HMCS Assiniboine and the 1974 Portuguese Coup
or "Where was this covered in command exams?"
Captain Robert H. Thomas, RCN, Ret'd
In the spring of 1974, Portugal had been in political
turmoil for some time, with dissent focussed within the Army
over policies in overseas Portuguese territories. In Angola,
Mozambique, and Guinea-Basseau revolution and terrorism had
challenged the Portuguese colonial administrations for over a
decade. An attempted coup on March 16, led by junior officers
opposed to the extreme right-wing government, had failed,
lulling the government into complacency. Six weeks later, a
second military coup succeeded and seized power.
HMCS Assiniboine found herself in the
middle of the coup. She was part of a NATO fleet scheduled to
assemble in Lisbon and to sail at first light on April 25. The
timing of the coup had been planned, in part, to follow the
departure of the fleet to ensure that the Tagus would be free of
foreign warships.{1} The vagaries of the sea intervened.
In the morning of April 22, while en route to Lisbon,
Assiniboine sighted a small Grenadian merchant
vessel, the Trade Mariner, which had been
adrift without power for eight days. Day-long attempts to repair
her engine were unsuccessful so Assiniboine
took her in tow and headed for Lisbon, 350 miles away. This
delayed Assiniboine's arrival until 11:00 a.m.
on April 24. However, Captain Jock Allen, Commander of the
Canadian Task Group, approved a 48 hour stay in Lisbon.
On arrival, Assiniboine secured outboard
of several other warships and had to shift very early on April 25
to permit the others to sail as planned for the exercise. The pilot
in charge of the move arrived late, almost incoherent and
complaining of a traffic jam in the city. A "cold" shift by tug to
the anchorage duly commenced at just before 7:00 a.m.{2} Two members of
Assiniboine's ship's company were left ashore
to move a rental vehicle to the Doca de Marinho, where the ship
was due to move.
At anchor, permission could not be received to move
alongside and it soon became clear that something serious was
going on. The pilot was talking to authorities ashore but either
could not, or would not, explain what was happening. In fact,
unbeknownst to us, the coup had started at 3:00 that morning
and the Army had moved rapidly to seize control of the city.
Shortly after 9:00 a.m. a Portuguese frigate, the
Almirante Gago Coutinho, approached
Assiniboine. She was clearly at action stations
and circled around us. Our reaction was to go to a higher degree
of watertight integrity but to take no overt action which might
be perceived as threatening or provocative by the Portuguese. At
the same time, we were giving serious thought as to what to do
if she attempted any hostile action. What we did not know was
that the Army was equally uncertain about the frigate's
intentions and had tanks ready to fire at it if it took hostile
action. However, in mid-morning, after its officers had
apparently refused the orders of the Captain to fire on the city,
the ship elevated its guns skyward and withdrew.{3}
We were finally ordered to remain at anchor at 10:00
a.m. hours due to political unrest ashore. To find out what was
going on, the Commanding Officer, Commander Robin Corneil,
took a small party ashore at 10:25 in an attempt to meet the
Canadian Ambassador and seek his instructions.
Meanwhile, our two sailors ashore had blissfully driven to
the ship's destination and parked, only to hear gunfire and
witness considerable commotion. Here members of the PIDE
(International Police for Defence of the State) had barricaded
themselves in their headquarters across the street and fired
indiscriminately into the crowd.{4} Ultimately, five individuals were killed
and many more wounded - the only bloodshed in the coup.{5}
On his trip ashore, Commander Corneil first spoke to
Commander Gregor MacIntosh of HMCS
Yukon which was about to sail from back to
Canada after participating in The NATO Standing Naval Force
Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT).{6} Meanwhile, the boat's crew was standing
by a railing around the square watching the gunfire! Commander
Corneil called the Canadian Embassy and was advised by the
Second Secretary that there did not appear to be any danger to
Canadians. He then contacted the Canadian Ambassador, R.
Duhamel, seeking advice and direction. He was unable to get
any specific direction from him, being told repeatedly to "do
what your superiors tell you to do". After these many
repetitions, Corneil finally said "Mr. Ambassador, you
are my superior officer, until you decide what
you want me to do!" He was then advised to get back to the
Embassy.
Shortly afterwards, the American Assistant Naval Attache,
in plain clothes, approached Commander Corneil. He was fluent
in Portuguese and described what was going on. From this,
Corneil was able to give the Embassy a detailed account of
events and the uncertainty of the Portuguese naval officers
present who did not want to leave the Doca until they were
certain who was going to win. At 12:18 the Commander Corneil
returned to the ship, having picked up the two members of
Assiniboine's ship's company who were ashore.
There were other Canadian complications ashore. A
Canadian Air Force Argus detachment from
Greenwood was at the international airport at Portela which had
been seized at 3:30 that morning by a unit of the officer training
school.{7} Several personnel had
brought spouses to Lisbon and were with them in downtown
hotels. There was no way of contacting them or ensuring their
safety, but the swiftness and lack of violence in the coup
prevented any harm coming their way.
By mid-afternoon it was clear that there was nothing
further we could do. Therefore, we weighed anchor shortly
before 3:00 p.m. and sailed slowly down the Tagus, watching
the activities of crowds ashore, especially their rapid dispersal
when a tank suddenly appeared at an intersection.
The author was the Executive Officer of HMCS Assiniboine at
the time.
Notes:
- Michael Harsgor.
Portugal in Revolution, The Washington
Papers, (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications), 1976, p. 21. Back to text
- All times are taken from the
log of HMCS Assiniboine for April 1974.
(Times have been converted to a.m./p.m. and rounded out in
some places - Editor) Back to
text
- Insight on
Portugal (London: Times Newspapers Limited, Andre
Deutch, 1975), p. 83. Back to
text
- Harsgor, p. 22. Back to text
- Insight, p.
96.Back to text
- All details of Commander
Corneil's activities ashore are from a letter to the author 11 Jan
98. Back to text
- Insight, p.
84-5. Back to text
© Copyright NOAC 1998