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Starshell

"A little light on what's going on."

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EDITOR

George A. Moore
1871 Primrose Crescent
Kamloops, BC V1S 0A5
Telephone 250-314-1284 Fax 250-314-1286
Starshell@shaw.ca

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EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

Richard Archer
12 Zokol Crescent
Kanata, ON K2K 2K5
Telephone & Fax: (613) 270-9597
noacexdir@msn.com

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1871 Primrose Crescent, Kamloops, BC V1S 0A5
Phone 250-314-1284 • Fax 250-314-1286
cascadecreek@shaw.ca

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Our cover

Cpl. Dany Veillette
Formation Imaging Services, Halifax, NS

When this photograph was taken on 14 August 2008, the Halifax-class patrol frigate HMCS *Ville de Québec* was in the region of Somalia, conducting escorts for the World Food Program (WFP) ships carrying life-saving supplies to the area. The government was acting on a request from the United Nations World Food Program and the UN International Maritime Organization.

The WFP is urgently purchasing food for Somalia, of which some eighty per cent arrives by sea. While pirates had to that time launched some twenty-four attacks on vessels off Somalia's eastern and northern coasts, no escorted WFP ships had been targeted.

On 17 July 2008, *Ville de Québec* originally deployed on Operation SEXTANT, Canada's maritime contribution to the Standing NATO Maritime Group 1 (SNMGI). With this new humanitarian assistance task, *Ville de Québec* was then scheduled to operate under Operation ALTAIR for about a month in direct support of the WFP shipments to Somalia. Following this mission which ended in September, she returned to her original tasking with SNMGI, which is scheduled to end in December.

Editor's cabin

George A. Moore

The autumn edition of *Starshell* is chock full of news and information, so much so that I found myself playing the old game of 'cut and hold' until the next issue, so regrettably, some regular items such as 'Fraser McKee's Little Known Navy,' and J. M. Thornton's 'Obscure and Offbeat Naval Oddities' are notable by their absence. My apologies to both. It was also necessary to cut short the 'In Memoriam' listing of non-member obituaries, but I will hopefully be able to make room for them in the Winter 2008/09 issue. I was determined, however, to include another instalment of Skinny Hayes' memoirs, and although shorter than I would prefer, it begins on p.17.

While on the topic of obituaries, it has become increasingly evident that age is taking an ever-increasing toll on our numbers. Looking at the service records and large numbers of ships many of these individuals served in, it is an absolute shame that the vast majority have taken their memories to the grave without sharing them with their fellow Canadians, especially the younger generations. As stated many times before, I would welcome your memoirs for publication in *Starshell*.

Guest editorial



A Canadian Crisis Response Capability

a national deficiency, a national need

Ken Summers

INTRODUCTION

As Canada enters the 21st century, we are faced with an increasingly complex and interrelated array of international and national challenges. None of these is more fundamental to any nation's survival than security, at home and abroad. This is increasingly the case as we see the global environment being dominated by continuing shortages of energy, increased competition for the natural resources needed for national economic growth, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, an unbalanced division of wealth, population expansion and migration, environmental and climate change, and by the resurgence of regional military powers. In addition, the failed, failing and non-effectively functioning states that increasingly dominate the international scene and create more humanitarian problems and regional instability, also act as breeding grounds for terrorism and non-state based ethnic and religious strife. In such an environment, Canadians will be challenged to preserve and protect our fundamental values and way of life by responding quickly and effectively to national and global threats. Nowhere will there be a greater requirement to respond to challenges than in the Asia-Pacific region.

REALITIES IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

Heretofore, the term Asia-Pacific referred to the region immediately adjacent to the Pacific Ocean. The ocean itself is vast and is the dominant feature of planet earth. It is the largest and deepest of the world's oceans, covers 70-million square miles, has 20,000 islands, comprises one-third of the world's surface, and is greater than all the land masses combined. The economic emergence of India, China and Japan as economic superpowers, the importance of oil to their economies, and the oil routes from the mid-east Gulf States, now compels one to look at the Asia-Pacific region as encompassing both the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Of equal importance, two-thirds of the world's population lives in the region. As a result, Asia-Pacific will increasingly be the focus of global issues, drawing the attention of Canadians more and more to the west, across the Pacific and less eastward to Europe, our traditional focus.

Geography has given the Asia-Pacific region challenges found nowhere else on earth. Volcanic activity and fault lines make natural disasters inevitable. The 'Ring of Fire' encompasses the entire perimeter of the Pacific Ocean. It extends from Alaska down the western coast of North and South America, over the South Pacific to New Zealand, and

up the islands to Japan, China and Russia. It is the most concentrated and active volcanic region on earth. Moreover, there are major earth fault lines resulting from tectonic plate movement. They extend north and south on each continent, and frequently and unexpectedly shift, causing earthquakes and spawning deadly tsunamis such as the one that devastated Thailand a few years ago. Canadians must, of course, be capable of dealing with our own natural disasters, but we will want to be capable of responding with appropriate assistance and support in the event of disasters in the Asia-Pacific region as well.

Perhaps the most striking and important dynamic in the Asia-Pacific region is the rise of the economic power of the major nations of the Indo-Pacific. While the United States and Europe have for many decades dominated the world economy, it is widely believed that the economic fundamentals and aspirations of China, Japan and India will dominate the region in the future. This change will not occur without problems, however. All three nations have the manpower, the technology, national aims, and the desire to be economic powers in the world. The global nature of markets and the interdependency of nations today, force them to go abroad and compete. They have proven they can successfully compete with Europe and North America, but increasingly have found their greatest competition is within themselves. Importantly, all three suffer from the same fundamental weakness — a lack of resources, and oil in particular. With no national oil deposits, they must import ever-increasing amounts of oil to feed their expanding industries, and consequently the pursuit of assured oil supplies is a national priority one of increasing competition.

Other natural resources are also a source of competition and conflict between regional powers. Known and potential sea-bed resources have been in dispute for many years, and claims have been hotly contested in international fora. Traditional fishing areas and zones continue to be a source of dispute between Japan, China and Russia. A resurgent oil-rich Russia is seeking to regain its former world leader status in the region. Moreover, population increases in many of the nations create aspirations for expansion, particularly into territories that are resource rich. Canadians must recognize these new economic realities of the Asia-Pacific region and adapt our trade and economic relationships accordingly. We must also be aware that conflicts, big and small, will arise from these national economic pursuits.

In the last decade, Canadians, and indeed the world, have been concerned with global impact of failed and failing states. When national



governments cannot provide good governance, essential services, and security to their citizens, chaos ensues. Poverty and misery set the conditions for population and refugee migrations, widespread disease, criminal activities, and the potential rise of terrorist activities. The Asia-Pacific region has not been immune to this. Serious internal conflicts are common in North Korea, Bali, the Philippines, Thailand, Cambodia, Sri Lanka and Afghanistan. If left unassisted, a failing state can become a fertile breeding ground for ethnic, Islamic and other religious extremists. It is therefore important for stable and developed nations like Canada to render assistance and support to failing states before extremism and terrorism develops and is exported to nations such as ours. National security begins abroad — not at our borders, seaports and airports.

The final significant reality in the region is the rise in military (particularly naval) capabilities. Russia is again flexing its muscle. Military capabilities that went fallow a few years ago at the end of the Cold War are now being brought back to life and used to manifest their presence, capability, and national interest in defending its traditional claims, including disputed islands fishing zones, against countries such as Japan and China.

But it is China that will likely lay claim to being the new regional naval power. Now that a land confrontation with Russia is seen as unlikely, China is rapidly building up its naval capability. Why? The mix of capabilities provides the answer. Three aircraft carriers are reportedly under construction. When operational and complemented by 70 destroyers and frigates, 50 dock-landing ships, 45 coastal warships and numerous fleet support ships, the People's Liberation Army's Navy will have an impressive three-carrier battle group surface fleet. Moreover, the PLA Navy has added 20 nuclear submarines to its fleet in the past five years, bringing its total number of submarines to 55. While capability is not intent, the Chinese have noted the role of naval power in support of national economic interests. Such sea capability enables them to be masters of the waters in their region, challenging the Russian and the American fleets. They could isolate Taiwan or lay claim to the Spratley Islands, at will. They certainly could effect sea control in key international straits and commercial sea lanes. China intends to be the regional naval power, and not surprisingly in response, India too is rebuilding its military, and their navy in particular.

What does this mean to Canada? Quite simply, much of our economic future is tied to trans-Pacific sea-lanes. The fastest and least expensive route from the Far East to the American heartland is by container shipping through the ports of Vancouver and Prince Rupert. Those ports will soon be handling almost 4-million containers annually. Freedom of the seas is fundamental to our commerce. Canada must be able to rapidly deploy joint forces at sea or on land anywhere in the region to provide presence and stability, and contribute to de-escalating and defusing potentially volatile situations that would interfere with our seaborne commerce.

Understanding these realities in the Asia-Pacific region is extremely important to Canadians. While not forgetting our traditional allies, we must look west across the Pacific to the countries that will affect us more and more in the future. We must come to understand that their future will greatly impact our future, for we are interdependent.

While we can speculate about the events that might occur in the region, the potential exists for any one or all of the following to require Canada's attention:

- (a) National or international natural or humanitarian disasters;

- (b) conflicts, big or small, as a result of economic competition for resources or territory;
- (c) crises in failed and failing states; and,
- (d) military conflicts resulting from national military programs in support of national goals and aspirations.

CANADIAN DEFENCE AND FOREIGN POLICY

The former and current Canadian governments have espoused the idea that Canada should play a greater role in world affairs. This sense that "the world needs more Canada" was translated into a wish for greater involvement in international organizations and through participation in alliances and coalitions to deal with global crises. Canada, seeking a seat at the decision-making table, realized that being there meant joining other like-minded nations in addressing crises and other problems around the globe. The events of 9/11 demonstrated that a nation could no longer be assured of national security simply by controlling its borders. National security begins well beyond a nation's borders, often on the other side of the world.

The Liberal government's *International Policy Statement* of 2005 embraced these thoughts. The Defence section of the *Statement* was particularly innovative in defining the future vision and role of the Canadian Forces (CF) at home and abroad. At home, the CF has transformed its command structure so as to be able to rapidly and effectively respond to any national crisis. *Canada Command* was created to be the single operational command with responsibility to protect Canadians at home. A fully integrated command with maritime, land, air and special operations capabilities at its disposal, it exercises its responsibilities through regional commands across the country. The Commander of *Canada Command* can move his assigned forces and capabilities wherever national emergencies or threats occur without having to first gain approval from National Defence Headquarters. This new approach has matured. Command forces have exercised as a team and the result of this cooperation has been a demonstrated success with an effect greater than the sum of individual capabilities.

A corresponding vision was postulated for operations abroad. A *Canadian Expeditionary Force Command* (CEFCOM) was created and assigned responsibility for the preparation, deployment and coordination of all CF operations outside Canada. To date, it has been primarily occupied with the Afghanistan mission and has exercised command of the Canadian multi-service force deployed there. The 2005 Vision Statement was progressive in its outlook. It called for a reorganization of the CF that would also include the creation of a *Special Operations Group* (SOG), a *Standing Contingency Task Force* (SCTF), and *Mission Specific Task Forces* (MSTF). The SOG, based on the *Joint Task Force 2* (JTF 2) capabilities, has been augmented with personnel and equipment so that it can operate effectively as a special operations counter-terrorism unit, or contributes to and integrates with air, land and maritime forces within an SCTF or MSTF. Regrettably, the *Standing Contingency* and *Mission Specific Task Forces* have not progressed as initially envisioned. A successful trial of the SCTF was completed in late 2006, and has yet to be implemented. One could argue that Afghanistan is an MSTF mission, and certainly the lessons learned from this operation will be invaluable in further developing the concept.

Following the penultimate election, the victorious Conservative government increased funding for defence and committed to a number of capital acquisition projects that were eventually embodied in the *Canada First Defence Strategy* tabled in May 2008. The government committed



to furthering Canada's diplomatic role abroad, and the CF's ability to be militarily successful in international commitments such as Afghanistan. Procurement was initiated to buy C-17 Strategic Lift aircraft, Hercules tactical air-lift aircraft and medium to heavy-lift helicopters; for the construction of Joint Support Ships for fleet sustainment operations and a modest sea-lift capability; and to acquire modern tanks, etc. Thus, the government's *Canada First Defence Strategy* should support the continued transition and vision of the CF, and progress it to reality.

However, there are two major shortfalls in the government's plan that directly affects our national crisis response capability.

Firstly, with defence policy an essential part of foreign policy, the *Standing Contingency Task Force* (SCTF) could be a particularly effective foreign policy instrument should the government wish to intervene to stabilize or defuse an international crisis or humanitarian disaster. But it is important to realize that such an intervention would be effective only if it were made in a timely manner. Unfortunately, Canada's recent responses to crises and disasters has suffered from a lack of inter-departmental coordination, and led to ad hoc approaches, conflicting aims and a lack of focus. The Tsunami relief operations in the Pacific, the East Timor crisis, and the crisis in Haiti, for example, show that while Canada did react, it did so in a less than expeditious and satisfactory manner. The reason? Our government was simply unable to quickly decide what Canada's response should be, which government departments would be involved, and who would take the coordinating lead.

