Hong Kong - The Double Edged Sword:
Military Asset to the PLA or a Liability?

Joe Varner

On June 30th, 1997, Hong Kong received 10,000 visitors from the mainland in the form of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA). The arrival of the PLA was seen by some Chinese as the vindication of the Chinese people after the their defeat in the Opium War. It was also seen as another step in the reunification of China: one of the most constant national security objectives of the People's Republic. Observers on military affairs are asking what the possession of Hong Kong means to the PLA. The answer seems to have all the characteristics of a double edged sword with both advantages and disadvantages.

Without question, possession of Hong Kong offers China and the PLA a remarkable logistics base for operations. With the acquisition of Hong Kong the PLA received one of the most operationally efficient ports in the world, and an excellent naval base. The port facilities are expanding rapidly every month according to officials in the Department of Foreign Affairs. Plans for the "Self Governing Region of Hong Kong" also include the development of a new airport considered to be one of the most modern in the world.

If the PLA naval forces need a new anchorage for its fleet, it would find Hong Kong of great benefit, particularly, if China acquired aircraft carriers. Many analysts believe the PLA wants a blue water fleet, and aircraft carriers would be a necessity in achieving that goal. Indeed, China purchased the rights to manufacture the naval variant of the SU-27 from Russia, and this may be the first step in carrier acquisition. Hong Kong as a base for a blue water navy would allow China to project power out into the Central Pacific. Additionally, for the British, Hong Kong was the first line of defence in Asia for Singapore, India, and Australia. In an article in the 9 September, 1996, issue of Defense News, an un-named British Diplomat suggested Hong Kong may well be the PLA's jump-off point for the South East Asia region, and the Indian Ocean. Many analysts would suggest that Hong Kong is too open for a military logistics base, and any Chinese military build-up would lack the element of surprise. In a world of satellite surveillance, the issue may soon be rendered largely irrelevant. Thus, Hong Kong may well be a significant strategic asset for the PLA, which it could use to its future advantage.

The other clear advantage of Hong Kong to the PLA would be as a new market ground and base of operations for PLA controlled business operations. According to Intelligence Digest, the PLA is believe to support 25 percent of their operations through business ventures. In the area just outside of the Self Governing Region of Hong Kong are some 1000 PLA controlled business. Hong Kong has long been a key Asian business centre, and for the PLA, may represent a new avenue to gain revenues for a ever modernizing Chinese military machine. It would be very surprising, if COSCO, a PLA controlled shipping fleet, did not start to increase its operations out of Hong Kong. The port facilities at Hong Kong are exceptional and would certainly be a good base of operations for COSCO. It seems that the PLA may gain considerable economic benefit from Hong Kong in addition to its strategic value.

The down-side for the PLA is the capitalist, and democratic nature of Hong Kong. It has long been the springboard for Chinese democracy movements that threatens the Communist Party's grasp on power in China, and Hong Kong's economic strength is well known. Indeed half of China's military support to control Hong Kong will be centred just outside of the Self Governing Region in Shen Zhen. Those PLA units now stationed in Hong Kong are quartered behind barbed wire, and they are not allowed to even go on leave in the region. This is almost certainly due to Communist Party fears that exposure to the Hong Kong culture will lead to a democratization of PLA units and questions of loyalty. Indeed Hong Kong may serve as a force that spreads democratic ideas and views throughout the PLA just as Napoleon's Grand Armee spread revolutionary ideas throughout Europe. This is the "double edge" of the Hong Kong sword for the PLA and a decided threatening disadvantage.

In the end only time will tell what value Hong Kong will represent in PLA hands, but one thing is for certain. The PLA itself is facing change due to Hong Kong's reunification with the mainland, and Hong Kong will shape the PLA's future.

Joe Varner is a military analyst presently working as an Intern for Maritime Affairs and conducting a major study of maritime security issues in the Asia-Pacific region.

The significance of the Chinese shipping conglomerate the China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO) should not be underestimated. Not only its size with some 600 ships in operation, but also its very controversial business links within the Americas make it an organization worth watching. Among the issues of concern are the lease of facilities in Long Beach, CA, which some analysts say amounts to a give away because the annual fee will never cover the renovation costs incurred by the Americans. Another issue is the US subsidization of a COSTCO subsidiary to build ships in a Mobile, Alabama, shipyard. An yet another contentious issue is the leasing of port facilities in the Panama Canal Zone. Although all these innovations have short-term employment benefits for the area concerned, they also help entrench COSCO as a very substantial and heavily subsidized shipper in an already strained market. Although all the strategic implications of COSCO's expansion are not immediately clear, a few things stands out. One of these is the growing maritime power of China. Not only is economic terms but also in military potential. The quiet but steady growth of the PLA(N) from an essential coast defence navy to one now capable of limited regional sea control should not be overlooked. China has become an important part of the Asia-Pacific maritime security equation.

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