Why Canada Needs A Navy and Why We Need Submarines:
Some Basic Facts

Why Canada Needs a Navy
What can Maritime Forces Do?
Canada's Navy
Why the Navy Needs Submarines
Why a Submarine Replacement is Needed

This compendium of facts about Canada's maritime forces, its naval requirements including the need for new submarines, and the option of acquiring four Upholder-class diesel-electric submarines from Britain has been assembled by the NOAC from a wide range of sources. Further information is available by e-mail to ExecDir@naval.ca or by contacting individual members of the National office:

Why Canada Needs a Navy

Every maritime nation in the world, throughout history, has found a navy (or maritime forces) indispensable.

Canada is a maritime nation; the facts are:

• Approximately one-quarter of the Canadian population, about 7 million Canadians, live in the coastal areas of our Country.
• Canadian shores touch three oceans (the Atlantic, the Pacific and the Arctic) in which our nation has vital sovereign interests.
• Canada has the world's longest coastline and one of the largest continental shelf regimes. Our Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), extending 200 nautical miles (370 km) off-shore, encompasses an area about two-thirds the size of the Canadian landmass. Under the provisions of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea Canada has a resource management responsibility on the continental shelf extending beyond the EEZ.
• Only two provinces do not have a direct connection to the sea, but the prosperity of the entire nation is directly linked to the ocean environment:
• Canada is an important fishing nation, with significant activity in conservation and sustainable utilization of a wide range of stocks.
• Accessible seabed resources within Canadian areas of jurisdiction include extensive deposits of gas, oil, sand and gravel, silica, precious metals and calcium carbonate. Some are already being exploited while others await the development of suitable markets or environmentally sound extraction techniques.
• Almost 40 per cent of the Canadian GDP is derived from trade with other countries. The sea lines of communication are a vital to the regional, national, and international exchange of goods. Over 350 million tonnes of cargo move through Canadian ports every year. For example, Vancouver is the busiest seaport on the West Coast of North America and second over-all on the continent, which reflects the importance sea-trade and the rising importance of the Pacific Rim to the Canadian economy.
• Simply stated, the Canadian economy and the standard of living are directly linked to our involvement in the world market place and to the free movement of shipping and the sustainable utilization of ocean resources.
• As a leading advocate of international peace and stability, Canada also has security interests beyond economic activity. Promotion of the principles of International Law and defence of Canadian values of human rights and freedoms requires us to take a global view of the world's oceans.

What can Maritime Forces Do?

Throughout history, a navy has been the prime instrument for ensuring national security and sovereignty at sea and supporting foreign policy and overseas trade. The qualities that characterize maritime forces in support of government policies ate: readiness, flexibility, self-sustainability and mobility.

• One of the strengths of maritime forces lies in their immediate availability to respond to contingencies. As a matter of course, by maintaining proficiency in the capabilities necessary to resolve major conflicts, maritime forces can provide a wide range of services in support of peacetime operations.
• Maritime forces have been employed in the resolution of many international crises since the end of World War II. The inherent flexibility of maritime forces permits government leaders and military commanders to shift focus, reconfigure and realign forces quickly to handle a variety of contingencies by providing a wide range of weapon systems, military options, and logistical or administrative skills. In tasks ranging from naval confrontation to non-combatant evacuation operations, disaster relief and humanitarian assistance, maritime forces can control the seas and provide diplomatic leverage in peace or time of crisis.
• The excellent command, control and communications capabilities of maritime forces provide a uniquely controllable force to complement diplomatic efforts. In all cases, maritime forces provide both a perception and a potential for action ashore without necessarily committing forces to sovereign soil.
• Maritime forces are capable of operating in forward areas, at the end of long supply lines, without significant land-based supply structures. With the capability of replenishment-at-sea and on-station relief of ships, maritime operations may be continued indefinitely.
• Maritime forces are much less constrained by political boundaries than air or land farces; they can deploy virtually anywhere in the world and transit through territorial waters of non-participating countries by the right of innocent passage customary in the Law of the Sea.
• Maritime forces have the ability to monitor a situation passively, remain on station for a sustained period. respond to a crisis rapidly and deploy in combat if necessary with authority.
• Mobility enables maritime forces to respond from over the horizon, becoming selectively visible to emphasize resolve or withdrawing when required without further action ashore.
• Distinctions between the operations of maritime forces in peacetime and in conflict are not clear cut, because the skills necessary to be effective in establishing security at sea under either condition are virtually the same.