During the Tsunami crisis, while other nations were on the scene providing valuable assistance and relief, Canada was sending multi-departmental high level teams to the area to determine where and with which capability we would respond. The CF's *Disaster Assistance Response Team* (DART) waited for over a week for a decision to deploy, and took a further week to deploy to the region. A review of this crisis reveals that the most effective assistance provided to victims came from other nation's sea-based units, given their ability to project assistance ashore and sustain it for a lengthy period of time. The bottom line is that for an SCTF deployment to be timely and effective, the government must insist on interdepartmental cooperation and coordination. The government must bring together in a timely manner, the considerable capabilities and expertise of all government departments in the same manner the military SCTF integrates and focuses all the capabilities at its disposal.

The second shortfall in the government's crisis response plan is the lack of progress in providing the SCTF with the actual means to deploy and carry out its assigned missions.

The SCTF is tasked with rapidly deploying a Canadian Battle Group of approximately 1,500 personnel to stabilize and control a developing situation. Unfortunately, the planned acquisition of the Joint Support Ships (JSS) as replacements for the ageing AORs (whose main role is that of sustaining the fleet at sea) will not provide the SCTF with the maritime capabilities needed to pre-position or deploy the Battle Group, support it during the conduct of its land operation, nor provide it with sea-based national or multinational command facility; capabilities that could be provided by a single ship similar to a naval LPD or a modified commercial container / Ro-Ro carrier.

THE SPECTRUM OF POTENTIAL GOVERNMENT TASKS

As Canada's future economic prosperity is tied to the Asia-Pacific region, our government must take measures to exercise as much influence as possible in shaping the outcome of events

in the region by understanding the nature of the existing relationships between major players in the region; becoming fully aware of their competing, national aspirations and goals; by establishing effective relationships with these major players; and, by contributing to peace and security in the region which will be, more often than not, a *sine qua non* of friendly and beneficial economic relations. Clearly, such an undertaking involves the majority (if not all) government departments and agencies and the Canadian Forces. In addition, the tasks that might accrue to government departments and the CF in the peace and security portion of such an undertaking are substantial in number and cover the entire spectrum from disaster assistance to armed conflict, and would include as a priority: crisis prevention, containment, reversal, and stabilization. In the event of crisis, it might well be in Canada's interest to be able to rapidly and effectively respond in any of the following ways:

- **Disaster Assistance** – Arguably, the Asia-Pacific region is the most likely region in the world to suffer tsunamis, hurricanes, typhoons, earthquakes, or forest fires. Canada will wish to act rapidly and effectively with an all-of-government response (the deployment of a DART, followed by sustained and focused relief assistance, for example).
- **Presence** – A worsening situation could escalate out of control. Often the mere presence, offshore, of a military force of substantial inherent capability is sufficient to calm the situation. A force that can be rapidly deployed to an unstable region is an effective arrow in a nation's foreign policy quiver.
- **National Evacuation Operations (NEO)** – There have been recent examples (Lebanon and Haiti) where the government has had to conduct an evacuation of Canadian citizens from a foreign country engulfed in chaos. A national capability trained to conduct such complex operations, often in conjunction with other nations, should be mandatory. It is not sufficient to cobble together resources to try to conduct these dangerous undertakings. A requirement will likely exist for NEO operations to be carried out in the future.
- **Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO)** – Since the first Gulf War in 1990, Canada has been involved almost continuously in interdiction operations in support of UN sanctions, and has shown leadership in coordinating multinational MIO efforts that have proven effective in the prevention of illegal shipments, and in the campaign against terrorism.
- **Stability Operations** – Modern day regional and limited conflicts can quickly escalate into violent confrontations. A requirement exists for a force to create a stable environment that will foster peace and allow for the resolution of the causes of conflict. This process requires 'boots on the ground.' The size and composition of the stabilization force will vary with each situation.
- **Peace Support Operations** – To prevent a stabilized conflict situation from re-igniting, and to allow for good governance to develop and reconstruction to occur, it is sometimes necessary to conduct peace support operations. Such operations can last for months or even years as in the case of Bosnia.
- **Combat Operations** – It is often necessary to achieve the peace before one can keep the peace, and combat operations may be necessary. UN-sanctioned and NATO combat operations in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan illustrate the point.
- **International/Coalition Operations** – Canada is a G8 nation, a member of both NATO and the UN, and therefore reaps the benefits of, and accepts the responsibilities of, such membership. More and



more, global problems are being addressed through the actions of 'Coalitions of the Willing.' Canada, as a major player in the world, can exercise its influence through involvement in these types of operations.

COMMON REQUIREMENTS

When the Canadian government is faced with any of the above situations, the key to a timely and effective response is top-down Cabinet direction and effective interdepartmental coordination. This will not occur, however, until there is a government-wide agreement on concepts, processes and procedures whose fundamental aim is to mesh and synchronize departmental capabilities tasked as part of the response. Today, regrettably, interdepartmental coordination is inadequate and less efficient and effective than it can and must be. The problem is of course not a simple one. It is not easy to determine at the outset of a crisis what Canada's response should be. To react with too little would be ineffective, and to react with too much would be wasteful.

In order for government departments and agencies to be in a position to contribute effectively to the resolution of a crisis, the resources/capabilities they would most likely be called upon to contribute should have the following characteristics (not an exhaustive listing by any means):

- (a) **Readiness and Availability** – The vast majority of the capabilities resident in departments and agencies that may be called upon to respond are well known. Those capabilities must be in a high degree of readiness and availability to deploy.
- (b) **Rapid Deployment** – Time is always of the essence in responding to a crisis, and even more so if the location of the crisis is distant from our shores. Quite simply, a delay, bureaucratic or otherwise, is counterproductive and unacceptable.
- (c) **Modular Approach** – Capabilities from all departments must be self contained and able to be packaged as part of the overall response. The correct set of capabilities can then be combined to achieve the greatest effect.
- (d) **Tailored Reaction** – Each crisis situation is different. An optimal response is a tailored response. Departments and agencies must not over or under-respond when asked to contribute.
- (e) **Flexibility in Response** – As important as it is to respond rapidly, it is also very important for departments or agencies to be able to increase or decrease deployed capability as the situation on the ground dictates.
- (f) **Sustainability** – It is always difficult to establish time-lines or determine when an end-state will be achieved. It is therefore prudent to be in a position to sustain a deployment for a minimum of six months. This rule of thumb, based on experience in such matters, provides sufficient time to mobilize replacement or follow-on teams.
- (g) **Joint Integrated Training** – To achieve effective department and agency responses to a crisis situation, departments, agencies and the government must champion regular programs and exercises aimed at rapidly and efficiently deploying a variety of capabilities. Such pro-

grams and exercises will have the additional benefit of identifying personnel, training and capability shortfalls in need of resolution.

(h) **Related Missions** – We must, at the national level, be capable of engaging in and coordinating two or more distinct but related crisis responses.

(i) **Coalition Operations** – Responses to serious crises in the Asia-Pacific region will come from many of the region's nations. Canada must be prepared to contribute to a coalition solution to the problem. To do so, human and technical interoperability issues must be addressed.

A CANADIAN RESPONSE CONCEPT - A RUBIK'S CUBE

When a national, regional, or global crisis occurs, it is the responsibility of the Canadian government to take the lead in determining our nation's response. Given that time is often the critical factor, a need exists for a national crisis command centre equipped and staffed so as to allow for rapid gathering, collating and disseminating of the information necessary for decision makers to react quickly and with confidence.


Further, on direction from the government, and as part of an integrated and coordinated top-down crisis response policy, all departments would be required to review, catalogue and package those capabilities they may be called upon to contribute to the government's response.

One can illustrate this concept if one considers the Rubik's Cube.. Essentially, each face of a 'governmental' Rubik's

Cube represents a particular government department. Each of the squares of that face represents a distinct departmental capability package. To create an optimal response to a crisis or disaster, the government would rotate the cube to achieve on a single face the appropriate combination of capability packages from all the departments involved, and determine which department should be the lead department for that mission.

For example, let us assume the cube contains capability packages for DFAIT, DND, CIDA, Solicitor-General, Fisheries & Oceans / Transport, and Public Safety Canada. To respond to a tsunami disaster on an island in the South Pacific, the Canadian national response might include a DFAIT team with regional diplomatic expertise, the DART and a small scale SCTF from DND with engineering, communications and mobility embarked, as well as a humanitarian aid and development capability team package from CIDA, civilian police from Solicitor-General, and a disaster aid coordination team from Public Safety Canada. As an additional consideration the government could consider the inclusion of the capabilities of NGOs and other agencies. If the departments had trained together as envisioned earlier, and if the Canadian response were deployed rapidly, this would represent a well-coordinated and timely national response.

Similarly, when considering the Department of National Defence, the obvious and most useful tool for the government when considering how to respond to a situation would be based on the capability of the *Standing Contingency Task Force* — if it were funded and became reality. It would be the core 'enabler' for virtually all crises or disasters one could envision. The actions of the Conservative government lead one





to conclude this is the direction it would prefer to pursue if Canada were not faced with a minority government situation. In the future the hope is that the SCTF will feature prominently in the government's international approach for the CF.

The 'departmental' Rubik's Cube for DND would feature faces that represent the expertise associated with the Maritime, Aerospace, Land, Combat Force Support, Special Operations and National Command capability functions. Within each of those areas one would find the following capabilities (which is not an exhaustive listing):

(a) Maritime

- Area presence
- Sea control / denial
- Power projection
- Maritime surveillance
- Sea-based command
- Maritime security
- Strategic sea-lift
- Force sustainment
- Trans-littoral manoeuvre

(b) Aerospace

- Strategic air-lift
- Tactical medium-lift helos
- Tactical air-lift
- Close air support
- Aerospace surveillance
- Long range A/C surveillance
- UAV
- Air support / airfield engineers

(c) Land

- Combat Battle Group
- Land transport
- Land recce
- Close Air Support Forward Observers
- Force Protection
- Land-based Command
- Land sustainment
- Provost / Military police

(d) Special Ops

- Command element
- Special Protective capabilities
- Special Boat Squad
- Airborne paras
- NEO
- Covert Injection capabilities
- Sharpshooters

(e) Force Support / Sustainment

- Tactical communications
- Movement control
- Logistics sustainment
- Force HQ / Administration
- Personnel Support
- Mail / Tel / Internet

(f) National Command

- Strategic Communications
- Strategic Intelligence
- Joint / National Command

- Joint / National Coordination
- Coalition Liaison
- CIMIC

NOTE: It is emphasized that the above capabilities do not include all the capabilities resident in those functional areas.

When tasked by the government to contribute to reaching a desired end-state for a crisis or disaster, DND would tailor its contribution by first considering all the capabilities resident in the department. It would then choose only those capabilities considered necessary to integrate with the other government department packages to achieve the optimal all-of-government response.

SUMMARY

As noted in the introductory paragraphs, the realities of the Asia-Pacific region promise Canada a bright future as well as significant challenges. Much of our country's economic future is tied to the region. Canada should therefore seek to play a significant leadership role in it.

Unfortunately, a review of Canadian foreign policy reveals that while Canada wishes to become more involved, serious planning and resource shortfalls make it difficult to 'Walk the Talk.' In the face of an Asia-Pacific crisis or disaster, for example, Canada does not yet have a fully integrated all-of-government rapid response capability. As outlined in the previous section however, Canada could choose to develop one and to improve its chances significantly of becoming a leader and of influencing events in the region. The keys to doing so are organizational and practical in nature.

The Prime Minister must mandate the creation of an organization, permanent in nature, responsible for designing, staffing, equipping, exercising, and overseeing the deployment and employment of an all-of-government crisis response capability. A government 'Rubik's Cube' approach could serve as a means of identifying and combining various departmental capabilities.

Rapid and effective deployment of capabilities to the target area requires special equipment. Given that 70% of the world's population is within 100 km of a coastline, and that Canada borders on three oceans and has the longest coastline in the world, a sea-based expeditionary capability should be viewed as an essential national requirement. The United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Australia, Spain and Italy have invested in such a concept through the purchase of commercially built amphibious ships that are far less expensive than modern warships; are manned with but a fraction of a warship's complement; and are readily available. Canada must likewise develop an amphibious expeditionary capability. Without it, we will not be able to rapidly deploy our national crisis response capabilities to the Asia-Pacific region or to littoral sectors of our own country.

Ken Summers, a retired Rear-Admiral, served 37 years in the Canadian military with much of the last half of his career in positions of command, and most notably as Commander CF Middle East during the 1990 Gulf War. Since retirement he has remained current with Canadian and NATO military issues and is frequently featured as a military analyst with the CBC. Ken has made frequent trips to Afghanistan and has written and spoken on that conflict. He remains very active in several organizations including serving on the Board of Directors of the Conference of Defence Associations Institute. He serves on the National Executive of The Naval Officers Association of Canada, as well as being President of NOAVI.



