areas into which they may be deployed. And this means that they must be capable of detecting submarines, taking countermeasures, and acting in self-defence when necessary.

These are the realities of the world structure in which we now live. Submarines and thus ASW are very much part of the new security equation.

Myth 2 - The primary function of a submarine is to attack shipping

Of course a submarine can still attack shipping, but as mentioned earlier, technology has given the submarine a versatility it did not have before. The image of a submarine touted by the disarmament groups is that of the "hunter" reflecting Second and Cold War operations rather than their actual flexibility. For instance, a submarine can carry out most of the same tasks as surface ships, but it is better at some tasks than others. For instance, submarines are much better at conducting surveillance and presence operations for long periods than they are at providing base support to an operation on shore. One of the real benefits of using a submarine on some of these tasks is that it can stay at sea for some 45-50 days without refuelling and can be operated by relatively few people. It is this flexibility and cost-efficiency that leads so many maritime nations to maintain a submarine capability of one form or another.

Although a submarine may be cheaper to run than a surface vessel, it cannot replace a warship in all situations. For instance, a submarine is a superb surveillance platform but a destroyer or frigate (with its helicopter) is far better at law enforcement at sea. Experience has shown that a mix of submarines and the surface ships make a highly effective team. Add a maritime patrol aircraft, and you have the ideal ocean management team able to keep watch over and respond to incidents in a area of some 300,000 square kilometres. (An area only slightly smaller than the entire Canadian Exclusive Economic Zone in the Pacific.) Submarines are able to operate in all Canadian waters below 60 degrees North and can also work on the ice edge. In time with new fuel cell technology, a diesel submarine should be able to work even further north. It is these capabilities that will allow Canada to enforce its new Oceans Act and preserve Canadian sovereignty at sea.

A submarine need not be restricted to home waters, it can fulfil the same ocean management role, as part of a multinational force, almost anywhere. Submarines can also undertake a whole range of scientific research tasks. In addition, many R&D and technical returns to Canada come from operating submarines.

The value of the modern submarine is reflected in the fact that there are now over 700 operational submarines in the world. Some of these are owned by unpredictable governments, which could easily be a major threat to some future UN or other collective operation to restore peace. We saw this in the Adriatic with the related need for Canadian and other surface ships to be proficient in self-defence procedures. Here, a submarine provides the very necessary training support; not only to our own forces but also to those of other countries.

The point overlooked by the disarmament advocates is that the modern submarine is not only a versatile and cost-effective instrument of ocean management and national security it can also be used on a wide range of tasks to support the country's foreign policy.

Myth 3 - What little submarine activity that takes place today can be monitored from space.

Even though the Russians, the Americans, and some of the NATO countries may be operating fewer submarines, the other three dozen or so submarine navies continue to function at their traditional levels which were not a function of the Cold War. Some nations, in fact, have increased the activity rate of their submarines.

As stated earlier, knowing exactly where certain submarines are may make the difference between the success or failure of a legitimate intervention operation. However, keeping track of all submarine movements is an impossible task without the cooperation of the various countries who operate submarines. The necessary cooperation is not universal, nor can it be expected. Thus, there is a continuing need for surveillance systems.

There are those who believe that one day the oceans are, or can be made, transparent from space. This is actually far more difficult than they realize and there has only been limited success so far. There have been some submarine detections in shallow water (around 50-100 feet) using a radar satellite, and blue-green lasers have also been used successfully in shallow water, particularly for communications. Also, there has been some success detecting wake interference with a radar satellite. At the moment and for the immediate future, submarines operating at any depth below the very shallow zones will remain undetectable from space.

The other problem with space surveillance is the cost. Depending on the orbit and the type of equipment, it can take anywhere from 10 to 18 satellites just to keep one part of the ocean (about the size of the approaches to the Strait of Juan de Fuca) under constant watch. That said, space-based systems only provide raw information, and information on its own has no deterrent or enforcement value.

Traditional means of detection thus remain necessary. Even though submarines have become quieter, it is premature to write off acoustic surveillance systems. Modern arrays, particularly when linked to high-speed computers, provide a capability to pick up and analyze a wide range of sounds at considerable distances. Detection can also be carried out effectively by groups of warships, submarines and naval aircraft (often with support from a fixed surveillance system) working as a team. Such task groups, are able to keep large areas under surveillance for extended periods. Where fixed systems are not available, the submarine can provide the necessary long-range coverage.

So, the fact is that not only are submarine operations still being conducted in many parts of the world, they mainly remain undetectable from space.

Conclusion

Contrary to the unfounded rhetoric of the disarmament advocacy groups, modern submarines provide an enormous operational return on a relatively small investment. That they are used by a large number of countries for a wide range of purposes attests to their versatility. Advances in technology, especially in the fields of control systems and air-independent propulsion continue to make the submarine even more efficient. The time has come to stop thinking about the submarine in its historic role and think of it as one of the most cost-effective platforms of the future.