Canada's Navy

In 1910, with the establishment of the Canadian Navy, Canada asserted her independence and drive to self-determination in maritime affairs.

At the moment, threats to national security exist largely in non-military forms. We are more concerned about people abusing our waters or using them illegally than we are in a direct military challenge to Canadian sovereignty. However, the absence of an obvious threat today does not preclude the emergence of a threat tomorrow. The most cursory examination of history makes this abundantly clear. The old adage, "every country has a navy in their waters, their own or someone else's" applies as much today as it did yesterday.

Under any conditions, our sovereign right and duty as a free country means that national and international laws must be respected in Canadian jurisdiction and, if laws are broken, then appropriate and effective action will be taken by Canadians, not someone else.

To be sovereign at sea, a state must be able to control every activity in its area of jurisdiction. Maintaining anything less than the capability to control all activities in our waters is an admission that anyone can use our waters for their own purposes as they please, without regard for our law. This is an abrogation of sovereignty.

Control of our ocean areas of responsibility, above, on and under the surface of the sea, requires:

• Surveillance: information gathering to know who is over, on or under our waters and what they are doing;
• Patrol and presence: a clear expression of government authority by an obvious demonstration of the exertion of sovereignty; and
• Response: the ability to take appropriate and effective action against any violation of the law or threat to national security.

Although some aspects of the law can be enforced at sea by non-military or para-military agencies, these forces are only effective when backed by credible armed force. In the same way that the preservation of sovereignty rests upon international acceptance of a country's ability to use force as the means of last resort in dealing with challenges and threats to national security, effective maritime law enforcement must also include the deterrent threat of sufficient force to compel compliance.

In the 1994 Defence White Paper the Government concluded that the maintenance of multi-purpose, combat-capable forces is in the national interest, and that by maintaining the capability to field a presence anywhere Canada maintains sovereign jurisdiction sends a clear signal that Canadians will not have their sovereignty compromised. Notwithstanding Canada's commitment to defence partnership with the United States and with our NATO allies, Canada should never put itself in a position where, as a consequence of past decisions, the defence of our national territory has become the responsibility of others.

Why the Navy Needs Submarines

Submarines are an essential component of balanced, multi-purpose, combat- capable maritime forces, along with surface ships and maritime air forces. In order to effectively control what happens above, on and below the surface of' the sea maritime forces require a range of complementary equipment: no single type of vessel or aircraft is capable of responding across the whole spectrum of activity required to establish effective sea control. However, by operating the right mix of equipment. maritime forces achieve a cost-effective synergy that surpasses the sum of each component of the fleet operating by itself. One would not ask a carpenter to make a choice between using a saw or a hammer when building a house - clearly, he needs both in his toolbox. Similarly, the Navy needs the right mix of assets to meet Canadian defence objectives.

The Special Joint Committee on Canada's Defence Policy whose recommendations formed the basis for the 1994 Defence White Paper recognized the utility of submarines and urged the Government to explore cost-effective means, within the existing Defence capital budget, for acquiring three to six modern diesel-electric submarines. In the White Paper, the Government stated its intention to explore the option of acquiring four recently constructed Upholder-class submarines from the United Kingdom.

Submarines represent an effective, and comparatively inexpensive, naval platform. Submarines require relatively small crews and can operate for about 20 per cent to 30 per cent of the cost of major surface vessels. Submarines are an integral element of the Canadian Task Group and complement the operational characteristics of surface vessels and maritime aircraft.

Submarines make a unique contribution to maritime operations. They may be stationed in an area of interest either overtly or covertly, giving them an unparalleled freedom of action and independence. They may be deployed or withdrawn anywhere in national waters or on the high seas without diplomatic cost or commitment.