The wardroom



View from the Bridge

Ray Zuliani
National President
rzuliani@shaw.ca



Front Desk

Richard Archer
Executive Director
noacexecdir@msn.com

HERE IT IS and we are starting into the fall with a renewed sense of enthusiasm. As a result of the Québec AGM we have established a Renewal Committee under the chairmanship of the National President to prepare a Strategic Business Plan for presentation at the 2009 AGM.

With many thanks to the hard work of Richard Archer, and input from the Renewal Committee membership, we are on track and focusing on NOAC Renewal. The branch presidents and national directors have been in the loop during the planning process, and I trust have been consulting with their respective memberships to make sure we have the broadest possible input. I look forward to working with this committee in order to be prepared to present a progress report at the 2009 AGM.

I will be meeting with the CMS later this fall to continue the building of a closer partnership between the Navy and NOAC. This meeting will help clarify the focus of our Renewal Committee work. The importance of the Renewal Committee cannot be understated. I would personally like to thank all of those who are contributing input, and would encourage all members to work through their Branch President to get their voices heard.

Speaking of AGMs, Bob McIlwaine has informed us that the plans for the full AGM in Vancouver for 2009 are well under way. This promises to be a very important point in our planning for the way ahead, and I would encourage as many as is possible to attend.

The planning for the 2010 AGM in Halifax has begun in earnest, and by reports from Gord Edwards they are in the initial planning stages of what promises to be a wonderful occasion.

Andy Irwin of Toronto is spearheading a National essay writing contest for high school students as a Naval Centennial project for which the NOAC is a strong supporter. The Endowment Fund is supporting this endeavour as it fits well with the mandate of the fund.

The fall fund raising campaign is soon to be under way for the Endowment Fund. I would remind you that we have set as a goal for 2010 to have increased the principle of this fund to \$500,000 as a Centennial project.

When planning your charitable donations this year, I would encourage you to place the Endowment Fund on your priority list. By achieving our goal we will be able to generate gifts of \$25,000 annually for projects near and dear to all our hearts.

Yours aye,

Ray

GREETINGS FROM THE HEAD OFFICE in Ottawa! The summer is over, the trees are losing their brilliant colours and it's time to think of getting the snow blower ready.

Your NOAC Renewal Committee is gearing itself up for a blitz on the development of the Strategic Business Plan. As I'm sure you're aware, the Plan is intended to implement the 40-odd recommendations found in the Fowler Report that was presented at the Board of Directors meeting and AGM in Québec City. We had asked Cdr. Russ Fowler to study and report on why our NOAC membership is steadily declining, and what we can do about it. The resulting Plan is due to be tabled for approval at the Vancouver AGM meetings in May 2009, but it looks like the Committee will have a first complete draft ready before the end of the year. We'll be trying to organize a face-to-face meeting of the Committee sometime in January.

If you're interested in how the plan looks at the moment, speak to your Branch Committee representative; i.e., your Branch President or National Director.

Something I can mention here is that when it comes to the need to improve NOAC's perceived relevance in the eyes of prospective members (and maybe the eyes of current members, for that matter), the Committee is settling on an organization supported by three equal and mutually-reinforcing pillars:

- ◆ The social camaraderie derived from maritime service to one's country.
- ◆ The acknowledgement and preservation of Canada's maritime heritage.
- ◆ The education of the Canadian public and government on the merits of a capable and robust naval service.

Now, these are grand-sounding goals. The trick will be to convert at least the first two into practical grassroots activities at the branch level. The third one will likely be led from the centre, NOAC National. Your Renewal Committee is working hard to develop the Plan for member approval, to make these pillars over into reality.

And speaking of the Vancouver AGM, see Bob McIlwaine's piece which follows this column regarding preliminary planning. We're looking for representation from *all* branches and a record turnout, especially in light of the crucial nature of the meetings for determining NOAC's future. Early planning and hotel booking on your part is essential. See you there!



2009 NOAC Conference Vancouver

Bob McIlwaine

The 2009 Conference will be hosted by NOABC, celebrating its 90th anniversary, and will take place at Lonsdale Quay in North Vancouver, BC, from 28 to 31 May.

The conference hotel is the Lonsdale Quay Hotel, <http://www.lonsdalequayhotel.com>. The rates are as follows: Standard: \$129 single / \$139 double occupancy; Jr. Suite: \$159 single / \$169 double; Executive: \$189 single / \$199 double. All rates are subject to applicable taxes. Block booking has been arranged under the Naval Officers Association of Canada and can be made by calling 1-800-836-6111 or 604-986-6111, or email to sales@lonsdalequayhotel.com. Do not book through the hotel's web site. The preliminary program follows:

DELEGATES

Thur. 28 May:

Executive Meeting
National Board of Directors Meeting
Registration
Host President's Reception

Fri. 29 May:

Registration
Seminar BCIT Marine Campus Topic TBA
Simulator Demo, BCIT Marine Campus
Dinner Cruise

Sat. 30 May:

64th Annual General Meeting
Nat. Pres. Formal Reception & Dinner

Sun. 31 May:

National Board of Directors Meeting
Up Spirits & Farewell Brunch

PARTNERS

Registration
Host President's Reception

Registration
TBA

Dinner Cruise

Nat. Pres. Formal Rec. & Dinner

Up Spirits & Farewell Brunch

Further details & updates on NOABC Website: <http://www.noabc.com> or call Bob McIlwaine in Vancouver at 604-270-6387 during workdays.

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The editor reserves the right to edit material for space and/or content.

✉ COMMANDING RESERVES

In a recent issue of Toronto Branch BUMPH, it is noted the new Commanding Officer of "their" HMCS *Toronto*, Commander Al Grant, at one stage in his career progression commanded the Reserve Division in Montréal, HMCS *Donnacona* between 2001 and 2004. This, if I may say so, is one of the most important and encouraging appointments for a Regular Force officer in the naval stream that has been seen. I hope it will continue.

Cdr. Grant has, in the normal course, served in various ships as a watchkeeper, operations room and combat officer, XO of *Athabaskan*, in various staff and War College courses in Canada and the US. In addition, he has an MSc in Oceanography and Acoustics.

But very few such officers have the opportunity to serve directly with a Reserve Division. In times long past (one hopes) the appointment as the Reg Force Staff Officer to a Reserve Division was considered by many to be a real backwater, even a punishment for some misdemeanour, or "red-lined" S-206 entry.

And yet these Reserves, in an emergency will, as in the last world war and Korea, make up a majority of the Navy's personnel. They are the face of the Navy before the public across the nation except in the coastal cities; the Navy's PR front line if it wants acceptance, politically and socially. In recent years those Reserves have taken on full niche responsibilities—NCS, MCDV, clearance diving, etc.—and are indeed, as many maritime commanders have noted, part of the "One Force" concept.

It has long been felt by this writer that **every** young officer on an upward progression should have on his or her record at least one period of service directly with the Reserves, or possibly as an Area Officer Sea Cadets. Without that first hand acquaintance with these forces, their background training should be considered less than complete.

Good on the Navy for having given Cdr. Grant the opportunity to see first hand who these "Volunteers for Sea Service" really are, and how they think. The Army has done it on several occasions, and it may only have occurred because no local Reserve was qualified to be CO, but it is a vital step in integrating those Reserves into the Force.

Fraser McKee, Toronto Branch

✉ TWO NAVAL COLLEGES IN CANADA

("Two naval colleges in Canada?" R. A. F. Montgomery, Vol. VII, No. 43, Summer 2008, 'Starshell,' p.15.)

What's in a name? I have read historical articles before which regrettably, made no mention of the third RCN college, the "Venture Officer Training Plan" (in HMCS *Venture*, Dockyard, Esquimalt, BC). From 1954 to the mid-1960s (when the onset of "Unification" changed so much in the military) the two year "Venture Plan" was very



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OUR SINCERE THANKS FOR YOUR CONTINUING SUPPORT!



Mail Call...

CONTINUED FROM PAGE 9

similar to the description given by Montgomery for the RCN College 1942-1947. He says: "classes of about fifty-five Naval Cadets aged 17 were recruited for a two-year course which covered both academic subjects and professional naval subjects. The course year for each of the two years commenced about mid-August and ran to the following first week in July." That description is virtually the same for the "Venture Plan," though intake numbers changed from year to year (78 in my year), and also "Venture" added winter cruises in the cruiser *Ontario* to 1958, then in frigates from 1959 onward, for at-sea naval indoctrination and training. Further, while Junior Matriculation was the minimum entry standard, many of the cadets joined with Senior Matriculation.

The first commanding officer of "Venture" was Capt. R. P. Welland (currently a member of NOAVI, RAdm. Ret'd.).

The "Venture Plan" rescued the Navy from a serious officer shortfall when the new DDEs of the late-1950s and early 1960s were introduced to the fleet. Also, the very major acquisition of Tracker and Banshee aircraft, to partner with our new carrier *Bonaventure*, required a rapid increase in the Aviator (Pilot) Cadre from the late 1950s onward, a significant portion of whom came through the "Venture Plan" (also to fly the expanded helicopter fleet—Sea Kings came in 1963).

Why is the "Venture Plan" overlooked so often? Is there a hint of elitism at play here, or simply a case of selective amnesia? I remember as a Cadet how it was whispered that most of us were not expected to rise above the rank of Lieutenant-Commander. How short sighted of that view!

At least two graduates (fleet officers) rose to the rank of Vice-Admiral (Thomas and Cairns), and numerous others achieved senior rank up to Rear-Admiral. Unification had a great impact on Naval Aviators, as those who chose to continue a flying career became Air Force officers, many becoming Squadron and Base Commanders at the Lieutenant-Colonel and Colonel level. At least one achieved Brigadier-General rank.

I do believe it's time to place the "Venture Officer Training Plan" in its true place in naval history. If it looks like a college, smells like a college, and acts like a college, then it must be a college!

I suggest it is timely to include the published history of the "Venture Plan" in an issue of *Starshell*, as researched and produced by Dr. Wilf Lund, PhD, Captain Ret'd, a "Venture Plan" graduate and member of NOAVI.

Stanley W. Brygadyr, NOAVI (Chief Cadet Captain 1958-59)

✉ CGS CANADA

("Our Cover," Vol. VII, No. 43, Summer 2008, 'Starshell,' p.2, re: front cover illustration by F. R. 'Hamish' Berchem.)

Should there be a hue and cry regarding the picture of *CGS Canada*, readers should be aware that the prefix stands for "Canadian Government Ship," not "Coast Guard Ship." The CCG was not created until 1962 (ref: <http://www.ccg-gcc.gc/eng/CCG/History>). When built she came under the control of the Department of Marine and Fisheries, now the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, also affectionately known as the "Dept. of Fish and Ships."

James Salt, Ottawa Branch

✉ WRENS UNIFORM REQUIREMENT

The CFB Equimalt Naval & Military Museum requires the donation of a World War II era uniform of the Women's Royal Canadian Naval Service, the Wrens, for a display celebrating the accomplishments of that celebrated component of the RCN. Single items from which a full uniform could be assembled would be most welcome. Rank and branch badges, as well as accoutrements, are also required.

Please contact the museum's administrator, Clare Sugrue, at Sugrue.CE@forces.gc.ca, or 250-363-4312 if you can be of assistance.

Dr. Wilf Lund, NOAVI

✉ PAT NIXON – RIP

Like most of us, it was sad and the further end of an era, to see Captain Pat Nixon's obituary in August.

When I was editor of *Starshell* an age ago, the matter of the loss of HMCS *Skeena* in Iceland in October 1944 came up. So I contacted Pat Nixon who had been there in command of HMCS *Chaudière*, and asked him for an article on the events that night from his perspective. This he provided; a detailed description of the storm and what had gone on. But he was highly critical of *Skeena's* CO, Pat Russell — the way he had anchored and reacted to the storm; in effect, his seamanship. I had met Russell a few times and felt he was a very fine person. He was then still alive, and I really felt I couldn't place the article, and hesitated to return it to Captain Nixon, who I really didn't know, for 'amendments.'

Quite understandably, Pat Nixon was most annoyed at me and told me so a couple of times, rather resenting the effort I had put him to, and then not used the result. We eventually were able to meet a few times at events without rancour. Editorial privilege was stretched a bit too far maybe, I admit.

Pat Russell had three serious problems that stormy October afternoon, the first probably the primary one. His Group Senior Officer was 'Chummy' Prentice, and one did not argue easily with Prentice, considered by most to be an expert in all phases of destroyer (and corvette!) seamanship. He had ordered the group to go off to Videy Island and anchor. *Skeena*, like *Saguenay*, had only a center line capstan, which meant he could only work one anchor at a time. The first could only be dropped underfoot, the cable broken and secured, and the second worked on the capstan—a not very safe practice. And the bottom was a silty volcanic soil, poor holding. The navigator, Lt. Peter Chance, voiced

Schober's Quiz #44

By George S. Schober

In early July 1927, a Royal Navy cruiser put to sea under rather unusual orders: she was to blow up another RN cruiser, her erstwhile flagship. This was not an exercise, nor some kind of test on an obsolete, expendable ship.

