Command/Control and Air Defence Replacement Program (CADRE):

The Iroquois-class DDHs, which might be better-termed DDGHs with their post-Tribal-class Update and Modernisation Programme (TRUMP) Standard SM-2 system, are rapidly reaching old age. The first of class, HMCS 1roquois herself, has now been in service for 27 years. It is hoped that these fine ships will be replaced on a one-for-one basis with new hulls; but as was pointed-out in a recent Canadian Forces Maritime Warfare Centre (CFMWC) symposium, the aim is to retain the capability-area air defence and command and control of the Canadian Task Group-not necessarily the ships. Given cost constraints and the difficulty experienced over recent decades in gaining approval for shipbuilding programs, a creative method of retaining this capability may well be necessary.

A command and control (C2) capability can be obtained through providing sufficient communications, data links, displays, and space (both operational and accommodations) for the requisite staff to perform this function. The area anti-air warfare capability is more problematic. Perhaps it could be fitted in new frigates (CPFs) or operational support ships (AORs), not necessarily in the same ship, providing task group command and control, but this requires many compromises. Certainly no other country that I can think of has combined these capabilities in an AOR.

What I want to do in this paper is look at some of the options, and recommend a way ahead. I hope that it will spark further discussion in either the Maritime Warfare Bulletin (MWB) or its sister publication, Maritime Affairs.

Capacity (Volume)

In order to be an effective anti-air warfare (AAW) unit, a ship must have a hull with sufficient volume for stowing missiles, as required for the Mk 41 Vertical Launch System (VLS) in the Iroquois-class. Our DDGHs were not designed with sufficient volume to carry a large missile magazine, necessitating many compromises in the conversion, including the loss of their naval gunfire support (NGFS) capability. A frigate hull design, such as a CPF conversion or new build, may not have the volume to carry sufficient missiles without major modifications. In the case of CPF, these modifications could involve the loss of the ability to operate a helicopter, which perhaps may be too great a sacrifice for a balanced future fleet. The Netherlands has modified the Standard frigate design to produce several AAW/C2 vessels, but the missile fitted is the less-capable SM-1. It also seems likely that these vessels were seen to be a compromise as the new and much larger FFGs will replace them.

Quantity

It is now recognised that a vertical launcher is preferable to a rail launcher-still found in many navies; for instance, the single arm SM- 1 launcher in the Oliver Hazard Perry FFGs, the SM-2 twin launcher in the Kidd-class DDGs recently sold to Greece. The Sea Sparrow rail launchers in the original DDH-280 design were housed inside an enclosure, and only exposed to the outside just before firing. Maintenance of missiles and launcher is certainly easier as there is no exposure to salt water to worry about, and vertical launchers can be very flexible in carrying other types of weapons. For example, an American Arleigh Burke-class DDG can load-out its VLS with Tomahawk land attack missiles, SM-2 surface-to-air missiles, vertical-launch ASROC, and Harpoon missiles. Since the DDH-280 VLS has only 32 launch tubes, with a maximum stowage of 29 SM-2 missiles, a capability for at least a 64 tube system would be highly desirable in CADRE.

Maintenance

One of the major current difficulties with TRUMP is the unique missile fire control systems developed for this small class of ships, and the problem of obtaining spare parts without cannibalising another ship (via Tranreq). An obvious lesson-learned is that our future AAW ship must have equipment similar to other allied vessels, in order to obtain spare parts- either from ships in company or, at least, from the manufacturer who is supplying a larger market.

Training

There are only 4 Iroquois-class vessels, two on each coast, and one AAW training facility in Esquimalt. The dispersion of assets, and the uniqueness of the equipment, makes it difficult for the maintainers, operators, directors, and Operation Room Officers (OROs) to sustain their proficiency. Keeping a ship a fully effective member of a task group is, in itself, a demanding task, much less though than being required to perform the role of Anti Air Warfare Co-ordinator in a multinational force. In addition, preserving common operating procedures between the coasts for a class of 4 ships is proving difficult.

Interoperability

Defence Planning Guidance (DPG) states that the Canadian Forces must "maintain the ability to operate effectively at sea, on land, in the air and in space with the military forces of the United States in defending the northern half of the Western Hemisphere." The result expected is to maintain "effective interoperability with US Forces." The US Navy, through its initiatives in network centric warfare and co-operative engagement capability, sets the standard for all NATO navies. Therefore, if we are interoperable with the USN, we should also be able to operate with our NATO and other allies in conducting multinational operations.

Choices

How then is the Navy to maintain this capability during a period when it is reasonable to expect that defence expenditures, and the naval share of the capital budget, will, at best, not increase? As I see it, if this capability is to be retained, we have a number of choices:

Option A

Build new hulls based on the CPF, optimised to perform this function. Perhaps extra volume could be built into the design in order to embark additional missiles, i.e. the 64-cell Mk 41 VLS for SM-2, "quad- pack" Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM), and any other compatible missile we may wish to purchase. This would maintain our major surface combatant size at 16, the minimum that a Naval Staff (DMOR) study of several years ago considered necessary to perform Maritime Command's DPG-mandated missions and tasks.

Option B

A less-expensive variant of option A: modify existing CPF hulls and fit them with modern AAW/C2 equipment, or, if money is really tight, the radar, communications, displays and VLS from the Iroquois- class. However, this would reduce the number of major combatants to 12-too few to carry out currently mandated tasks.

Option C

As briefly mentioned earlier in this paper, why not put the CADRE capability in the AOR replacement vessel (Afloat Logistic Support Capability-ALSC)? The equipment options would be as per option B, and there would certainly be a large hull to provide adequate volume. However, there must be some good reason why no other navy has combined all of these functions: an Operational Support Ship with fuel, ammunition and solid stores for surface combatants, some amphibious capability level to be determined, and an area air defence/C2 role in the same hull. Certainly, it would appear that there would be too many conflicting activities for such a concept to be effective. In the distant past we carried out replenishment at sea (RAS) from the aircraft carrier, but only when there was no available tanker.

Option D

The final option would be to procure four new AAW/C2 ships from the one navy with which we must maintain interoperability-the USN. If we lease or buy, or build under licence, Arleigh Burke-class DDGs we would have some of the most capable AAW/C2 warships in the world, together with instant interoperability with the USN and NATO. We could make use of American infrastructure to train our warfare personnel in USN schools and refit the ships in USN yards to maintain configuration control. Perhaps we could refit some American amphibious or auxiliary vessels in Canadian shipyards as an offset. Based on our experience in trying to re-invent the wheel in recent years, surely this approach would be a more cost-- and operationally-effective approach.

Conclusion

It should be obvious that the approach I am advocating is option D. "TRUMPING" the DDH-280s made sense at the time; and if everything is working, and if the ship's company is well trained, they are effective ships. However, we will need a capability when they are worn out in 2010-2015. I believe that the most cost-effective way of achieving that goal is to procure a proven vessel from the USN for this very specialized role.

LCdr DS Thomas is a staff officer at CFMWC, and among other duties he is editor of The Maritime Warfare Bulletin and an associate Editor of Maritime Affairs. He has been an exchange officer with the Tactical Procedures Group at the School of Maritime Operations at HMS Dryad and attended the Royal Navy Staff College at Greenwich.