The nature of submarines makes them a strategic national military asset with an influence that transcends their cost. Due to its relative invulnerability, covertness and potential lethality, the submarine makes a superior deterrent. During the Falklands/Malvinas conflict in 1982, the presence of a British submarine virtually prevented the Argentine surface fleet from sailing, and the greatest source of concern to the Royal Navy throughout the campaign was the whereabouts of the Argentine submarines. Although we cannot be sure, the influence of Canadian submarines probably helped defuse the possibility of escalation between naval surface forces during the Turbot dispute of 1995.

A modern diesel-electric submarine can conduct sustained maritime patrols in all extremes of weather in any season. Typically, a submarine like Upholder, can remain on patrol far at least 45 days without refuelling or resupply. While on station, the unique surface and underwater surveillance capabilities of the submarine permit observation of an area about one-third the size of the entire island of Newfoundland.

While the submarine makes a strong contribution to military deterrence, it is equally effective as a maritime law enforcement tool. Both the Department of Fisheries and Oceans and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police have benefited from the services of Canadian submarines. Canada has demonstrated the ability to use the result of covert submarine surveillance in obtaining convictions of fisheries violators and narcotics smugglers. Pictures of offending vessels, taken through a submarine's periscope, have been published in newspapers in Canada and abroad, and serve to highlight the commitment to maritime law enforcement. Indeed, the covert nature of submarine surveillance immeasurably enhances its effectiveness. Like the use of radar to enforce highway speed limits, submarine surveillance compels compliance with law by the mere possibility of its presence. By having a submarine service, a deterrent, military and civil, exists in Canadian waters regardless of the submarine's actual location at any given time.

Submarines are an important aspect of cooperation with our allies. Our allies expect Canada to maintain an effective degree of combat capability. Every nation is wrestling with national fiscal issues; however, for the principle of collective defence to be meaningful, each nation must be seen to be "pulling its own weight". Obviously, the political and economic benefits, separate from but associated with, participation in alliances, must be factored into any decisions to limit defence activity.

• Submarines permit Canada to participate in the important arena of "waterspace management". By having submarines capable of conducting underwater surveillance and responding to intrusions, indeed, simply from a safety point of view for regulating underwater traffic, allied navies share information about the location and activity of their submarines. Without submarines, Canadian sovereignty beneath the sea would rely upon the goodwill alone of our friends. Clearly, there may be occasions when, although no harm is meant to Canada, it would be expedient or convenient for a neighbour to use our water without our knowledge. The suburban adage, "good fences make good neighbours" may apply.
• Under the influence of restraints on defence spending, the United States and the United Kingdom have elected to employ only nuclear-propelled submarines, and depend upon their allies, including Canada, to provide diesel-electric submarines for training and, should the need arise, for operations. In return for this division of labour, the allies share many forms of intelligence and information. Consequently, in addition to the national benefits deriving from a submarine service, Canada receives access to a broad range of information that would be unaffordable within Canadian means alone.
• Provision of diesel-electric submarine training services to our allies, primarily the United States and the United Kingdom, acts as a form of revenue generation that can be offset against military expenditure in other areas on a quid pro quo basis.
• There is a specious argument that the submarine threat disappeared at the end of the Cold War. However, the proliferation of submarines around the world clearly shows that this is not true. At the present time there are 47 countries operating more than 600 submarines around the world. By the year 2006, the number of countries is expected to increase to 49, although modernization by the big operators (United States, United Kingdom, Russia) will result in a modest decrease in the overall numbers. Clearly, the utility of submarines is evident to other countries, like Canada, that operate medium to small navies. It is obvious too that Canadian well-being may not be foremost in the national objectives of all of these countries.
• There is another ostensible, but equally inaccurate argument that breakthroughs in technology have rendered the submarine obsolete. Scientific advances have been made but the oceans remain opaque and will continue to be for the foreseeable future. Radar, lasers and infra-red energy cannot penetrate the sea surface beyond a few metres. Under ideal conditions, radar satellites have detected the wakes of submarines operating at high speeds near the surface: but satellites are limited in their ability to provide real-time information processing. Satellites cannot provide continuous coverage of large geographic areas, particularly in polar regions. For example, the Canadian Government's RADARSAT, operated by the Canadian Space Agency, has a revisit time in the order of three days; hence, a constellation of satellites would be required to provide continuous coverage of Canada's ocean areas. Moreover, the cost of one radar satellite exceeds the cost of the four Upholders. In short, satellites have a role, but they are not the whole solution to the problem, and they are not a cost effective alternative to submarines.
• In hockey parlance, the best defence is a good offence. In the world of submarines, the best anti-submarine weapon is another submarine. In addition to the requirement for submarines for training above water forces, surface and air, submarines are needed to exercise the whole range of anti-submarine warfare. Clearly, NATO has held the advantage in this field for years, due in no small part to the contribution of the Canadian Navy; however, it is a complex and perishable skill. Analysts can demonstrate that if ASW capability were allowed to erode, it would take far less time for a new submarine threat co emerge than it would to resurrect the necessary combination of equipment and training necessary to combat it.
• Arctic surveillance is difficult. Fixed arrays have some utility, but they are expensive to install, difficult to maintain, have limited flexibility and do not have any inherent ability to respond to intrusions. Up until recently, only nuclear- propelled submarines had any capability for under-ice operations. However, this is changing. Emerging technologies, of which Canadian companies like Ballard Industries are leading proponents, may soon be viable which will permit non-nuclear submarines to patrol the ice-covered expanses of our polar seas.
• Submarines are not a specialized capability. Rather, they are an essential part of a balanced maritime force. They are cost-effective and affordable.