QUESTION:

What was the name of the ship sailing on this unusual mission?

Answers on page 22

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his objection to anchoring there for just the last two reasons, but Russell elected to stay.

In hindsight, Russell maybe should have stood out to sea, which Skeena almost certainly would have survived, but he declined to tell 'Chummy' he wasn't going to obey his order to anchor.

An interesting couple of lessons — in Senior Officer relationships and editorial privilege. No doubt my successor editors have faced similar unhappy choices.

Fraser McKee, Toronto Branch

✉ PLEASE CHECK THOSE CAP TALLIES

The Naval Museum of Alberta (currently involved in moving into its brand new quarters) is revising their cap tally collection, and is wondering whether anyone could provide tallies for the following ships: *Micmac*, *Nootka*, *Algonquin*, *Huron*, *Port Quebec* or *Winnipeg*.

If so, please contact me at captrabbit@shaw.ca.

Bill Wilson, Calgary Branch

✉ SCHOBER'S QUIZ #43

(*Schober's Quiz #43*, Vol. VII, No. 43, Summer 2008, 'Starshell,' p.9.)

As soon as I saw George Schober's photograph on p.9 of the Summer *Starshell*, I thought ... "I know who that is (for a change)!" But on checking, I was wrong — of course. I had never heard of the ship in the bushes, and then noted he said it was a cruiser.

But I have an aerial photo that is similar, only on a much smaller scale, this time of an ex-Canadian warship, the *Fairmile ML Q080*. She too lies in the bushes, but off the La Plata River in Argentina, in her case abandoned there by her last owners who are not identified.



Built by J. J. Taylor & Sons of Toronto and commissioned in June 1942, she spent the war on the East Coast and at Gaspé on St. Lawrence River convoy escort patrols. She was sold in October 1945 to a New York boat broker and converted to a pleasure yacht in Toronto for H. B. Prior of Larchmont, New York, as his *Quarterdeck*. Later sold to a Nassau trading company and registered for fishing as the *Almeta Queen*, she was sold again for Panamanian registry as *Cosa Grande*, and as of 1954 was owned by a D. H. Bramar of Port O'Connor, Texas. I have no further record of changes, and she ended her days under that

name much later. The location is described as "In Lujan and Abra Vieja, at Parana."

Fraser McKee, Toronto Branch

✉ DO YOU REMEMBER LCDR JOHN QUINN?

A long time ago my father, LCdr. (G) John Quinn, was killed in HMCS *Iroquois* with three other men. Would anyone remember him, and could they please tell me anything about him? I was all of three years old when this happened (October 1952) so my memories of my father are very few. Could anyone put me in touch with any of the crew (or others) who knew him? If so, please contact me direct at 7970 Upper 146th St. West, Apple Valley, Minnesota, USA, 55124, telephone (business) 651-962-2408 or email charles.quinn@usbank.com.

Charles Quinn

(For the record, *Iroquois* was shelling shore targets in Korea when, as we understand, a shell from a North Korean shore battery struck 'B' gun directly below the bridge killing four of the ship's crew, including LCdr. Quinn.)

In brief



The Naval Documentation Preservation and Research Centre

Photo courtesy Kasian Architecture and Roy Ooms



The new Naval Museum of Alberta at night.

At the opening of the relocated and expanded Naval Museum of Alberta (NMA), a constituent museum of the new Naval Museum of Canada on October 16, 2008, LCdr. Graeme Arbuckle, Maritime Staff Heritage Officer, formally announced that the Naval Documentation Preservation and Research Centre would be co-located with the NMA in the new Military Museums facility in Calgary. It is intended to consolidate and protect the contributions of personal documents and papers of individuals and families of former members of the Royal Canadian Navy and its successor.

In the past, it has been difficult to properly maintain and provide access to donations of personal papers from individuals who have witnessed the history of the Canadian Navy 'as it happened.' This new naval archive is being established in order to ensure that invaluable documents and papers such as personal journals, are not lost through the passage of time; that important collections remain undivided as they are preserved for posterity; and that their contents are made available for review and research both in Calgary and on the world wide web.

The first collection to be received will be that of Vice-Admiral Ralph Hennessy, followed shortly by the family archive of Vice-Admiral Nigel Brodeur — a collection that chronicles the three generations of his family's involvement with the Naval Service of Canada.

The University of Calgary military and naval library and archives, supporting the Centre for Military & Strategic Studies, is equipped with state-of-the-art environmental controls, and an agreement has been reached to accommodate the archival collection of Maritime Command in their new facility. The NMA and the University library are co-located in the tri-service museum complex which will be officially opened early next year. "The Military Museums" in Calgary will be the largest armed forces museum in Canada. The creation of the Naval Documentation Preservation & Research Centre coincides with the creation of the "Naval Museum of Canada." This single museum will bring the current museums located in Halifax, Québec City, Winnipeg, Calgary and Esquimalt under one authority. With improved communication and coordination, the Naval Museum of Canada will better serve those interested in learning about the history and heritage of the navy that has served Canada faithfully and dependably since 1910.

Bill Wilson, NOAC Calgary

UNTDs join NOAC in Québec City

(Editor's Note – Regrettably, this item was not received in time for the summer issue of 'Starshell' which reported on our AGM in Québec City held from 28 May to 1 June. The following was originally published in the fall edition of the UNTD Association's 'Newsletter' and is reprinted here with their editor's permission.)

As we did in Hamilton in 2006, UNTDs made their presence known in Québec at the end of May. More than forty UNTDs and partners were given a warm welcome and high profile by Pierre Houle, Jean-Claude Michaud and Pierre Dudemaine, who arranged for special name tags, transport and tables, as well as a registration desk and space for the sale of our last remaining regalia.

Following the President's reception on the Thursday evening, 'UNTidies' were bused down to the harbour for a tour of the Naval Museum, followed by a meet and greet at the Reserve Naval Headquarters Wardroom. Unfortunately the planned visit by Commodore Bennett and the CO was pre-empted by a last minute request from political dignitaries for a tour of HMCS *Protecteur*, one of five naval vessels in Québec for the "Naval Days" portion of the 400th anniversary events (see photos at <http://www.untd.org>).

On Friday, partners enjoyed a bus tour and luncheon on Isle d'Orleans, while we sailors engaged in a four part seminar on the effect of global warming on the Canadian Arctic — and its implications for the Navy who currently have neither ice-strengthened ships, nor officers trained in ice navigation. The day concluded with a catamaran cruise to Isle d'Orleans for dinner at Le Moulin de Saint-Laurent.

On Saturday, while NOAC members held their AGM, UNTDs and partners toured the historic fortifications of Québec before we all joined together for the National President's Reception and Dinner at the Château Laurier.

The formal reunion ended with 'Up Spirits' and brunch on the Sunday morning, but many stayed on to enjoy the hospitality and festivities of Québec's 400th anniversary. This included the sail-past of visiting ships. The returning salute for the sail-past was made from the guns of the Citadel, where the Governor General and Provincial Lieutenant

Governor were in residence.

In a change from recent traditions, the NOAC opted to make every AGM a programmed reunion. That came as a surprise to the Vancouver delegates who are hosting the event in 2009. On the other hand it was welcome news indeed for the UNTDs — who, as it is widely recognized, are always up for a party.

The Rev. Canon Bill Thomas, President, UNTD Association

Navy League Scholarships awarded



TOP – L to R: Ken Summers, President NOAVI, Sea Cadet Tarpan Roy and Gary Garnett, President, Navy League of Canada.

BOTTOM – L to R: David Hood of the Navy League, Sea Cadet Jamie Bone and Bob McIlwaine, President NOABC.

The Navy League of Canada's Maritime Affairs Scholarships (\$2000) are funded through the Maritime Affairs Alliance, a group of individuals and corporations that sponsors the public education activities of the NL of Canada. The Naval Officers Association of Canada is the largest contributor to the scholarship program, having donated \$11,500 over the past five years. In addition to this national award, the various branches of the NOAC remain strong supporters of local cadet activities. Each year they provide thousands of dollars for local scholarships and toward local training programs for both the Royal Canadian Sea Cadets and Navy League Cadets.

The Navy League of Canada



Add a little COLOUR to your life!

Starshell is now available in PDF format in full living COLOUR well ahead of the bulk-mailed black and white printed versions. To register for the PDF version in lieu of the printed issue — thus saving printing and mailing costs — please contact the Executive Director Richard Archer at noacexdir@msn.com today.

Navy Monument announced

The National Capital Commission's board decided on September 23rd that a \$2-million monument paying tribute to the Canadian Navy is to be erected in Ottawa in 2010. The monument is to be funded by the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces. It will also mark the 100th anniversary of the Navy, and will be comparable in size to the downtown Ottawa Peacekeeping Monument or the Canadian Firefighters Memorial at LeBreton Flats. Seven federally-owned sites have been identified as possible locations for the monument, including Dow's Lake, but a decision on the location and more details on the design competition will not be finalized until November 2008.

The Ottawa Citizen

Onondaga departs Halifax for last time

Serge Guay / Maple Leaf



Onondaga is towed by the tug Jerry Newberry to her permanent berth at Rimouski, Québec.

The former HMCS *Onondaga* quietly slipped a jetty in Halifax Harbour on July 11th and began the journey to her permanent berth at Site Historique Maritime de la Pointe-au-Père in Rimouski, Québec. A highly trained slipping party of CPO2 Robert Arbour, PO2 Michael Fines and LCdr. Marc Pallard tended the lines and landed the bow. As the boat is no longer capable of steaming under her own power, she was towed approximately 560 km. Commissioned in 1967 and active until 2000, the boat will be preserved as Canada's first submarine museum. The Pointe-au-Père facility will ensure the safekeeping of the boat, and show the public what life in one of these vessels was like. The sub was dry-docked in August with modifications being made for interpretation, access and security. The exhibit is expected to be ready for opening to the public in the summer of 2009. Once it is solidly on dry land, access doors will be cut into the forward and after torpedo rooms to allow for easy access of museum visitors. A gallant warrior of the Cold War, *Onondaga* silently served Canada below the waves for decades. Through the efforts of Site Historique Maritime, the history of

the Canadian Oberon-class submarines, and the submariners who served in them, will be preserved for future generations.

Darlene Blakely, The Maple Leaf

Sacrifice Medal receives Royal approval

The recently approved Sacrifice Medal will occupy a new place in the Canadian Honours system, recognizing the contributions and sacrifices made both by CF personnel and by those who work alongside our troops. Governor General and Commander-in-Chief of Canada, Michaëlle Jean announced Royal approval of the creation of the medal on August 29th. The medal will be awarded to those who are injured or die as a direct result of hostile action. Injuries must be serious enough to require treatment by a medical officer, and the treatment must be recorded. CF personnel and the people working alongside them who are injured or killed in friendly fire incidents, and those who experience operational stress injuries which are the direct result of hostile action, will also be eligible for the Sacrifice Medal. Individuals who are injured or die as a result of accidents, even those happening in-theatre, will not be eligible, nor will individuals who receive minor wounds that are treated by a platoon medic.



While the Wound Stripe was considered a suitable dress distinction in the past, the Sacrifice Medal will afford recognition in a more formal and lasting way as an honour from the Crown. Eligibility for the medal dates from October 7, 2001, the beginning of Canadian involvement in the campaign against terrorism. General distribution of the medal will begin this autumn, with priority given to posthumous awards. Individuals who receive the Sacrifice Medal and who subsequently meet the criteria for a further incident will be awarded a bar.

The Maple Leaf

Korean junket

Dr. Jim Kirkpatrick of Winnipeg Branch was chosen to represent NOAC National on the Veteran's Affairs sponsored trip to Korea to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the Korean armistice. As part of the full delegation, Jim, accompanied by his wife Genevieve, took part in the Korean Armistice commemoration activities from July 7 to 16, 2008.

It was my expectation, and Jim's, that this fall he would make a presentation to the Winnipeg Branch and provide *Starshell* with an account of his experience. Unfortunately, Dr. Kirkpatrick was recently admitted to hospital preventing either from happening.


Genevieve describes their time in Korea as "absolutely awesome" and has nothing but the highest praise for everyone who was involved in the planning and execution of the trip. She states that it was a wonderful experience for Jim and, for her, the most incredible experience of her life. She says that all those accompanying the Canadian veterans, from organizers to medical team, performed to the highest level of proficiency with great kindness and courtesy. Genevieve is determined that a full report with pictures will be made to the Branch; if not by Jim then by herself. Hopefully Jim will be able to take part in the planning, and perhaps the presentation of that report. It is also my hope that we may be able to provide something for *Starshell* at a later date.

Chris Thain, President, Winnipeg Branch

Broadsides!

Minority government action...