Why a Submarine Replacement is Needed

The existing Oberon-class submarines were purchased from the United Kingdom in 1965 (HMCS Ojibwa), 1967 (HMCS Onondaga), and 1968 (HMCS Okanagan). Their original life expectancy was 25 years.

During the mid- and late-1980s, the Government investigated the acquisition of nuclear-propelled submarines as a replacement for the Oberons to meet Cold War requirements; however, by 1989, it was determined that this option was no longer affordable in view of the emerging strategic environment.

The immense pressures of compression and expansion associated with submerged operations require periodic safe-to-dive certifications for submarines. A 1991 review of the remaining useable life of the Oberons, determined that the submarines could undergo extensive life-extension refits to make them safe for operations beyond the turn of the century. Ojibwa and Onondaga have already completed such a refit and will reach the end of their extensions in 2000 and 2003 respectively. Okanagan, should she receive such a refit, would extend her life to 2005, estimated to require about 600,000 man hours plus the cost of materials. This process can probably be repeated, but it becomes progressively more expensive as the equipment, hull, and fittings age.

Over their lives, the Oberons have received capability updates to maintain their operational effectiveness. Improvements in sensors and communications equipment reduced the number of bunks and increased the ambient temperature, imposing a severe impact on the already Spartan habitability conditions in the submarine. Nonetheless, the new equipment and the acquisition of the US Mark-48 torpedo system permit the submarines to perform creditably.

The effectiveness of a submarine is often measured in terms of stealth. Lessening the submarine's noise reduces its vulnerability to detection. Also, because a ship's sonar can hear its own noise, the noise threshold limits detection opportunities against other vessels. Making the submarine quieter improves the ability to detect other ships and submarines. Through meticulous attention to detail, the Oberons are still relatively quiet, but they are probably noisier than the new generation of diesel-electric submarines, for example the Russian Kilo-class, that is readily available on the open arms market. The Oberons certainly do not enjoy a competitive advantage.

There are limits, in addition to the finite life expectancy to the hull, imposed by the 1950s design of the Oberons. Modern submarines use smooth, hydrodynamic teardrop hull forms to improve propulsion efficiency and permit the application of sound absorbing technology to reduce the acoustic reflectivity of the boat and insulate internal noise. The external ballast tank arrangement of older submarines precludes the use of these techniques. Some improvements in technology are not consistent with the original design of the vessels; ultimately, an old submarine will not be able to compete with a new submarine. An owner can restore a 1957 deSoto, but in the end it is still, a 1957 deSoto.