Canadian maritime defence and security issues



By Fred R. Fowlow

A new set of domestic challenges that might confront Canada's newly elected minority government could negatively impact on the funding of projects shown in the *Canadian Forces Defence Strategy* (CFDS). Should this happen, the building of a state-of-the-art military would endanger the Canadian Forces' (CF) capability to respond to one or more of the six core missions set out in the CFDS, namely:

- (1) *Conduct daily domestic and continental operations including in the Arctic and through NORAD.*
- (2) *Support a major international event in Canada, such as the 2010 Winter Olympics.*
- (3) *Respond to a major terrorist attack.*
- (4) *Support civilian authorities during a crisis in Canada such as a natural disaster.*
- (5) *Lead and/or conduct a major international operation over an extended period of time.*
- (6) *Deploy forces in response to a crisis somewhere in the world.*

Accepting the six core missions as future missions for the CF dictates that the newly-elected minority Conservative government must hold fast to the theory that in the immediate future, the CF will need to be a fully integrated, flexible, multi-role and combat-capable force. Clearly, the new government must make good on the promises it set out in the CFDS plan it announced when it was elected as a minority government in 2006. A challenging task because little if any debate concerning the defence and security of our country took place during the most recent election campaign, when all parties showed slight if any interest, and little if any concern about rectifying the shortcomings of the Canadian Forces, never mind demonstrating in the least, any understanding of the importance or significance of the CFDS plan. Not unusual, because few MPs have ever made a meaningful contribution to any discussion concerning Canada's contribution to international military deployments or North America's continental defence and security, including the security and sovereignty of our Arctic territory.

The course of action recommended to be taken by the newly-elected Conservative minority is that, when defence and foreign policy issues are discussed by the government, partisan politics must be set aside with a view to ensuring national interests take precedence, especially when discussing matters related to the CF's readiness, relevance and responsibility. Which is to say, the time has arrived when all parliamen-

tarians must develop an intelligent understanding of the importance of building a new defence and foreign policy founded on the principle the CF must be rebuilt to the point where it is an effective and efficient military ready to respond to the six core missions set out in the CFDS plan.

Recognition *must* be given to the importance of having an improved Coast Guard, RCMP and Canadian military presence in our northern territories, with special emphasis on the fact that in recent years the situation in the Arctic has changed dramatically. For example, Russian's National Security Council recently held a symbolic gathering at a military base less than 600 miles from the pole, at which time their security secretary Nikolai Petrushev declared: "the Arctic must become Russia's main strategic resource base." A challenging statement coming at a time when, "Russians are staking out the Arctic, building their case for control of the lion's share of a resource-rich Arctic." It is a given that, "after more than a century of Arctic neglect by governments of all Canadian parties, Canada is not well prepared to protect their north, whether it is defending its Arctic claims at UN-sponsored negotiations with other polar nations, especially Russia starting in 2013, or realistically admitting what we cannot control, let alone defending our sovereignty in the north should it be violated."¹

It is obvious that social and other government programmes, along with the increasing cost of the diversion of defence funds to satisfy demands for equipping the army for their operations in Afghanistan, are issues that account for government funding problems. Defenders of the Afghan war funding have stated there has been no reason to worry about the CF funding problem, because funding army operations in Afghanistan came at a time when the navy was in the best shape of Canada's three services because it had a balanced inventory of modern equipment. This statement was, and is still, challenged. Examination of a National Defence document entitled *Your Fleet - In transition Between Today and Tomorrow*, describes in detail the status of the navy's fleet, stating the expected service of the three Trump'ed destroyers ends in 2015; the end of frigate service life in 2020, following a modernization programme; the end of service life for our two replenishment ships (AORs) in 2012; and, the ill-fated submarine fleet is optimistically expected to be fully operational by 2010, with their mid-life taking place around 2018. Nothing will likely happen regarding the Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ships (A/OPS) until at least 2015. The concern expressed by many is that by 2015 (if not sooner), the impact of global warming will be well advanced in Canada's Arctic. There is increasing evidence the



melting of our Arctic territorial waters, and the consequential opening of the Northwest Passage for a longer period in a calendar year, demands that Canada should have:

- (i) *an increasing number of go-anywhere icebreakers and A/OPS operating in the Arctic;*
- (ii) *some form of arrangement that would ensure foreign vessels report their planned presence before entering Canadian waters;*
- (iii) *a network of underwater listening devices to detect ship movements in sensitive areas;*
- (iv) *Coast Guard ships equipped to deal with pollution emergencies;*
- (v) *extended radar coverage for Canadian air space to the pole;*
- (vi) *more long-range patrol aircraft; and,*
- (vii) *expanded search and rescue capacity as Arctic traffic increases.*

In the next sitting of the House of Commons, all Members of Parliament, regardless of their political stripe, should remember the importance of Canada's Arctic, and take note of Stephen Harper's statement that, "Canada must use the Arctic, or lose it."²

For decades, Canada's military leaders have been caught in the cross-fire between politicians representing all parties in the House of Commons, especially when they were at loggerheads regarding funding for the CF. The disagreements over CF funding have impacted upon funding for all three services, and along with ill-defined defence, security and foreign policies, has accounted for the CF lacking a wide-range of capabilities because of shortfalls in the inventory of military vehicles, naval ships, transport aircraft — and an area that is often overlooked — large units of young, well-trained personnel.³ The shortfalls prompt the conclusion that the resultant inflexibility of the CF calls for serious revamping of an inept and underfunded procurement system.⁴

Keeping in mind that a long period passes between the time ship acquisition is identified, the statement of requirements, completion of ship design, and funding is set aside for the award of a contract to a Canadian shipbuilder,⁵ there is an important caveat to be mentioned should the government decide to take action to approve funding for a major shipbuilding programme for new surface destroyer or frigate type ships, plus the A/OPS, in the immediate future. Notwithstanding glowing capability reports offered by DND officials and the shipbuilding industry, one concludes that barring careful defence procurement planning spread over a period of 20+ years, the shipbuilding industry might be hard-pressed to provide all that is needed to handle a sudden influx of navy and coast guard shipbuilding contracts.

In the meantime, if the global warming situation continues to accelerate the melting of ice in our Arctic waters, and if the Northwest Passage is ice-free sooner and for a longer period in a calendar year than forecasted, these changes will call for the A/OPS and new icebreaker(s) to be constructed and delivered before the expected delivery dates shown in the government's *Fleet in Transition* document. The issue becomes more than confusing when we recall the cancellation of plans to purchase replenishment ships for the navy and new patrol vessels for the coast guard. The rejection of the bids for the Joint Supply Ship project, because they too were significantly over the established budget for the shipbuilding programme, as well as the cancellation of the proposed \$750-million project to purchase twelve mid-shore patrol vessels for the coast guard when the bids exceeded the anticipated costs.⁶

It came as no surprise the government got an earful when Atlantic

province premiers, reacting to a rumour that the high costs associated with the construction of Canadian warships in Canada, prompted consideration to be given to awarding navy contracts to overseas builders. It was suggested that Defence Minister Peter MacKay and Jim Prentice felt that "maybe the Joint Support Ships could be built offshore, since Canadian yards can't seem to do the job within budget."⁷

Canadians will usually prefer to see a strong Canadian shipbuilding industry survive in Canada. Reasons for this are obvious. If our shipbuilding industry can build a quality product with first-class performance at a reasonable price, with no over-budget costs, meeting deadlines without strikes, then we should award the contract for building the navy and coast guard ships to a Canadian shipbuilder. If, however, for political and funding reasons we end up purchasing ships at a higher price than Canada could acquire elsewhere on the world market, then the government must give the matter serious second thought, taking into consideration the fact that for decades, we have purchased aircraft, trucks and helicopters from foreign countries. It should also ask why other nations such as Australia, New Zealand and even Russia purchase ships from foreign shipyards. In the final analysis, our federal government has an obligation to get the best value it can for the Canadian tax dollar.⁸

An important question remains — if our government decides to move ahead with the coast guard and navy vessel purchases (including a replacement for the AORs), concurrent with continuing the work on the submarine and frigate refits — will there be sufficient capacity remaining in the Canadian shipbuilding industry for new keel-laying work?

One speculates that the CF supports the need for a new and preferably nonpartisan approach to the development of defence, security, sovereignty and foreign policy. At this writing it is clear the time has arrived when MPs stop playing 'gotcha' politics with defence and foreign policy issues, which means it must take a positive step to "develop the expertise parliamentarians need if they are to comment intelligently on the CF's roles, equipment and personnel needs, and budgets."⁹ Bipartisan debate, without the usual disgraceful question period and committee hearing behaviour, would hopefully achieve this by "bringing together members of all parties to hear from knowledgeable military figures, scholars and industrialists; a move that would over time, create a group of informed parliamentarians who could improve defence expertise in government, benefit the CF, and be "long steps toward national maturity."¹⁰

The new minority government must restart the procurement process for the Joint Support Ships and patrol vessels for the Coast Guard. These acquisitions will allow our maritime forces to maintain a high state of capability for covering a wide range of missions, including disaster relief and humanitarian aid, both on the domestic and international scenes, as the need arises.

¹ Editorial, "Turn focus to the Arctic, not puffins," *Calgary Herald*, 5 Oct. 2008.

² *ibid.*

³ Douglas Bland, "Maybe we should just stay home," *Ottawa Citizen*, 2 Oct. 2008.

⁴ *ibid.*

⁵ The Ruxted Group, "Far Distant Ships: Looking at the Future of Canada's Navy," www.ruxted.ca, 24 Sept. 2007.

⁶ David Pugliese, "Federal government cancels 'key priority' ship contract," *Canwest News Service*, 22 Aug. 2008.

⁷ David Pugliese, "Designate specific shipyards to build warships," *Ottawa Citizen*, 2 Oct. 2008.

⁸ *ibid.* endnote 7.

⁹ Dr. J. L. Granatstein, "We need bipartisan policy," *Globe & Mail*, 17 July 2008.

¹⁰ *ibid.* endnote 9.



Days of Endeavour

Selected excerpts from the memoirs of
Captain Godfrey H. 'Skinny' Hayes, RCN

Part Four ~ The Balloon Goes Up

In Part Three of 'Days of Endeavour' which appeared in the Summer 2008 edition of 'Starshell,' 'Skinny' was placed on the active list of the RNR and drafted to the Armed Boarding Vessel KING ORRY. We now join him as he commences survivor leave in England following the loss of KING ORRY on 30 May 1940, after being bombed by German aircraft during the evacuation of Dunkirk. Ed.

DUNKIRK AND THE CHANNEL (Continued)

ONE OF THE LITTLE VIGNETTES that sticks in my memory about this whole experience concerns the final stages of our trip back to Liverpool [following the loss of *King Orry*]. We were on a bus from the railway station in Liverpool out to Waterloo where the Marsdens lived and where Pam waited. Darkness had fallen at the end of a long day, following many long days and a long week. As the bus bobbed and weaved its way out of Liverpool we sat there too tired to chat, when I suddenly heard the unmistakable whine of a falling bomb. I gritted my teeth and waited for the explosion. It never came, but a second falling bomb noise did. I waited for that explosion and didn't hear that one either. It crossed my mind that no one else had apparently heard it because there was no reaction that I could see amongst the other passengers on the bus. When it happened a third time, and this time even closer with still no reaction from the bus load at large, I stole a look at my companion to see if he was reacting. I found him stealing a look at me! Still no reaction from anyone else. After exchanging remarks like, "Did you hear that?," and, "Wonder where that hit?," it suddenly dawned on us that we were hearing the whine of the bus's transmission as the driver changed gears. Talk about being tensed up!

The weather that summer of 1940 in England was superb. Hot and sunny for weeks on end. After my initial stay with the Marsdens while awaiting my first appointment in the Navy, 18 Norma Road had somehow become my home in England. Their son John (Jamo) was away in the Army and there was lots of room. Pam and I were becoming very close and the Marsden clan were experts at gathering in strays. My two weeks' leave after being sunk in *King Orry* at Dunkirk went very quickly amidst news stories of impending invasion and almost frantic preparations to repel any attack. I felt useless hanging around and not having a job or belonging to any unit. Once I had replenished my stock of uniforms, shaving kit and underwear, I was ready and anxious to return to duty. At the end of my survivor's leave, I was further in debt to Messrs. Gieves, and ordered to report to the Naval Officer-in-Charge [NOIC], Falmouth, Cornwall.

Cornwall is a lovely part of England, but very difficult to get to with-

out going through London. It took me all day in a train and I finally arrived quite late on the day appointed. I was so late that I finally officially reported to the NOIC's office the following morning. That probably saved my life! I found out much later that I had been destined to join a small converted yacht called *Zaza*. She had sailed the day before (the day I had been ordered to report), and was sunk with all hands a day or two later in the Irish Sea. I was not aware of this appointment until much later when my Admiralty Record of Service finally caught up with me and showed a cancelled appointment to *Zaza*. I remember hearing about *Zaza* at the time, because she was locally based and most of the staff knew her people. At any rate, I duly reported and was promptly sent for a medical on the basis that, having been sunk recently in a ship at Dunkirk, the authorities wanted to be sure that all was well before I went to another job. At age 21 I thought they were all nuts, so imagine my surprise when the doctor told me I had a heart murmur and some deafness in one ear, and sent me home again on another two weeks leave. In retrospect, I have decided that the second whack of leave was given me because, having missed joining *Zaza*, there was no other job for me at the moment.

After my second period of leave I reported back to the NOIC Falmouth and was allocated to the shipping control organisation as a Boarding Officer. The only job I can remember doing that was at all interesting, was boarding a French merchant ship that had been herded into the harbour when France fell into the hands of Germany, and taking possession of her in the name of the King. I don't remember the date but Britain took over a large part of the French Navy, and every merchant ship they could get their hands on at the same time, all over the world.

My appointment to Falmouth only lasted about a month, quite a bit of which was leave. It was obviously only a holding pattern because at the end of July I was told to report to the Admiral Commanding Southampton. By this time I had been promoted to the rank of Acting Sub-Lieutenant RNR. When I arrived in Southampton, I found myself one of a gaggle of eight Midshipmen, eight Sub-Lieutenants and eight Lieutenants, almost all of us Royal Naval Reserve, e.g., ex-Merchant Service officers. After a certain amount of milling around I found one old friend from *Conway* days, George Ogilvy, now a Midshipman. We were told to form ourselves into eight groups, each to consist of a Lieutenant, a Sub-Lieutenant and a Midshipman. George and I were clever enough to stick together and were adopted by a Lieutenant by the name of George Davies. We were then told that each group of three officers was going to pick a ship, each from the small boat pool in the harbour, to be fitted out to tow balloons through the Channel. None of us had any idea what the hell that all meant. It turned out that Winston Churchill,



by then Prime Minister, had the bright idea that the barrage balloons used ashore to try to keep the German bombers up high and thus impair their aim, might also achieve the same result if they could be attached to ships. We had been elected to find out whether it would work.

The boat pool in Southampton Harbour was full of boats and small ships of every description. The large majority of them had been commandeered to bring people across the Channel when the German Army overran Western Europe. There were pilot boats, tugs, cross-channel ferries, motor boats, sailboats, etc. My new captain, aided and abetted by Ogilvy and me, chose a small French cargo ship called *Gatinais*. She had been designed and used to transport cargo (mainly wine) direct between London and Paris through the French canal system. She was therefore, narrow and flat-bottomed. She had a counterbalanced mast forward which could be swung down to the deck when a bridge came along. Other crews from our group picked out a large ocean-going French tug, a Belgian pilot boat, a British Southern Railway ferry, and various other types of ships. Our crews consisted of men from the Fisherman's Reserve who were almost entirely North Sea trawlermen, not very well educated, but fine seamen with a great deal of experience in coastal waters. All the ships were commissioned and became 'HMS.'

While the ships were being fitted out with light machine guns and a winch, we were familiarising ourselves with *Gatinais* and how she ran. Our major problem in that area was the fact that all the plans of the ship and the signs and 'directions' on the equipment were in French. None of our engineering staff had any knowledge of that language, and in addition they were only experienced in fishing boats which had much smaller engines. For instance, none of them knew about air compressors, and compressed air was used to start and manoeuvre the main engine from ahead and astern. Both Ogilvy and I got involved trying to help them trace all the different systems (electrical, fresh water, compressed air, salt water cooling, etc.). By virtue of rank and seniority, I was appointed First Lieutenant (second in command), and George Ogilvy did everything else. The ship was armed with a 3-inch Hotchkiss gun forward, and two .333 calibre strip machine guns on the bridge. The .333 cartridges were clipped into metal strips about two feet long which had to be fed into the side of the gun by a human loader. We were issued the metal strips and the cartridges separately so we had to sit down and painstakingly load each strip by hand. It took about five seconds to fire a complete strip, so we had to have a large number of loaded strips ready for action. The first time we fired these guns in practice we realised that there were no adequate sights or no tracer shells in the loaded strips so we could not tell where the bullets were going. We then had to procure some incendiary tracer bullets and unload every third cartridge and replace it with tracer. What a job!

I note that my time in *Gatinais* started on August 2nd, 1940. I also note that we sailed for our first voyage to Sheerness, which was to be our base, on August 4th. This first venture was not relaxing. We cleared Southampton in thick fog, through mine-infested, unfamiliar waters, with charts that we weren't sure were up to date. We did arrive in Sheerness okay, and after a day or two storing ship and embarking a balloon and the RAF crew to look after it, we sailed again on what was to be our regular duty of escorting small coastal convoys through that part of the English Channel off Dover known as 'Hell's Corner.' Our run was to be from Sheerness at the mouth of the Thames, to Falmouth in Cornwall. This was ultimately changed to Sheerness to Southampton. When we formed this 'Mobile Balloon Barrage,' as it was eventually

titled, no Allied cargoes had passed through the English Channel for five to six weeks due to the threat of German bombing. This situation could not be allowed to continue!

Our first passage with a convoy was not without incident. We sailed from Sheerness on August 7th, and early the next morning we were attacked in the dark by German E-boats, which were heavily gunned, large, fast naval attack craft. I think a couple of small ships in the convoy were sunk well astern of us. When daylight came we all got back in formation and settled down until noon, when a large formation of German aircraft appeared overhead and promptly shot down all our balloons! This was unsettling in the extreme in that we then expected a heavy bombing attack to take place on our ships in the convoy. The immediate problem of losing our balloon was that 2,000 feet of steel wire rope suddenly fell onto the deck of the ship and into the water close astern—an immediate danger to our propeller. In the event, we were able to quickly reel in the wire with the power winch.

I should explain that the convoys consisted of fifteen or twenty ships steaming along in a very narrow swept channel, in two columns with the balloon ships interspersed amongst the cargo ships. Consequently, when we lost our balloons we looked just like any other ship in the convoy and therefore likely targets for the bombers. In the event, a few fighter-bombers flew in to strafe some ships and a few bombs were dropped. The convoy was ordered to scatter and we were ordered to proceed to Falmouth.

We reached Falmouth the next day and spent about a week there making minor repairs and shipping a new balloon. We then began the return journey in short overnight passages.. We finally got back to Southampton and rejoined our group. On August 21st we started back for 'Hell's Corner' and Sheerness with another convoy. Early the next day, when we were in the narrowest part of the Channel, the convoy came under fire of some very large guns from the Cap Gris Nez area on the coast of France. We were subjected to a heavy bombardment for three hours, followed soon after (25-30 minutes) by a heavy bombing raid. None of our little ships were hit by either the artillery or the bombing, but it sure scared the hell out of us!

Because of the shelling from the German guns on the French coast, our convoy sailings were changed to put us past Dover (the closest point) in darkness. To our surprise this did not stop the shelling. In spite of the darkness, the Germans seemed to know just when the first ship would come in range of their guns and would stop firing when the last ship got too far away. It wasn't until our captain met a pal of his ashore one evening who was serving in one of the guardships anchored in the mouth of the Thames River that we found out how they did it. Said pal mentioned that he knew we were arriving in Sheerness that morning because he 'saw' us rounding the corner to enter the river sometime after midnight the night before. Lt. Davies, our captain, wanted to know how he could have possibly known that, and, in strict confidence, was told that these guardships we had been seeing in the Estuary, with great big bedspring-like antenna hanging all over them, were in fact among the first, very basic radar ships. Radar was called Radio Direction Finding (RDF) then, and we had never heard of it or even imagined something like that was possible.

It followed that, if we had radar, so probably did the Germans, and they were probably ranging on our balloons which were flying at 1500 to 2000 feet. The obvious solution was to haul the balloons down as low as possible, about 50 feet, and deny the enemy the information he needed. This was done subsequently and, while it didn't stop them

US Coast Guard



ABOVE LEFT – Landing Craft Infantry (Large) head toward the Normandy Invasion beaches on D-Day towing barrage balloons which will be deployed as protection against low flying German aircraft. **ABOVE RIGHT** – Landing craft unloading supplies during the invasion under the protection of barrage balloons. **BELOW RIGHT** – An impressionistic painting by Eric Ravilious (1903-1942) of small warships leaving harbour with a balloon in tow. (This was the only image I was able to locate specifically of the Channel Mobile Balloon Barrage. Ed.)

shooting, it certainly made them less accurate. Since we had to use the mine-free swept channel, the gunners knew the range within very close limits. They also knew when we sailed from either end of the run, so they could work out the approximate time we would be within range. We on the other hand, could vary the speed of advance to some extent and so not be in the exact place in the channel at the time calculated. It was still pretty scary through 'Hell's Corner,' but we never had one ship hit directly, although a few suffered damage and one officer was killed on the bridge of one of the balloon ships when hit by shrapnel.

That pattern of bombing by day and shelling by night persisted for the next nine months. The Battle of Britain had started in August with raids on one of our convoys as well as attacks on the coastal towns and dockyards. September and October 1940, were particularly difficult. We were attacked every time we made the Channel passage.

One particular occasion *Gatinais* was somewhat separated from the rest of the ships and was attacked by four fighter-bombers with both bombs and machine guns. These aircraft were in fact fighters which carried two bombs apiece and were armed with 20mm cannons. Every crew member in the ship could man our Hotchkiss guns on the bridge, and when the alarm was sounded unexpectedly, the nearest man rushed to the nearest gun and started firing. On this particular day all three of us officers were on the bridge when the planes attacked so I ended up manning one gun and my pal George Ogilvy, I think, manned the other.

At any rate we shot one aircraft down, a not inconsiderable feat considering the primitive sights we had. After the action I found a tear in the right sleeve of my duffel coat where a cannon shell had come through the gun barrel slot in my gun shield and nicked my sleeve. Another shell had penetrated the steel wall in my cabin and landed in the middle of my bunk!

It is difficult to describe one's thoughts and feelings in a situation like this. As I remember, it was a lovely day, sunny and calm, but with the

ever-present possibility of an attack by the enemy. In view of that contingency, I had remained on deck after turning over the watch, just in case of action stations. When it happened, the adrenaline started to flow. I grabbed the gun, found the target, and started firing. In retrospect, it seems that a form of hysteria set in. I remember shouting epithets at the German pilots as we were firing at each other. A few seconds later, when it was all over, the fear set in as the realisation of the danger became apparent, along with the relief that you got away with it this time.

To be continued...


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Book reviews



A Review by Peter Chance

THREE PRINCES ARMED LUXURY LINERS TO WARSHIPS

By Robert Darlington and Fraser McKee, self-published by Bob Darlington, 224 pp, numerous photographs and illustrations, index, soft cover, ISBN 978-0-9810274-0-1. Price \$25 if mailed within Canada; \$30 in mailed to the USA; \$35 to UK or other international addresses. Order direct from F. M. McKee, Ste. 2104 Barclay Terrace, 1320 Islington Ave., Etobicoke, ON M9A 5C6, email fmck22@rogers.com, phone 416-237-1301, or from R. A. Darlington, 1820 Merida Place, Victoria, BC V8N 5C9, email robadar@telus.net or phone 250-477-6390.

monopoly on the West Coast triangle ferry route between Vancouver, Victoria and Seattle, with the construction and operation of three luxury Prince liners named after the members of Sir Henry's board, including one for himself. They were only partially successful, having been overtaken by the economic collapse of the Great Depression. By 1939, with a 'white elephant' sobriquet, all three were purchased by the Department of National Defence. With their lives revitalized they would become valued complements to Canada's hugely expanding navy.

Whether outfitted as Armed Merchant Cruisers, Anti-Aircraft Cruisers or Landing Ships Infan-

The initial impression is one of thoroughness of research and eye appeal. The layout, many photos and illustrations, the appropriate lines from classic prose as an opener to each chapter, the personal comments from wartime crew members, the list of credits and a very good index — all add to the value of this exciting and engaging book about the three all-but-forgotten *Princes*, *Henry*, *David* and *Robert*. Initially peacetime luxury liners, the ships were converted to wartime workhorses in various valuable roles, but went on to only partial success in postwar service with two of them being reconverted to passenger liners. A few edits in the first fifty pages, which do not detract from the force of the story, have been passed to the authors.

While the book's prime purpose is to tell the stories of the wartime activities of these ships, the pre- and postwar peacetime lives of the three vessels is an intriguing and very well told preface and finale. Moreover, the comments of former crew members add a special flavour of authenticity to the ship's wartime accounts.

The essential backdrop to this story is, as the authors dub it, "the well described involvement of the would be empire builder Sir Henry Thornton." With the success of his Canadian National Steamships 'Lady Boats' on the Halifax–West Indies passenger and trade runs, he then challenged the Canadian Pacific's British Columbia Coastal Steamships'

try, with service stretching from the Aleutians to the relief of Hong Kong and participating in D-Day, as well as operations in the Mediterranean from the south of France to Greece, their Canadian naval contribution during WWII makes for an exciting and hitherto unknown and unsung story.


Once again, the team of Darlington and McKee has produced a quality book. This one surely must be added to the lexicon of Canadian naval history. It is a thoroughly enjoyable read for, not only all of us with continuing naval connections, but also for the layman with a thirst for maritime history.

Peter is a member of NOAVI, residing in Sidney, BC.