The Oberons are approaching the end of their useful lives. A replacement program for the submarines could cost as much 3 to 4 billion dollars if new design and construction were undertaken in Canada. Some savings might be obtained by contracting for an existing foreign design, but it is estimated that the final costs of such a purchase would still he in excess of 2.5 billion dollars, and there are few existing designs that meet the robust operational and sea-keeping requirements of Canadian waters. There is, however, one clearly affordable option, achievable at about 20-25 per cent of the cost of a new purchase program. The United Kingdom is offering Canada a unique opportunity to undertake a lease- to-own contract for four fully operational Upholder-class submarines. This includes crew training, a suite of operations and maintenance trainers/simulators and a complete technical data package, to ensure all subsequent maintenance and upgrades to the submarines could be conducted in Canada. further, much of the lease cost would be "bartered" against the use of Canadian facilities used by UK troops in Wainwright and Suffield, Alberta and Goose Bay, Labrador, and additional offsets would be evident in terms of Canadian jobs associated with the project.

In the late-1970s, at the height of the Cold War, the United Kingdom identified the requirement for a new class of diesel-electric submarine. Vickers Shipbuilding and Engineering Limited (VSEL) submitted the winning design, the VSEL 2400, subsequently named Upholder by the Royal Navy. Four of a planned sixteen were built between 1986 and 1992. However, by this time, the Warsaw Pact had been dissolved and the Soviet Union had disintegrated into its component states. Although Russia, in particular, maintained a significant military and naval capability, there was evidently no indication of intent to use it internationally. Under the new strategic environment, there was significant pressure to reduce defence spending in the UK, as there was in every Western nation. After a thorough review, the Royal Navy determined that its operational commitments could most economically be met by specializing in nuclear- propelled strategic missile and patrol submarines. Under the new fleet plan, the Upholders were declared "redundant to need" and placed in extended readiness storage at the VSEL yard in Barrow.

Upholder-class submarines are based upon the hull design of the Trafalgar-class nuclear-propelled patrol submarine. The teardrop hull is very quiet and efficient and incorporates the most modern acoustic reduction technology available. Design advancements have permitted reductions in the number of through-hull fittings by about two-thirds from earlier submarine classes, reducing maintenance requirements and the number of potential failure points in safety certification. The improvements in hull design result in less maintenance man-hours; indeed, the refit for the Upholders is at their expected mid-life point compared to a cycle of every 5 years for the Oberons. This, coupled with the smaller crew size (49 in the Upholders versus 67 in an Oberon) will permit four new submarines to be operated for about the same annual operating cost as the three old ones. All of the existing infrastructure associated with submarine support is compatible with the new submarines.

The propulsion system in the Upholder is a modern diesel-electric design, but it is not significantly different from that in the Oberons. Nominally, the Upholders have marginally less range than the Oberons, but this is not an operationally significant difference. More importantly, there is sufficient flexibility in the new design to eventually incorporate new air independent propulsion (AIP), when such systems become economically viable. Ballard Industries of Vancouver is a leader in this field. Application of this new propulsion technology would permit the new submarines to carry out limited patrols under the polar ice. Inability to conduct this mission has long been recognized by the Government as a major deficiency in the protection of Canadian sovereignty.

The acquisition of four submarines will permit the permanent presence of a Canadian submarine on the Pacific Coast. This, too, has been considered a major but unfilled requirement. Stationing a submarine in Esquimalt, in addition to emphasizing the importance of the Pacific to the Canadian defence strategy, will greatly enhance the training opportunities for the West Coast surface Fleet, balance the exchange of training resources with the United States, facilitate subsurface intelligence exchange and give the West Coast similar surveillance capability to that enjoyed on the East Coast.

The Oberon-class submarines are rapidly approaching the end of their useful lives. Four Upholder-class submarines are available at a much-reduced cost through a lease-to-buy arrangement. The four new submarines will be safer and more capable than the existing vessels. They can be operated for about the same annual cost as the existing three, maintenance costs will be reduced, they will permit a Pacific submarine presence and, potentially, they can contribute to addressing the long standing concerns over Arctic sovereignty.

Submarines are not a specialized capability. Rather, they are an essential part of a balanced maritime force. They are cost-effective and affordable.

© Copyright NOAC 1998, 2003