Postscript by Robert Darlington – Fraser McKee and I have collaborated on another book. It is the full historiography of the three Prince ships. There are eight chapters in 224 pages. The first two deal with Sir Henry Thornton of CN Steamships, and the background of the decision to acquire them. The next four chapters deal with their wartime lives including West Coast and Caribbean patrols, the capture of the German ship *Weser*, Hong Kong, the Aleutians, conversions, Normandy and Dragoon landings, Biscayne convoys, Greek waters and Hong Kong again. The final two chapters cover their postwar lives. We leaned heavily on a 1965 DHist paper, Fraser's research, plus interviews dating back 20 years. Sadly, many of those interviewed have passed on.



Illustration by Bill Sloan, showing HMCS *Prince Robert* outfitted as an anti-aircraft cruiser.



A Review by Jan Drent

SPY WARS: Moles, Mysteries & Deadly Games

By Tennant H. Bagley, Yale University Press (2007),
xii + 312 pp, appendices, notes, index. Hardcover
US\$28, paperback US\$17, ISBN 978-0-300-13624-1.

Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko, a KGB defector, died peacefully at age 80 in the United States on August 23, 2008. Nosenko had first covertly contacted the CIA in 1962 while part of the Soviet Disarmament Delegation in Geneva talks, and then on returning to Russia passed on information from within the KGB for two years. He finally defected during another visit to Geneva in January 1964 and was flown to the US. Nosenko had passed on intriguing information including details about how the CIA's chief informant within the KGB had been unmasked, that Lee Harvey Oswald had not in fact, been used by the KGB who had concluded that he was unstable, and information about how the construction of the new American Moscow embassy then under way, included an extensive system of 'bugs.' Once in the hands of the CIA in Virginia, Nosenko began a lengthy period of questioning. There were differing opinions within the Agency about whether he was a genuine defector. A credible earlier defector, Golitysn, had warned that the KGB would export a series of bogus defectors and this information, along with apparent inconsistencies in Nosenko's stories, coloured his interrogators' views.

One of the CIA's principal case officers was Tennant ("Pete") Bagley who had been sent to Geneva to conduct the first interview with Nosenko back in 1962, and remained closely involved with this defector until 1966 when Bagley was transferred abroad. Pete Bagley comes from a distinguished naval family — two of his brothers became the first sibling four star Admirals — and he had served in the US Marine Corps at the end of the Second World War. He was a career CIA officer for twenty-two years, and has many insider stories to tell in this book. Typical is an account of how he and another CIA officer smuggled a different defector out of Vienna on a train through the Soviet Occupation Zone by boxing him as 'machinery' and loading him in the baggage car.

Determined to prove that Nosenko was a KGB plant, Bagley and his colleagues eventually incarcerated him in a small purpose-built cell where he was fed porridge and weak tea, and a light bulb was kept burning. He was given a lengthy polygraph test. This treatment was found later to have contravened the CIA founding charter, but Nosenko apparently did not change his story. The author says very little about this phase of Nosenko's four year incarceration by the Agency, but is certain that had he not been transferred abroad, Nosenko would not have been officially rehabilitated. In fact, the defector was finally awarded \$150,000 in compensation and settled somewhere in the southern USA under a new name where he married an American woman. (Bagley says that he eventually had two American wives after going through

three back in the USSR.) Nosenko returned periodically to Virginia to give lectures to CIA audiences and to act as a consultant on the KGB.

During their first interview, Bagley discovered that Nosenko spoke good English. While the author does not sketch in Nosenko's personal history beyond mentioning that he was married with daughters, he apparently had a privileged youth as a son of Stalin's longtime Minister of Shipbuilding. His story offers an illuminating insight into the class structure of the USSR. Yuri Nosenko was an indifferent student at the special schools available for the children of the *Nomenklatura*, the privileged layer of officials and academics, and he owed his entry into the KGB to an introduction by his father

to one of its generals at the family dacha in 1953. One of the inconsistencies which triggered Bagley's suspicions was Nosenko's own embroidering of his importance and status within the KGB. He seems to have been a relative lightweight in comparison with other defectors.

So was he a genuine turncoat who casually left his wife and daughters behind? Tennant Bagley thinks not, and buttresses his book with an independent account by another defector (in fact the one shipped out of Vienna as 'machinery') who questions Nosenko's credentials. In another appendix, Bagley dissects in detail the inconsistencies in Nosenko's versions of events. The readers may conclude that the Nosenko case was closed because it was a way of resolving the sharp differences of opinion between various factions within the CIA, itself a huge bureaucracy.

Tennant Bagley, by then retired from the CIA and running his own security business, was able to meet several former KGB officers after the collapse of the USSR. They confirmed his conclusion that Nosenko was a deliberate plant. Bagley's cumulative evidence raises doubts about the officially-accepted version of Nosenko's defection.

On the other hand, two credible former KGB members corroborate Nosenko's status as a genuine turncoat. The authoritative Vasili Mitrokhin (*The Mitrokhin Archive*, 1999) describes Nosenko as genuine, and cites KGB follow-up after his defection including a plan to have him assassinated if he were to visit the World's Fair in Montréal in 1967. Mitrokhin emigrated to the UK in 1991 after the collapse of the Soviet Union, bringing voluminous notes with him based on decades of study of the KGB files which had been entrusted to his care as an Agency archivist. Oleg Gordievsky defected to the UK in 1985 after working for 12 years for the British as a penetration agent at senior levels inside the KGB. In *KGB: The Inside Story* (1990), coauthored by an authoritative Cambridge academic, Christopher Andrew (also co-author of *The Mitrokhin Archive*), Gordievsky describes Nosenko as a defector and cites various pieces of intelligence he brought to the west.

Tennant Bagley writes in a fluid style. The reader is introduced to many agents from both sides, but the author has provided a helpful appendix with capsule histories. While he describes in passing several CIA operations against the Warsaw Pact, Bagley's focus throughout is on Yuri Nosenko, the self-proclaimed defector whose first interview with the CIA had been with the author.

This is then an authoritative insider's account of a chapter in the CIA's history which remains murky. It should appeal to those with an interest in how the CIA operated between the sixties and the end of the USSR.



Answer to Schober's Quiz #44 on page 11

ANSWER:

HMS *Calcutta*, flagship of the North American and West Indies Station. She was under the command of Captain A. B. Cunningham, RN, (later Admiral of the Fleet Viscount Cunningham of Hyndhope, First Sea Lord from 1943 to 1946). At the time she was a 4,910 ton light-cruiser of the 'Carlisle' Class, mounting a main armament of five 6 inch guns.¹

At 1029 on 8 August 1922, HMS *Raleigh* weighed and proceeded from Hawke's Bay, Newfoundland, bound for Forteau Bay, Labrador, on the north shore of the Strait of Belle Isle, ETA 1615. She was a 9,750 ton heavy-cruiser of the 'Cavendish' Class, later known as the 'Hawkins' Class, mounting seven 7.5 inch guns as main armament. An almost brand new ship, commissioned barely a year before, on 23 July 1921, under the command of Captain Arthur Bromley, RN, for service as flagship of the North America and West Indies Station, based on Bermuda. She was a sister-ship of HMS *Effingham*, lost through grounding in Norwegian waters in May 1940. (See Schober's Quiz #39, Vol. VII, No. 39, Summer 2007, 'Starshell,' pages 8 and 22)

While *Raleigh* was on a routine "showing the flag" cruise to the Canadian Maritimes, Newfoundland and Labrador — the latter two then British colonies — her purpose in calling at Forteau was for her officers to get in some salmon and trout fishing. Indeed, generations of RN officers had often sailed there in the past for the fishing. History does not record, however, whether Captain Bromley knew that on 16 September 1889, HMS *Lily*, a 720 ton gunboat calling at Forteau for the same reason, had missed the entrance to the Bay in fog and run aground, becoming a total wreck and losing seven of her crew.

At 1520, an iceberg was sighted about three miles on the port beam. Shortly afterwards, *Raleigh* entered thick fog and speed was reduced to six knots. Contrary to popular belief, Captain Bromley was on the bridge, along with the ship's Navigating Officer, Commander (N) Leslie Bott² and Sub-Lieutenant C. E. Lambe³, the Officer of the Watch.

At 1538, breakers were sighted on the starboard bow. The engines were immediately put "full astern." The Captain shouted "Put the helm over," exclaiming to the Navigating Officer "Good God, Bott, where are we?" The OOW instantly ordered "Hard-a-starboard"⁴ down the voice pipe, followed by "Pipe hands to collision stations."

But it was too late. Barely a minute later *Raleigh* struck the rocks at the mouth of Forteau Bay, about a half-mile north-west of Point Amour Lighthouse. When it became clear that going "full astern" on both engines would not free the ship, the port engine was put "full ahead" to keep the stern off the reef. On his way aft from the bridge the Captain gave the abortive order to get the stream anchor⁵ out, to prevent the ship from being swung beam on to the shore. It was in vain: pushed by a heavy sea and the strong South-West wind, *Raleigh* was quickly swung abeam on to the rocky shore.

The starboard pulling cutter was then lowered to take a line ashore. It was manned with a scratch crew of a Midshipman, 4 seamen and 9 stokers inexperienced in boat work. Lowered in haste, it was not properly fended off and repeatedly crashed into the heavily rocking ship, being partially stove in before entering the water. Then the sinking cutter drifted onto a rock ledge and the panic-stricken crew jumped



HMS *Raleigh* at Bermuda in 1922, wearing the flag of Vice-Admiral Sir William Pakenham, C-in-C North America & West Indies Station.



Raleigh aground, photograph probably taken on 9 August 1922, the day after the grounding, as the weather was bad on the 10th, and there were only a handful of her crew left at the scene in the days after.



This was probably taken after the picture directly above, albeit not very long after, judging from the intact state of the ensign. Note the stream anchor still housed at the stern, which the captain had ordered out in vain.



HMS *Calcutta* as built. During 1938-39 she was radically converted to an A/A cruiser.

Obituaries

Compiled by Pat D. C. Barnhouse



We that survive perchance may end our days
In some employment meriting no praise;
They have outlived this fear, and their brave ends
Will ever be an honour to their friends.

Epitaph by Phineas James, Shipmaster, 'To his stricken comrades.' (1633)

■ Lt.(E) Réal J. A. ARSENAULT, RCN(R), (Ret'd)

Montréal Br., 81 in Montréal 21/05/08. UNTD Cdt.(E) '50, SLt.(E) '54, and all at Donnacona. Srv'd. in *Swansea*, *Crescent*, *Naden*, *Stadacona*, *Quebec* and *Cayuga*. Athlone Scholarship in UK 1953-55, and with RNVr, HMS *Eraham* and HMS *Relentless*. On Ret'd. List by '57. Civ. Career at MIL and Hydro Québec. (*LaPresse*, PDCB)

■ LCdr. Leon Rex CARR, CD*, RCN (Ret'd)

NOAVI, 83 in Victoria 06/02/08. Jn'd. RCNVR as SLt. in '44 and srv'd. *Dundas*. Trsf'd. RCN as Lt. 15/07/45, to *Stadacona*, RN for trg., and thence *Stadacona* (Comm. Cse.) in '49, *Ontario* in '51 and *Niobe* in '52. Prom. LCdr. 15/07/53, fill'd. by *Stadacona* (FLAGLANT), *Lanark* as XO in '56, *Niagara* in '57 and *Bytown* in '60. Ret'd. in '69. (*Times-Colonist*, JA, PDCB)

■ Cdr. Ernest Maurice CHADWICK, MiD, CD*, RCN (Ret'd)

Former NOAVI, 87 in Victoria 19/05/08. Jn'd. RN Vindictive Program in '38, Mid. 09/39 in HMS *Revenge*, and tsf'd. RCN as SLt. 05/41. Prom. Lt. 08/42 and srv'd. *Skeena* (MiD), *Gatineau* i/c in '43, and thence *Uganda* as XO, fill'd. by *Naden* 11/45. To *Royal Roads* as XO in '49, prom. LCdr. 01/08/50, and *Bytown* in '51, *Nootka* i/c 12/54, and *Naden* in '56. Prom. Cdr. 01/07/57, *Saguenay* i/c in '59, thence *Bytown* in '61 and EASTLANT in '65. Ret'd. '68. (*Times-Colonist*, *Globe & Mail*, JA, PDCB)

■ Con. LCdr. Ferguson FINLAY, CD*, RCN (Ret'd)

Ottawa Br., in Alexandria, VA, 16/01/08. Direct entry Nav. Arch. Draftsman as Cmd. Con. 0 01/56, srv'd. *Bytown*, thence RN for trg. in '58, back to *Bytown* in '59 and prom. Con. Lt. 01/60. Attached *Niobe* for Oberon s/m purchase and prom. Con. LCdr. 07/64. Further service in NDHQ and *Niagara*. Ret'd. in '80. (PDCB)

■ LCdr.(L) John Umstead GRAHAM, CD*, RCN (Ret'd)

Former NOAVI, 78 in Powell River, BC, 07/02/08. Jn'd. RCN in '40s, thence Cadet(L) under CTP at *Brunswick* 01/09/51. SLt.(L) 01/06/55 and *Stadacona* (Long L Cse.), thence Dky'd. Hfx. Prom. Lt.(L) 02/57 and *Haida* 01/58. *Stadacona* for 1st Wpns. Cse., fill'd. by wpns. duties in *Fraser*, *St. Laurent* and 2nd Escort Squn. Prom. LCdr. 01/01/65 and ret'd. '74 (*Times-Colonist*, JA, PDCB)

■ Lt.(S) Trevor Frederick HEARD, MID, RCNVR (Ret'd)

NOAVI, 86 in Victoria 30/07/08. OS Wtr. '41 and CFR'd '42 at *Naden*, thence *Bytown* as Casualty Officer. Prom. Lt.(S) 11/43, fill'd. by SO *Strathadam*, *La Hullose* and *Stadacona*. Rls'd. 01/46. Life Mbr. HMCS *York*, fill'd. industrial business career and was a jazz buff. (*Times-Colonist*, JA, PDCB)

■ Cdr. Charles Ellis HEARN, CD (CIC)

Ottawa Br., 79 in Ottawa 02/01/08. Longtime Sea Cadet, Sea Cadet officer and CPO RCN(R) with over 32 years service. (*Citizen*)

■ Surg. Capt. Ross B. IRWIN, DFM, CD*, RCN (Ret'd)

Former NOAVI, in Victoria 15/07/08. WWII RAF, jn'd. *York* in '49 with seniority as Surg. Lt. of 15/12/49. To *Beacon Hill* in '51, thence *Athabaskan* in '52 for Korea. Prom. Surg. LCdr. 15/12/53 and to *Bytown* followed by *Stadacona*. Prom. Surg. Cdr. 01/07/61, thence i/c three of four DND military hospitals. (*Times-Colonist*, JA, PDCB)

■ Lt. H. W. B. (Barry) MANNING, RCNVR (Ret'd)

Winnipeg Br., 88 in Winnipeg 07/07/08. Jn'd. '42 and prom. Lt. 10/43. Srv'd. in *Kings*, *Winnipeg* and *Coppercliff*. Rls'd. in '45. Civilian career as corporate lawyer and mem-

ber many boards incl. Winnipeg Blue Bombers. (*Free Press*, PDCB)

■ Surg. Cdr. John Robert MOORE, CD, RCN (Ret'd)

Montréal Br., 92 in Oromocto, NB, 07/07/08. Jn'd. RCNVR 06/42 as Surg. SLt. and prom. Surg. Lt. Srv'd. *Naden*, *Chippawa* and *Montreal*, thence RN 12/43 for HMS *Montgomery*, HMS *Drake*, rescue ships HMRS *Goodwin* and *Empire Lifeguard*, fill'd by HMS *Hogue* and RNB *Devonport*. Thence *Stadacona* and *Donnacona* to rls. 01/46. Jn'd. *Discovery* as Surg. LCdr. RCN(R) 07/54, prom. Surg. Cdr. 01/1/57, and thence *Donnacona* 05/60 as PMO. Ret'd. 28/10/63. Civilian career as surgeon at Royal Victoria Hospital and McGill. (*Globe & Mail*, PDCB)

■ Capt. Charles Patrick NIXON, DSC, MiD*, GCLJ, Legion d/Honneur, CD*, RCN (Ret'd)

Ottawa Br., 90 in Ottawa 16/08/08. Cdt. entry '35 and RN for trg. (Mid. in HMS *Exeter*). Prom. SLt. '39, thence *St. Laurent*, *Kings* (XO), and in '43 i/c *Chaudière*. Imm. postwar *Crescent* i/c, fill'd. by duty with RN in '47, *Bytown* in '49 and prom. to Cdr. 01/01/51. Back to RN in '51, thence *Magnificent* as XO and *Bytown* in '54. Prom. Capt. 01/07/55 and srv'd. SAFLANT. *Bytown*, *Gatineau* as Cdr. 5th Escort Sqd'n., and back to *Bytown* in '63. Ret'd. in '65. (*Citizen*, RN, PDCB)

■ Inst. LCdr. Rudolphe Leonard Miller PICARD, CD, RCN (Ret'd)

Montréal Br., 93 in Montréal 16/08/08. RCNVR SLt.(SB) 28/01/43, Lt.(SB) 28/01/43, Instr. Lt. 27/06/44. Srv'd. *Cornwallis*, *Bytown*, *Naden*, *Stadacona* and *Donnacona*. Rls'd. 06/46. Jn'd. RCN(R) at *Donnacona* as Instr. Lt. 06/46 and prom. Instr. LCdr. 26/10/48. Tsf'd. RCN as Instr. LCdr. '51 and srv'd. *Montcalm*, *D'Iberville*, *Magnificent*, *Stadacona*, *Bytown* (for CMR), *Donnacona* and *Hochelaga*. Rls'd. 07/01/65. Bronze Medalion 1981. (*Citizen*, FD, PDCB)

■ LCdr.(O) Harold Lewis PICKERING, CD*, RCN (Ret'd)

Toronto Br., 85 in Cochrane, ON, 26/07/08. OS RCNVR 05/41, thence Prob. SLt. 08/43 to *Stadacona*, *Prevost*, *Cornwallis*, *Kings* and SLt. 04/44 at *York* and *Cornwallis*. Prom. A/Lt. 02/45 and srv'd. *Stadacona*, *Niobe*, HMS *St. Vincent* (O Trn'g.) RNAS *Arbroath* and RNAS *Rattray*. Lt.(O) 05/46 in *Warrior* and *Stadacona*. Rls'd. 10/46. Jn'd. *York* as Lt.(O) RCN(R) 12/46, thence SSA 07/49 and srv'd. *Carleton*, *Shearwater*, 826 Sqd'n (duty with USN), *Magnificent* (VS-881 as Snr.O). Prom. LCdr.(O) 05/55 to *Stadacona* and XO *Saguenay* '58, thence XO *Athabaskan*, fill'd. by *York* (RCAF Staff College) and NDHQ. Ret'd. 1968. (FF, 'Canada's Naval Aviators')

■ LCdr. Harold Barry RUSSELL, RCN (Ret'd)

Former NSNOA, 75 in Halifax 12/03/08. Jn'd. UNTD in *Prevost* 01/52, thence SLt. RCN(R) and Lt. 09/56. Tsf'd. RCN as Lt. in '58 and srv'd. *Swansea*, *Stadacona* (JOLTC) in '59, and *Restigouche*. XO *Quinte* '62, fill'd. by XO *Victoriaville* '64. Prom. LCdr. 01/01/65, thence *Stadacona* (FLAGLANT). Ret'd. '66. Civ. career as investment broker. (*Chronicle Herald*, SR, PDCB)

■ Cdr.(S) Douglas Elliot SAMSON, CD*, RCN (Ret'd)

Ottawa Br., 85 in Victoria 31/01/08. Srv'd. WWII and jn'd. RCN as SLt.(S) 05/46 in *Stadacona*. Prom. Lt.(S) 09/47, thence *Bytown*, *Quebec* and *Stadacona*. LCdr.(S) 19/04/54, fill'd. by *Bytown*, *St. Laurent*, *Stadacona* and *Bytown*. Prom. Cdr. 01/01/62 and ret'd. '73. Long association with RCNBF and Exec. Sec. Admirals' Medal 1995-04. Bronze Medallion '83 and Silver '06. (*Times-Colonist*, JA, PDCB)

In Memoriam (Non Members)

■ Cdr. Peter John BALLARD, OMM, CD, RCN (Ret'd)

62 in Ottawa 03/08/08. Jn'd. as Cdt. 09/64 (*Hunter*). No further details. (*Citizen*)

■ LCdr. Edward Arthur BURKE, CD**, RCN (Ret'd)

80 in Ottawa 01/08/08. Srv'd. RN WWII, thence RCN '49 for Sup. Rad. CFR'd 28/08/59 and Lt. 01/63. Srv'd. in *Gloucester* and northern radio stn's. Ret'd. '82. (*Citizen*, PDCB)

■ Lt.(S) Caroline Helen EVANS (nee CATE), WRCNS (Ret'd)

In Kanata, ON, 25/07/08. Jn'd. '43 and Lt. 20/03/44. Srv'd. *Stadacona* and *Niobe*. Rls'd. '46. (*Citizen*, PDCB)

■ Cdr.(E) Kenneth George HARRISON, CD*, RCN (Ret'd)

72 in Victoria, 15/03/08. Jn'd. '52 first Tech. Apprentice intake. Cdt. 01/09/57, SLt.

01/05/61, Lt. 23/08/63. Srv'd. *Terra Nova*, *Algonquin*, *Cornwallis*, *Bonaventure* and RN (*Manadon*). Ret'd. '82. (*Times-Colonist*, JA, PDCB)

■ LCdr.(S) Leslie Andrew JACKSON, CD*, RCN (Ret'd)

90 in Victoria 20/07/08. Jn'd. RCN in '37 and Wt. SO 03/44. Lt.(S) 02/50 and LCdr.(S) 02/58. Srv'd. ashore both coasts in *Preserver* (1st) and *Ontario*, and in *Gloucester*. Ret'd. '68. (*Times-Colonist*, JA, PDCB)

■ Lt.(L) Egerton W. KING, RCNVR (Ret'd)

89 Red Deer 21/08/08. Jn'd. '43, Lt.(L) 08/44, srv'd. *Bytown*, and rls'd. '45. (*G&M*)

■ Lt. Jean A. MacKENZIE (nee BARKER), WRCNS (Ret'd)

85 in Vancouver 04/07/08. Jn'd. '44 and prom. Lt. 26/02/45. Srv'd. in *Stadacona* and rls'd. '45. (*Globe & Mail*, PDCB)



Schober's Quiz #44

CONTINUED FROM PAGE 22

overboard into the icy, fuel-oil-covered water. Thankfully, they were the only casualties suffered as result of the grounding.

Space considerations preclude a detailed account of subsequent events concerning the abandonment of HMS *Raleigh*, and the repatriation of her ship's company to England. Suffice to say that she was gradually de-stored and her armament and all movable deck fixtures salvaged.

In October 1922, Capt. Bromley, Cdr. Bott and SLt. Lambe were court-martialed in the Royal Naval Barracks, Portsmouth. The Captain was reprimanded and dismissed his ship. The Navigating Officer was severely reprimanded and dismissed his ship. Both officers retired soon afterwards. SLt. Lambe was acquitted, to pursue a distinguished career rising to First Sea Lord.

But, five years after her grounding, there was a new problem with the abandoned *Raleigh*, as later recorded by Admiral Cunningham. "The ship was fast on the rocks, and a Canadian professor who often made the voyage through the Straits [of Belle Isle] had written to the Admiralty suggesting that the wreck should be blown up, as the sight of it lying there apparently undamaged caused much derision among his American fellow passengers at the expense of the Royal Navy. So we [HMS *Calcutta*] had been ordered to destroy her, and were given an unlimited allowance of depth-charges to do so..."

"[In July 1927] We anchored in Forteau Bay, Labrador, our first sight of the *Raleigh* having shown us how right the professor was. Except for the absence of guns and a rusty side the ship looked quite undamaged. ... Her destruction proved a tough proposition. She was strongly built; but by blowing our way down to the magazines and putting the charges there we finally made a complete job of it."⁶

But Admiral Cunningham was wrong; they had not made a complete job of it! The various salvage and demolition operations conducted by the British did not clear all unexploded ordnance — mostly 7.5 inch shells — from the wreck, raising concerns about potential safety hazards. When Newfoundland and Labrador joined Canada, the fore-going became a Canadian problem and it was the responsibility of the Canadian Navy to clear it up. The task was assigned to a naval explosives ordnance disposal team from the Fleet Diving Unit (Atlantic). The job was carried out periodically during 2003, 2004 and 2005, being completed in June 2005, when a navy spokesman announced the latest round of detonations had left only about 10 to 12 shells below the surface. Eighty-three years after her deplorable loss, the ghost of HMS *Raleigh* was finally laid to rest.

¹ On 25 June 1940, HMS *Calcutta* collided with HMCS *Fraser* in the Gironde River estuary causing the latter to sink. She was in turn sunk by German aircraft off the Egyptian Coast on 1 June 1941.

² He was a full Commander by virtue of the fact he also served as Fleet Navigating Officer of the North America and West Indies Station.

³ Later Admiral of the Fleet Sir Charles E. Lambe, First Sea Lord 1959-1960.

⁴ At this time, all steering orders were given in terms of reference to the helm, i.e., the tiller. It followed that if the order "starboard" was given, it meant that the tiller was hypothetically moved to the starboard side of the vessel, while in actual fact the rudder, wheel and ship's head were moved to port. This archaic and confusing system was officially replaced with the present method of steering orders in the late 1920s.

⁵ Prior to the early 1920s, RN heavy-cruisers and above carried an anchor at the stern, called the "stream anchor." It was smaller than the bower anchors and not provided with chain cable, a wire hawser having to be attached instead, which was worked from the after capstan. Consequently, getting out the stream anchor was a slow and laborious operation.

⁶ A. B. Cunningham, Viscount Cunningham of Hyndhope, *A Sailor's Odyssey*, p.129.

The NOAC Endowment Fund KEEP GOING FOR THE GLORY!

This is the key message being sent to all members for the 2008 Endowment Fund Campaign.

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